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Inductive Logic.Vincenzo Crupi - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):641-650.details
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Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind.Matteo Colombo, Lee Elkin & Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):185-220.details
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Bayesian Cognitive Science, Monopoly, and Neglected Frameworks.Matteo Colombo & Stephan Hartmann - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2):451–484.details
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Getting Accurate about Knowledge.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind 132 (525):158-191.details
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Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
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Big Systems Versus Stocky Tangles: It Can Matter to the Details.Nancy Cartwright - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (1):3-19.details
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Interpreting enthymematic arguments using belief revision.Georg Brun & Hans Rott - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4041-4063.details
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Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.details
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Infinitism and probabilistic justification.Benjamin Bewersdorf - 2014 - Synthese 191 (4):691-699.details
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Truth in Evidence and Truth in Arguments without Logical Omniscience.Gregor Betz - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1117-1137.details
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What Makes Something Surprising?Dan Baras & Oded Na’Aman - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):195-215.details
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Varieties of Justification—How (Not) to Solve the Problem of Induction.Marius Backmann - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (2):235-255.details
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Explicating the Concept of Epistemic Rationality.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - Synthese (1-2):1-26.details
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Better Foundations for Subjective Probability.Sven Neth - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Non-Ideal Decision Theory.Sven Neth - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeleydetails
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Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Lockean Thesis.Paul Silva - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
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Rethinking the Acceptability and Probability of Indicative Conditionals.Michał Sikorski - 2022 - In Stefan Kaufmann, Over David & Ghanshyam Sharma (eds.), Conditionals: Logic, Linguistics and Psychology. Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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On Strengthening the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision: Proper Ordinal Interval Operators.Jake Chandler & Richard Booth - 2018 - In Michael Thielscher, Francesca Toni & Frank Wolter (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR2018). pp. 210-219.details
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Thou Shalt Not Squander Life – Comparing Five Approaches to Argument Strength.Simon Wells, Marcin Selinger, David Godden, Kamila Dębowska-Kozłowska & Frank Zenker - 2023 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 68 (1):133-167.details
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David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems.Sven Ove Hansson (ed.) - 2013 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Rational Suspension.Alexandra Zinke - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1050-1066.details
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Introduction to the special issue “Logical perspectives on science and cognition”.Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Peter Brössel, Alexander Gebharter & Markus Werning - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1381-1390.details
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Credence for conclusions: a brief for Jeffrey’s rule.John R. Welch - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2051-2072.details
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Reasoning and Deducing.Markos Valaris - 2018 - Mind 128 (511):861-885.details
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Do Ceteris Paribus Laws Exist? A Regularity-Based Best System Analysis.Matthias Unterhuber - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S10):1833-1847.details
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Philosophy of Science in Germany, 1992–2012: Survey-Based Overview and Quantitative Analysis.Matthias Unterhuber, Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):71-160.details
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A Utility Based Evaluation of Logico-probabilistic Systems.Paul D. Thorn & Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):867-890.details
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Unanimous Consensus Against AGM?Rush T. Stewart - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):222-231.details
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Learning and Pooling, Pooling and Learning.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):1-21.details
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Causal concepts and temporal ordering.Reuben Stern - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 27):6505-6527.details
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The epistemic account of ceteris paribus conditions.Wolfgang Spohn - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (3):385-408.details
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Three kinds of worlds and two kinds of truth.Wolfgang Spohn - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1335-1359.details
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How the Modalities Come into the World.Wolfgang Spohn - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (1):89-112.details
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Epistemic justification: its subjective and its objective ways.Wolfgang Spohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3837-3856.details
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Defeasible normative reasoning.Wolfgang Spohn - 2019 - Synthese:1-38.details
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Defeasible normative reasoning.Wolfgang Spohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1391-1428.details
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A Ranking‐Theoretic Approach to Conditionals.Wolfgang Spohn - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1074-1106.details
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The logic of epistemic justification.Martin Smith - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3857-3875.details
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The Hardest Paradox for Closure.Martin Smith - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):2003-2028.details
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Risky belief.Martin Smith - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):597-611.details
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The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):917-939.details
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Ranking Theory and Conditional Reasoning.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (4):848-880.details
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Relevance differently affects the truth, acceptability, and probability evaluations of “and”, “but”, “therefore”, and “if–then”.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, David Kellen, Hannes Krahl & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (4):449-482.details
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Relevance and Reason Relations.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, Henrik Singmann & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S5):1202-1215.details
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Norm Conflicts and Conditionals.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, David Kellen, Ulrike Hahn & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2019 - Psychological Review 126 (5):611-633.details
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Conditionals and the Hierarchy of Causal Queries.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, Simon Stephan & Michael R. Waldmann - 2021 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 1 (12):2472-2505.details
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The Ramsey Test and Evidential Support Theory.Michał Sikorski - 2022 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 31 (3):493-504.details
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Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8069-8090.details
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