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Overmathematisation in game theory: pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme against the Epistemic Programme.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):290-300.details
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Keep 'hoping' for rationality: A solution to the backward induction paradox.Alexandru Baltag, Sonja Smets & Jonathan Alexander Zvesper - 2009 - Synthese 169 (2):301 - 333.details
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Keep ‘hoping’ for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox.Alexandru Baltag, Sonja Smets & Jonathan Alexander Zvesper - 2009 - Synthese 169 (2):301-333.details
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The epistemic structure of a theory of a game.Michael Bacharach - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (1):7-48.details
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Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.details
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In a Weakly Dominated Strategy Is Strength: Evolution of Optimality in Stag Hunt Augmented with a Punishment Option.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (1):29-59.details
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Response to Bonanno and Nehring.Robert Stalnaker - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (3):297-299.details
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Subjunctive conditionals and revealed preference.Brian Skyrms - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):545-574.details
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Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games.Robert Stalnaker - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (2):133.details
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Grappling With the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction for BI-Terminating Games.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (1):95-126.details
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Dynamic Epistemic Logic I: Modeling Knowledge and Belief.Eric Pacuit - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (9):798-814.details
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Rational beliefs in rationalizability.Xiao Luo - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):189-198.details
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On the Epistemic Foundation for Iterated Weak Dominance: An Analysis in a Logic of Individual and Collective attitudes.Emiliano Lorini - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (6):863-904.details
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A minimal logic for interactive epistemology.Emiliano Lorini - 2016 - Synthese 193 (3):725-755.details
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On the logic of common belief and common knowledge.Luc Lismont & Philippe Mongin - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (1):75-106.details
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Two Paradoxes of Common Knowledge: Coordinated Attack and Electronic Mail.Harvey Lederman - 2018 - Noûs 52 (4):921-945.details
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Perplexing expectations.Alan Hájek & Harris Nover - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):703 - 720.details
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Strategic Reasoning: Building Cognitive Models from Logical Formulas.Sujata Ghosh, Ben Meijering & Rineke Verbrugge - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (1):1-29.details
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Game Theoretic Pragmatics.Michael Franke - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (3):269-284.details
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Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics.Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.) - 2014 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.details
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Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2010 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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A Computational Learning Semantics for Inductive Empirical Knowledge.Kevin T. Kelly - 2014 - In Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.), Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics. Springer International Publishing. pp. 289-337.details
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When Do Introspection Axioms Matter for Multi-Agent Epistemic Reasoning?Wesley H. Holliday, Yifeng Ding & Cedegao Zhang - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:121–139.details
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A syntactic approach to rationality in games with ordinal payoffs.Giacomo Bonanno - 2008 - In Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge (eds.), Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory. Amsterdam University Press.details
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