- Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Self-Experience.Darryl Mathieson - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.details
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Introspection, mindreading, and the transparency of belief.Uwe Peters - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1086-1102.details
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Interpretive sensory-access theory and conscious intentions.Uwe Peters - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):583–595.details
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Technology and the Body: the (Im)Possibilities of Re-embodiment. [REVIEW]Helena De Preester - 2011 - Foundations of Science 16 (2-3):119-137.details
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Reconstructing the minimal self, or how to make sense of agency and ownership.Sanneke de Haan & Leon de Bruin - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):373-396.details
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Commentary on Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen.Glenn Carruthers - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):515 - 520.details
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Can “I” prevent you from entering my mind?Marc Champagne - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):145-162.details
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The nature of representation and the experience of oneself: A critical notice on Gottfried Vosgerau's Mental Representation and Self-Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):411 - 425.details
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Difficulties for extending Wegner and colleagues’ model of the sense of agency to deficits in delusions of alien control.Glenn Carruthers - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 5 (3):126-141.details
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A problem for Wegner and colleagues' model of the sense of agency.Glenn Carruthers - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):341-357.details
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The sense of agency – a phenomenological consequence of enacting sensorimotor schemes.Thomas Buhrmann & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):207-236.details
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The Elusive Experience of Agency.Robert E. Briscoe - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267.details
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Delusional beliefs and reason giving.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew R. Broome - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.details
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A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.details
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Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion.Alexandre Billon - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.details
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The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.details
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Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-Awareness. [REVIEW]Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - Synthese 159 (3):475 - 491.details
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Me and I are not friends, just Acquaintances: On thought Insertion and Self-Awareness.Pablo Lopez-Silva - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):319-335.details
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Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 29-54.details
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From Introspection to Essence: The Auditory Nature of Inner Speech.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2018 - In Peter Langland-Hassan & Agustín Vicente (eds.), Inner Speech: New Voices. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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First-person belief and empirical certainty.David B. Martens - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):118-136.details
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First-Person Perspective and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - In Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. [Place of publication not identified]: Ontos Verlag. pp. 245-272.details
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Psychopathy: Morally Incapacitated Persons.Heidi Maibom - 2017 - In Thomas Schramme & Steven Edwards (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Medicine. Springer. pp. 1109-1129.details
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Kant and the phenomenon of inserted thoughts.Garry Young - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837.details
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How to integrate dreaming into a general theory of consciousness—A critical review of existing positions and suggestions for future research.Jennifer M. Windt & Valdas Noreika - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1091-1107.details
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Accounting for the phenomenology and varieties of auditory verbal hallucination within a predictive processing framework.Sam Wilkinson - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:142-155.details
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Descartes discarded? Introspective self-awareness and the problems of transparency and compositionality☆.Markus Werning - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):751-761.details
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Thoughts, motor actions, and the self.Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):22–43.details
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Authorship and Control over Thoughts.Gottfried Vosgerau & Martin Voss - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):534-565.details
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The comparator account on thought insertion, alien voices and inner speech: some open questions.Agustin Vicente - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):335-353.details
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We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency.Deborah Tollefsen & Shaun Gallagher - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2):95-110.details
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Beyond the comparator model: A multi-factorial two-step account of agency.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.details
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Thought insertion: Abnormal sense of thought agency or thought endorsement?Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.details
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Making Sense of an Endorsement Model of Thought‐Insertion.Michael Sollberger - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):590-612.details
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Authorship of thoughts in thought insertion: What is it for a thought to be one's own?Max Seeger - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):837-855.details
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On the Phenomenon of Inserted Thoughts: A Critique of Shaun Gallagher’s Neurophenomenological Account of Thought Insertion.Steve Schofield - 2006 - Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 6 (2):1-10.details
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Consciousness, the self and bodily location.David M. Rosenthal - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):270-276.details
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Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-Awareness.Johannes Roessler - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):541-557.details
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How anxiety induces verbal hallucinations.Matthew Ratcliffe & Sam Wilkinson - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 39:48-58.details
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Thinking of oneself as the same.Joëlle Proust - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):495-509.details
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Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
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Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness and self across waking and dreaming: bridging phenomenology and neuroscience.Martina Pantani, Angela Tagini & Antonino Raffone - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):175-197.details
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Self‐Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2010 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.details
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Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control.Shaun Gallagher - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):865-879.details
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Wegner on hallucinations, inconsistency, and the illusion of free will. Some critical remarks.Gerben Meynen - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):359-372.details
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The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy.Thomas Metzinger - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4:931.details
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Embodied Normativity: Revitalizing Hegel’s Account of the Human Organism.Barbara Merker - 2012 - Critical Horizons 13 (2):154 - 175.details
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On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:35-104.details
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Thought insertion as a disownership symptom.Michelle Maiese - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):911-927.details
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