- Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
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“I Am the Original of All Objects”: Apperception and the Substantial Subject.Colin McLear - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (26):1-38.details
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Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.details
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On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:35-104.details
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From Introspection to Essence: The Auditory Nature of Inner Speech.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2018 - In Peter Langland-Hassan & Agustín Vicente (eds.), Inner Speech: New Voices. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Self Shows Up in Experience.Matt Duncan - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):299-318.details
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(1 other version)The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy.Thomas Metzinger - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4:931.details
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Schizophrenia and the Place of Egodystonic States in the Aetiology of Thought Insertion.Pablo López-Silva - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):577-594.details
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Difficulties for extending Wegner and colleagues’ model of the sense of agency to deficits in delusions of alien control.Glenn Carruthers - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 5 (3):126-141.details
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Mineness without Minimal Selves.M. V. P. Slors & F. Jongepier - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):193-219.details
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Authorship of thoughts in thought insertion: What is it for a thought to be one's own?Max Seeger - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):837-855.details
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(1 other version)When actions feel alien: An explanatory model.Timothy Lane - 2014 - In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Singapore: Springer Science+Business. pp. 53-74.details
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(1 other version)When actions feel alien: An explanatory model.Timothy Lane - 2014 - In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Singapore: Springer Science+Business. pp. 53-74.details
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The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence.Stan Klein - 2014 - Oxford University Press.details
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The comparator account on thought insertion, alien voices and inner speech: some open questions.Agustin Vicente - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):335-353.details
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Embodied Normativity: Revitalizing Hegel’s Account of the Human Organism.Barbara Merker - 2012 - Critical Horizons 13 (2):154 - 175.details
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The self and its brain.Stan Klein - 2012 - Social Cognition 30 (4):474-518.details
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Out of nowhere: Thought insertion, ownership and context-integration.Jean-Remy Martin & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):111-122.details
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(1 other version)Self‐Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Can “I” prevent you from entering my mind?Marc Champagne - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):145-162.details
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Strong Interaction and Self-Agency.Shaun Gallagher - 2011 - Humana Mente 4 (15):55-76.details
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The Elusive Experience of Agency.Robert E. Briscoe - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267.details
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How to integrate dreaming into a general theory of consciousness—A critical review of existing positions and suggestions for future research.Jennifer M. Windt & Valdas Noreika - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1091-1107.details
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A problem for Wegner and colleagues' model of the sense of agency.Glenn Carruthers - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):341-357.details
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Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Self-Experience.Darryl Mathieson - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (2):523-539.details
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A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.details
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The Sense of Self in the Phenomenology of Agency and Perception.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13.details
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The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.details
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Kant and the phenomenon of inserted thoughts.Garry Young - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837.details
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Delusion, dissociation and identity.Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.details
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Mental causation and the agent-exclusion problem.Terry Horgan - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):183-200.details
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In Defense of Introspective Affordances.David Miguel Gray - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.details
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What is it like to lack mineness? Depersonalization as a probe for the scope, nature and role of mineness.Alexandre Billon - 2023 - In M. Guillot & M. Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), Self-Experience: Essays on Inner Awareness. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 314-342.details
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(1 other version)Inner Speech.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2021 - WIREs Cognitive Science 12 (2):e1544.details
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Me and I are not friends, just Acquaintances: On thought Insertion and Self-Awareness.Pablo López-Silva - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):319-335.details
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Psychopathy: Morally Incapacitated Persons.Heidi Maibom - 2017 - In Thomas Schramme & Steven Edwards (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Medicine. Springer. pp. 1109-1129.details
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Combining Minds: A Defence of the Possibility of Experiential Combination.Luke Roelofs - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Torontodetails
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I'm thinking your thoughts while I sleep: sense of agency and ownership over dream thought.Melanie Rosen - 2015 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 2 (3):326-339.details
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(1 other version)Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279-295.details
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Names, Descriptions, and Assertion.Ray Buchanan - 2014 - In Zsu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer. pp. 03-15.details
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Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 29-54.details
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Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion.Alexandre Billon - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.details
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Technology and the Body: the (Im)Possibilities of Re-embodiment. [REVIEW]Helena De Preester - 2011 - Foundations of Science 16 (2-3):119-137.details
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Fractured phenomenologies: Thought insertion, inner speech, and the puzzle of extraneity.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):369-401.details
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Thoughts, motor actions, and the self.Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):22–43.details
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The natural philosophy of agency.Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):347–357.details
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Delusional beliefs and reason giving.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew R. Broome - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.details
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We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency.Deborah Tollefsen & Shaun Gallagher - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2):95-110.details
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How anxiety induces verbal hallucinations.Matthew Ratcliffe & Sam Wilkinson - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 39:48-58.details
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