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  1. Arrogance, Anger and Debate.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2):213-227.
    Arrogance has widespread negative consequences for epistemic practices. Arrogant people tend to intimidate and humiliate other agents, and to ignore or dismiss their views. They have a propensity to mansplain. They are also angry. In this paper I explain why anger is a common manifestation of arrogance in order to understand the effects of arrogance on debate. I argue that superbia is a vice of superiority characterised by an overwhelming desire to diminish other people in order to excel and by (...)
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  • Teaching Virtue: Changing Attitudes.Alessandra Tanesini - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (4):503-527.
    In this paper I offer an original account of intellectual modesty and some of its surrounding vices: intellectual haughtiness, arrogance, servility and self-abasement. I argue that these vices are attitudes as social psychologists understand the notion. I also draw some of the educational implications of the account. In particular, I urge caution about the efficacy of direct instruction about virtue and of stimulating emulation through exposure to positive exemplars.
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  • Intellectual Humility, Confidence, and Argumentation.Ian James Kidd - 2016 - Topoi 35 (2):395-402.
    In this paper, I explore the relationship of virtue, argumentation, and philosophical conduct by considering the role of the specific virtue of intellectual humility in the practice of philosophical argumentation. I have three aims: first, to sketch an account of this virtue; second, to argue that it can be cultivated by engaging in argumentation with others; and third, to problematize this claim by drawing upon recent data from social psychology. My claim is that philosophical argumentation can be conducive to the (...)
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  • Epistemic Virtues in Business.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 113 (4):583-595.
    This paper applies emerging research on epistemic virtues to business ethics. Inspired by recent work on epistemic virtues in philosophy, I develop a view in which epistemic virtues contribute to the acquisition of knowledge that is instrumentally valuable in the realisation of particular ends, business ends in particular. I propose a conception of inquiry according to which epistemic actions involve investigation, belief adoption and justification, and relate this to the traditional ‘justified true belief’ analysis of knowledge. I defend the view (...)
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  • On Cosmopolitan Humility and the Arrogance of States.Luis Cabrera - 2018 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-25.
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  • Arrogance, Anger and Debate.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.
    Alessandra Tanesini ABSTRACT: Arrogance has widespread negative consequences for epistemic practices. Arrogant people tend to intimidate and humiliate other agents, and to ignore or dismiss their views. They have a propensity to mansplain. They are also angry. In this paper I explain why anger is a common manifestation of arrogance in order to understand the...
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  • The Ethics of Reflexivity: Pride, Self-Sufficiency, and Modesty.Jeremy Fischer - 2016 - Philosophical Papers 45 (3):365-399.
    This essay develops a framework for understanding what I call the ethics of reflexivity, that is, the norms that govern attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth. I distinguish five central aspects of the reflexive commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals: the extent to which and manner in which one regards oneself from an evaluative point of view, the extent to which one cares about receiving the respect of others, the degree to which one interprets (...)
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  • "Calm Down, Dear": Intellectual Arrogance, Silencing and Ignorance.Alessandra Tanesini - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):71-92.
    In this paper I provide an account of two forms of intellectual arrogance which cause the epistemic practices of conversational turn-taking and assertion to malfunction. I detail some of the ethical and epistemic harms generated by intellectual arrogance, and explain its role in fostering the intellectual vices of timidity and servility in other agents. Finally, I show that arrogance produces ignorance by silencing others (both preventing them from speaking and causing their assertions to misfire) and by fostering self-delusion in the (...)
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  • Epistemic Vices in Public Debate: The Case of New Atheism.Ian James Kidd - 2017 - In Christopher Cotter & Philip Quadrio (eds.), New Atheism's Legacy: Critical Perspectives From Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 51-68..
    Although critics often argue that the new atheists are arrogant, dogmatic, closed-minded and so on, there is currently no philosophical analysis of this complaint - which I will call 'the vice charge' - and no assessment of whether it is merely a rhetorical aside or a substantive objection in its own right. This Chapter therefore uses the resources of virtue epistemology to articulate this ' vice charge' and to argue that critics are right to imply that new atheism is intrinsically (...)
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  • Epistemic Temperance.Paul Bloomfield - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):109-124.
    The idea of epistemic temperance is introduced and explicated through a discussion of Plato's understanding of it. A variety of psychological and epistemic phenomena are presented which arise due to epistemic intemperance, or the inappropriate influence of conations on cognition. Two cases familiar to philosophers, self-deception and racial prejudice, are discussed as the result of epistemic intemperance though they are not typically seen as having a common cause. Finally, epistemic temperance is distinguished from epistemic justice, as these have been conflated.
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  • Caring for Esteem and Intellectual Reputation: Some Epistemic Benefits and Harms.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:47-67.
    This paper has five aims: it clarifies the nature of esteem and of the related notions of admiration and reputation ; it argues that communities that possess practices of esteeming individuals for their intellectual qualities are epistemically superior to otherwise identical communities lacking this practice and that a concern for one's own intellectual reputation, and a motivation to seek the esteem and admiration of other members of one's community, can be epistemically virtuous ; it explains two vices regarding these concerns (...)
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  • Vícios Intelectuais E as Redes Sociais: O Acesso Constante À Informação Nos Torna Intelectualmente Viciosos?Felipe Rocha L. Santos - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):657.
    Muitos chamam a era em que atualmente vivemos como a Era da Informação. Isso porque vivemos em um mundo altamente conectado onde o fluxo de informação é constante. Uma das principais fontes de informação nos dias de hoje é a Internet, seja através de pesquisas no Google, seja através do testemunho de nossos amigos ou empresas em que confiamos, através das redes sociais. Este artigo visa realizar uma análise desde um ponto de vista da epistemologia social e de uma epistemologia (...)
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  • Hope for Intellectual Humility.Aaron D. Cobb - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):56-72.
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  • Why Can’T We Behave? Justice and Ethical Conduct in the Academy.Margaret Crouch - 2016 - Social Philosophy Today 32:7-26.
    The mantra of the Western philosopher is “know thyself.” However, many of us in the discipline of philosophy don’t seem to practice what we preach—or even preach this mantra. This is true in the conduct of our profession. The practices and norms of the members of an institution constitute that institution. If we are not rigorously self-examining ourselves, especially in the conduct of our professional lives, then the discipline of philosophy, the institution of philosophy as it exists in the West, (...)
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