- Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2315-2340.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):463-484.details
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Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
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Resolving to believe: Kierkegaard's direct doxastic voluntarism.Z. Quanbeck - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (2):548-574.details
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The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
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Inferences and the Right to Privacy.Jakob Mainz - 2024 - Journal of Value Inquiry 58 (4):563-581.details
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Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control.Blake Roeber - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):415-431.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism.Mark Boespflug & Elizabeth Jackson - 2024 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A defense of back‐end doxastic voluntarism.Laura K. Soter - 2025 - Noûs 59 (1):112-139.details
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In Search of Doxastic Involuntarism.Matthew Vermaire - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):615-631.details
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Acceptance and the ethics of belief.Laura K. Soter - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2213-2243.details
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(1 other version)Are We Pre-Theoretically Committed to Doxastic Voluntarism?Nikolaj Nottelmann, Anthony Booth & Rune Lomholt - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3):1077-1098.details
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The Ethics of Religious Belief.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Religious Studies Archives 1 (4):1-10.details
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Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?Blake Roeber - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):839-866.details
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(1 other version)What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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(1 other version)What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2021 - Sage Publications: Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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(1 other version)Are We Pre-Theoretically Committed to Doxastic Voluntarism?Nikolaj Nottelmann, Anthony Booth & Rune Lomholt - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3):1-22.details
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Involuntarism impugned?E. J. Coffman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-11.details
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Permission to believe is not permission to believe at will.Phillip Hintikka Kieval - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-12.details
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Resolving to believe: Kierkegaard's direct doxastic voluntarism.Z. Quanbeck - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (2):548-574.details
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A limitation on agency in judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-21.details
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Ought to believe vs. ought to reflect.Anthony Robert Booth - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.details
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I Know What You Will Do Next Summer: Informational Privacy and the Ethics of Data Analytics.Jakob Mainz - 2021 - Dissertation, Aalborg Universitydetails
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The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
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