Despite the criticism of Karl Popper's falsifiability theory for the demarcation between science and non-science, mainly pseudo-science, this criterion is still very useful, and perfectly valid after it was perfected by Popper and his followers. Moreover, even in his original version, considered by Lakatos as "dogmatic", Popper did not assert that this methodology is an absolute demarcation criterion: a single counter-example is not enough to falsify a theory; a theory can legitimately be saved from falsification by introducing an auxiliary hypothesis. (...) Compared to Kuhn's theory of revolutions, which he himself later dissociated from it transforming it into a theory of "micro-revolutions," I consider that Popper's demarcation methodology, along with the subsequent development proposed by him, including the corroboration and the verisimilitude, though imperfect, is not only valid today, but it is still the best demarcation methodology. For argumentation, I used the main works of Popper dealing with this issue, and his main critics and supporters. After a brief presentation of Karl Popper, and an introduction to the demarcation problem and the falsification methodology, I review the main criticisms and the arguments of his supporters, emphasizing the idea that Popper has never put the sign of equality between falsification and rejection. Finally, I present my own conclusions on this issue. CONTENTS -/- Abstract Introduction 1 The demarcation problem 2 Pseudoscience 3 Falsifiability 4 Falsification and refutation 5 Extension of falsifiability 6 Criticism of falsifiability 7 Support of falsifiability 8 The current trend Conclusions Bibliography Notes -/- DOI: 10.58679/MM99220. (shrink)

În această lucrare argumentez faptul că, în ciuda criticilor teoriei falsificabilității propuse de Karl Popper pentru demarcarea între știință și ne-știință, în principal pseudoștiință, acest criteriu este încă foarte util, și perfect valabil după perfecționarea lui de către Popper și adepții lui. Mai mult, chiar și în versiunea sa inițială, considerată de Lakatos ca ”dogmatică”, Popper nu a afirmat că această metodologie este un criteriu absolut de demarcare: un singur contra-exemplu nu este suficient pentru a falsifica o teorie; mai mult, (...) o teorie poate fi salvată în mod legitim de falsificare prin introducerea unei ipoteze auxiliare. În comparație cu teoria lui Kuhn a revoluțiilor, de care el însuși s-a dezis ulterior transformând-o într-o teorie a ”micro-revoluțiilor”, consider că metodologia de demarcare a lui Popper, împreună cu dezvoltarea ulterioară propusă de acesta, inclusiv coroborarea și verosimilitudinea, deși imperfectă, nu numai că este valabilă și azi, dar este încă cea mai bună metodologie de demarcare. Pentru argumentare, m-am folosit de principalele lucrări ale lui Popper care tratează această problemă, și a principalilor săi critici și susținători. După o scurtă prezentare a lui Karl Popper, și o introducere în problema demarcației și metodologia falsificabilității, trec în revistă principalele critici aduse și argumentele susținătorilor săi, accentuând pe ideea că Popper nu a pus niciodată semnul egalității între falsificare și respingere. În final prezint propriile concluzii în această problemă. -/- DOI: 10.58679/TW55590. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Levy, Gadd, Kerridge, and Komesaroff attempt to defend the ethicality of homeopathy by attacking the utilitarian ethical framework as a basis for medical ethics and by introducing a distinction between evidence-based medicine and modern science. This paper demonstrates that their argumentation is not only insufficient to achieve that goal but also incorrect. Utilitarianism is not required to show that homeopathic practice is unethical; indeed, any normative basis of medical ethics will make it unethical, as a defence (...) of homeopathic practice requires the rejection of modern natural sciences, which are an integral part of medical ethics systems. This paper also points out that evidence-based medicine lies at the very core of modern science. Particular arguments made by Levy et al. within the principlist medical ethics normative system are also shown to be wrong. (shrink)

The paper is an overview of the connections between scientific psychology and religion. The thesis that scientific psychology, which deals with empirical research of all manifestations of spirituality and religiousness within the different principles and contexts of culture, cannot refer to the doctrine of religion, but it should take into account in its research the cultural aspects of the religion without valuing them at the individual human level and their influence on the "fate" of the world, is being discussed. Conclusion: (...) Against the background of the twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon psychology, based on the positivist paradigm, there is no place on the basis of valid methodological canons for building a direct relationship between scientific psychology and religion. (shrink)

The results of forensic science are believed to be reliable, and are widely used in support of verdicts around the world. However, due to the lack of suitable empirical studies, we actually know very little about the reliability of such results. In this paper, I argue that phenomena analogous to the main culprits for the replication crisis in psychology are also present in forensic science. Therefore forensic results are significantly less reliable than is commonly believed. I conclude that in order (...) to obtain reliable estimates for the reliability of forensic results, we need to conduct studies analogous to the large-scale replication projects in psychology. Additionally, I point to some ways for improving the reliability of forensic science, inspired by the reforms proposed in response to the replicability crisis. (shrink)

This study considers the short list of Nature of Science features frequently published and widely known in the science education discourse. It is argued that these features were oversimplified and a refinement of the claims may enrich or sometimes reverse them. The analysis shows the need to address the range of variation in each particular aspect of NOS and to illustrate these variations with actual events from the history of science in order to adequately present the subject. Another implication of (...) the proposal is the highlighting of the central role of science educators who, facing various strong claims of researchers in education and philosophy of science, often have difficulty in making a choice of what to teach about NOS. It is suggested that a representative variation with regard to the traditional NOS claims may be appropriate for a genuine understanding of the subject. In that, using the discipline-culture structure of the fundamental theories of physics and addressing the plurality of scientific methods may be helpful in the actual teaching and learning of NOS. (shrink)

Karl Popper (1902-1994) was one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century. He made significant contributions to debates concerning general scientific methodology and theory choice, the demarcation of science from non-science, the nature of probability and quantum mechanics, and the methodology of the social sciences. His work is notable for its wide influence both within the philosophy of science, within science itself, and within a broader social context. Popper’s early work attempts to solve the problem of (...) demarcation and offer a clear criterion that distinguishes scientific theories from metaphysical or mythological claims. Popper’s falsificationist methodology holds that scientific theories are characterized by entailing predictions that future observations might reveal to be false. When theories are falsified by such observations, scientists can respond by revising the theory, or by rejecting the theory in favor of a rival or by maintaining the theory as is and changing an auxiliary hypothesis. In either case, however, this process must aim at the production of new, falsifiable predictions. While Popper recognizes that scientists can and do hold onto theories in the face of failed predictions when there are no predictively superior rivals to turn to. He holds that scientific practice is characterized by its continual effort to test theories against experience and make revisions based on the outcomes of these tests. By contrast, theories that are permanently immunized from falsification by the introduction of untestable ad hoc hypotheses can no longer be classified as scientific. Among other things, Popper argues that his falsificationist proposal allows for a solution of the problem of induction, since inductive reasoning plays no role in his account of theory choice. Along with his general proposals regarding falsification and scientific methodology, Popper is notable for his work on probability and quantum mechanics and on the methodology of the social sciences. Popper defends a propensity theory of probability, according to which probabilities are interpreted as objective, mind-independent properties of experimental setups. Popper then uses this theory to provide a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, though its applicability goes beyond this specific case. With respect to the social sciences, Popper argued against the historicist attempt to formulate universal laws covering the whole of human history and instead argued in favor of methodological individualism and situational logic. Table of Contents 1. Background 2. Falsification and the Criterion of Demarcation a. Popper on Physics and Psychoanalysis b. Auxiliary and Ad Hoc Hypotheses c. Basic Sentences and the Role of Convention d. Induction, Corroboration, and Verisimilitude 3. Criticisms of Falsificationism 4. Realism, Quantum Mechanics, and Probability 5. Methodology in the Social Sciences 6. Popper’s Legacy 7. References and Further Reading a. Primary Sources b. Secondary Sources -/- . (shrink)

Philosophers of science have recently begun to pay more attention to scientific practice, moving away from the discipline’s focus on theories. The creation of the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice in 2006, as well as the emergence of scholarship on experimental practice (e.g. Sullivan 2009; 2010; 2016) as well as on the tools scientists use to construct explanations and theories (e.g. Feest 2011) all point to a disciplinary shift towards a more practice-conscious philosophy of science. In addition, scholars (...) are realizing the potential social relevance of philosophy of science and identifying the obstacles that stand in the way of realizing said potential (e.g. Douglas 2010). The aim of this dissertation is to propose a novel descriptive framework for philosophy of science, one that rests on the idea that scientific practice should be described as accurately as possible so that philosophical discussions of science rest on a solid descriptive base and can more easily be of use in engaging users and practitioners of science. The dissertation is organized along the stages of developing what I call the dynamic-iterative model of scientific practice. In chapter 1, I clarify the project’s philosophical background and outline six conditions of adequacy on a descriptive model of science. These conditions allow me to evaluate the three descriptive models reviewed in chapter 2. Chapter 3 combines Nickles’ problem-solving view of science (1981) with core insights from the heuristics and biases literature into a workable version of the dynamic-iterative model. I then apply the model to the case of place cell research in chapter 4 as a test of the model’s usefulness and applicability. In chapter 5 I evaluate the model with respect to my six conditions and assess its strengths and weaknesses. The dynamic-iterative model is a flexible descriptive framework that not only allows for more complete philosophical analyses of cases than other current models, but also supports important practical applications. (shrink)

Karl Popper, en tant que rationaliste critique, a été un opposant à toutes les formes de scepticisme, de conventionnalisme et de relativisme scientifique. En 1935, il a écrit Logik der Forschung. Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft, traduisant plus tard le livre en anglais et le publiant sous le titre The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), considéré comme un travail de pionnier dans son domaine. De nombreux arguments de ce livre sont dirigés contre les membres du « Cercle de Vienne », (...) tels que Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, Rudolph Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, Carl Hempel et Herbert Feigl. Popper est d'accord avec eux sur les aspects généraux de la méthodologie scientifique et sur leur méfiance à l'égard de la méthodologie philosophique traditionnelle, mais ses solutions ont été sensiblement différentes. Popper a largement contribué aux débats sur la méthodologie scientifique générale, la démarcation de la pseudo-science, la nature des probabilités et la méthodologie des sciences sociales. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.12087.57763. (shrink)

Karl Popper, as a critical rationalist, was an opponent of all forms of skepticism, conventionalism and relativism in science. A major argument of Popper is Hume's critique of induction, arguing that induction should never be used in science. But he disagrees with the skepticism associated with Hume, nor with the support of Bacon and Newton's pure "observation" as a starting point in the formation of theories, as there are no pure observations that do not imply certain theories. Instead, Popper proposes (...) falsifiability as a method of scientific investigation. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11481.36967 . (shrink)

This is a thesis about interdisciplinarity, scientific integration, and problem solving in sustainability science. Sustainability science is an emerging and highly interdisciplinary field that seeks to integrate vastly differentiated bodies of knowledge in addressing the challenge of transitioning contemporary societies towards sustainability. Interdisciplinarity is paramount. Interdisciplinarity in general, and in the context of sustainability science in particular, has often been associated with solving particular problems and problem solving is one important theme in this thesis. A central idea that is developed (...) is that of problem-feeding. Sometimes problems arise within one discipline that can only be solved with the help of another. This concept, that has predecessors in e.g. the work of Lindley Darden and Nancy Maull, is explored considerably. It is argued that in interdisciplinary contexts—such as sustainability science—where collaboration is sought it is important to maintain cross-boundary problem stability. That is to say, as the problem is transferred from one discipline to another transformations will often be necessary. These transformations then, need to be acceptable to all involved parties to maintain an active interdisciplinary connection. Another topic that is discussed both in the introductory essay and some of the papers included is that of scientific imperialism. Scientific imperialism—the infringement of one discipline upon the domain of another—is here suggested to be primarily a threat to in-terdisciplinary collaborations. A distinction is introduced between imperialist failures of expansionism and failures of replacement. These are labelled type-I and type-II imperialism respectively. Particular attention is devoted to the latter form. Type-II imperialism concerns cases where imperialist infringements fail as the imperial- izing framework replaces viable, or compatible alternatives. Such an error of replacement does, importantly, not imply that the framework or theory should be disregarded completely. This type of imperialist error can both be quite subtle, and damaging. For one, if one directs the attention to specific contexts knowledge is actually lost in the process. This is particularly serious in fields such as sustainability science that are, to such an large extent, aimed at influencing concrete policy. Finally, interdisciplinarity is difficult to achieve and in many cases represents a grand challenge in itself. There are however many different ways in which interdisciplinarity may be accomplished and different forms are suitable in different contexts. In a field such as sustainability science where complexity is such a prevalent feature, an inclusive, pluralist, approach is likely to be appropriate. (shrink)

This dissertation seeks to examine the validity of the justification commonly offered for a coercive (1) psychiatric intervention, namely that the intervention was in the ‘best interests’ of the subject and/or that the subject posed a danger to others. As a first step,it was decided to analyse justifications based on ‘best interests’ [the ‘Stage 1’ argument] separately from those based on dangerousness [the ‘Stage 2’ argument]. Justifications based on both were the focus of the ‘Stage 3’ argument. Legal and philosophical (...) analyses of coercive psychiatric interventions generally regard such interventions as embodying a benign paternalism occasioning slight, if any, ethical concern. Whilst there are some dissenting voices even at the very heart of academic and professional psychiatry, the majority of psychiatrists also appear to share such views. The aim of this dissertation is to show that such a perspective is mistaken and that such interventions raise philosophical and ethical questions of the profoundest importance.(2) The philosophical well-spring of the Stage 1 dissertation argument lay in an observation made by Philippa Foot (3) that the “… right to be let free from unwanted interference” is one of the most fundamental and distinctive rights of persons, a right which takes precedence over any “… action we would dearly like to take for his sake.” This – in conjunction with the recognition that some coercive psychiatric interventions are of a gravity as to result in the personhood of the subject being severely damaged if not destroyed – suggested that the concept of personhood play a central role in the formulation of the dissertation argument. For ease of analysis it was presumed that the term ‘person’ could be defined by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions of which ‘minimum levels of rationality’ and ‘ability to communicate’ were the only conditions relevant to the formulation of justifications for coercive psychiatric interventions. This presumption was explicated into a number of postulates which enabled the construction of a rigorous foundation on which to develop the dissertation argument. This argument then sought to determine whether psychiatric assessments of irrationality were accurate and reliable. In furtherance of this analysis it was necessary to examine the reliability of psychiatric determinations in other areas of claimed expertise namely diagnosis, treatment and assessment of dangerousness. This ‘crossing of the disciplinary threshold’ brought to light the dearth of studies on psychiatric misdiagnosis and iatrogenic harm. A variant of the Precautionary Principle was developed to enable the extent of such harms to be estimated. The not insignificant levels of psychiatric misdiagnosis and iatrogenic harm and erroneous assessments of dangerousness which were thus found are of considerable relevance to any ethical analysis of the justification for coercive psychiatric intervention and serve to undermine simple paternalistic justifications. --- (1)The term ‘coercive’ (rather than ‘non-consensual’) is used to indicate an intervention carried out against the explicit and contemporaneous objections of the subject (2)Not least because the number of individuals detained in Irish psychiatric hospitals is of a comparable order of magnitude to the number detained in Irish prisons subsequent to a criminal conviction (3)See Foot (1977), p.102. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn criticized falsifiability because it characterized "the entire scientific enterprise in terms that apply only to its occasional revolutionary parts," and it cannot be generalized. In Kuhn's view, a delimitation criterion must refer to the functioning of normal science. Kuhn objects to Popper's entire theory and excludes any possibility of rational reconstruction of the development of science. Imre Lakatos said that if a theory is scientific or non-scientific, it can be determined independently of the facts.He proposed a modification of (...) Popper's criterion, which he called "sophisticated (methodological) falsification". DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.30572.82568. (shrink)

A scientific theory, according to Popper, can be legitimately saved from falsification by introducing an auxiliary hypothesis to generate new, falsifiable predictions. Also, if there are suspicions of bias or error, the researchers might introduce an auxiliary falsifiable hypothesis that would allow testing. But this technique can not solve the problem in general, because any auxiliary hypothesis can be challenged in the same way, ad infinitum. To solve this regression, Popper introduces the idea of ​​a basic statement, an empirical statement (...) that can be used both to determine whether a given theory is falsifiable and, if necessary, to corroborate falsification assumptions. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22162.09923. (shrink)

Karl Popper, ca raționalist critic, a fost un oponent al tuturor formelor de scepticism, convenționalism și relativism în știință. În 1935 a scris Logica cercetării (Logik der Forschung. Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft), traducând ulterior cartea în engleză și publicând-o sub titlul The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) considerată ca o lucrare de pionierat în domeniu. Multe dintre argumentele din această carte sunt îndreptate împotriva membrilor "Cercului Vienez", precum Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, Rudolph Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, Carl Hempel și Herbert (...) Feigl. Popper este de acord cu aceștia cu privire la aspectele generale ale metodologiei științifice și neîncrederea lor în metodologia filosofică tradițională, dar soluțiile sale au fost semnificativ diferite. Popper a contribuit semnificativ la dezbaterile privind metodologia științifică generală, demarcarea științei de pseudoștiință, natura probabilității și metodologia științelor sociale. (shrink)

La falsifiabilité de Popper a été critiquée à la fois pour avoir exclu la science légitime et pour avoir accordé un statut scientifique aux pseudo-sciences. Selon Larry Laudan, « cela a la conséquence fâcheuse de considérer comme « scientifique » toute demande faisant de fausses allégations de manière concluante ». Certains reprochent à Popper en disant que sa théorie ne constitue pas une alternative légitime aux propositions inductives qu’il critique. Jeffrey soutient que le bayésianisme, qui insiste sur le point de (...) savoir dans quelle mesure les preuves empiriques appuient une hypothèse, est beaucoup plus proche de la pratique scientifique que la falsifiabilité de Popper. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.21235.27680. (shrink)

My dissertation titled Two Models of Consensus is based on five arguments. 1. Consensus is asymmetrical. 2. Consensus is partial or limited unanimity. 3. Consensus and democracy do have a concomitant relation. 4. Consensus is not organic to political systems. 5. Consensus depends upon civil society, subsidiarity, and the dominant cultural paradigm of society. In the first chapter titled "Historical Specificity of the Western Conception of Civil Society" I argue that concept of civil society evolved under certain conditions in a (...) liberal democratic tradition such as shared social imaginaries. As an example of how diversity could lead to hypostatization of cultural differences, I exposit the concept of Indian caste system. In the second chapter, "Intersubjectivity and the Problem of Cultural Identities", I compare the ideas of Hans Georg Gadamer and George Herbert Mead about self- interested action and mutual cooperative action. Gadamer and Mead emphasize intersubjective communication, I Thou relationships. I explain the importance of the I Thou relationship for a consensual activity. The third chapter, "Consensus in the Realm of Science", discusses the impact of science as the context of justification in advanced liberal democracies and its effect on consensus. Charles Sanders Peirces attempt to apply his scientific method to arrive at a consensus in the social sphere is also discussed in this chapter. In the fourth chapter, "Kwasi Wiredu The Akan Conception of Communitarian Consensus", I discuss Kwasi Wiredus emphasis on achieving a consensus on the basis of what is and not what ought to be, in the social realm. Wiredu differentiates between a government by consent and a government by consensus. I elaborate Wiredu's abakysis of the process of consensus that was in vogue in the Akan community of Ghana. In the final chapter, "Political Consensus - Intra-cultural and Extra-cultural," I argue that consensus is asymmetrical. It is imperative to compromise in social, political, economic, and religious beliefs on the basis of weak deontological and weak consequential approaches. Consensus necessitates a synthesis of different kinds of social actions such as purposive-instrumental, traditional, value-laden, and communicative action into what I call the Cooperative Action. Only such an action can speak across cultures and facilitate genuine cross-cultural interaction. (shrink)