- Revisionism about Free Will: A Statement and Defense.Manuel Vargas - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):45-62.details
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Philosophical methodology: The current debate.Anand J. Vaidya - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):391-417.details
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(Metasemantically) Securing Free Will.Jason Turner - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):295-310.details
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Temperament and intuition: A commentary on Feltz and Cokely.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Trevor Kvaran & Eddy Nahmias - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):351-355.details
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Distinguishing free will from moral responsibility when measuring free will beliefs: The FWS-II.Alec J. Stinnett, Jordan E. Rodriguez, Andrew K. Littlefield & Jessica L. Alquist - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Fresh starts.Helen Steward - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):197-217.details
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Cultural Variations in Folk Epistemic Intuitions.Finn Spicer - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):515-529.details
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Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):99-107.details
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More work for hard incompatibilism.Tamler Sommers - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.details
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More Work for Hard Incompatibilism1.Tamler Sommers - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.details
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Experimental philosophy and free will.Tamler Sommers - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):199-212.details
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Determinism, Moral Responsibility and Retribution.Elizabeth Shaw & Robert Blakey - 2019 - Neuroethics 13 (1):99-113.details
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Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: Muddled Intuitions and Biased Intuitions.Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1263-1281.details
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Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the Expertise Defense.Eric Schulz, Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.details
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The Lesson of Bypassing.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):599-619.details
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Neuroscientific Prediction and the Intrusion of Intuitive Metaphysics.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & Shaun Nichols - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (7).details
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Neuroscientific Prediction and the Intrusion of Intuitive Metaphysics.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & Shaun Nichols - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (2):482-502.details
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A Strawsonian look at desert.Adina L. Roskies & Bertram F. Malle - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):133-152.details
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Reductionism, Agency and Free Will.Maria Joana Rigato - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):107-116.details
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Belief in free will: Integration into social cognition models to promote health behavior.Tom St Quinton & A. William Crescioni - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Reductionism, Agency and Free Will.Joana Rigato - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):107-116.details
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Експериментальна філософія: Новий напрям у філософії та нові можливості для міждисциплінарних досліджень.Oleksiy V. Polunin - 2018 - Вісник Харківського Національного Університету Імені В. Н. Каразіна. Серія «Філософія. Філософські Перипетії» 58:13-28.details
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The phenomenon objection to conceptual engineering.Mark Pinder - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3281-3305.details
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Philosophy's New challenge: Experiments and Intentional Action.N. Ángel Pinillos, Nick Smith, G. Shyam Nair, Peter Marchetto & Cecilea Mun - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (1):115-139.details
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Self‐Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2010 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.details
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Frankfurt-Style Cases and Moral Responsibility: A Methodological Reflection.Koji Ota - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (3):295-319.details
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After incompatibilism: A naturalistic defense of the reactive attitudes.Shaun Nichols - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):405-428.details
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Replies to Critics.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):476-491.details
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Replies to critics.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):123-131.details
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Do we have a coherent set of intuitions about moral responsibility?Dana K. Nelkin - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):243–259.details
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Why 'Willusionism' Leads to 'Bad Results': Comments on Baumeister, Crescioni, and Alquist.Eddy Nahmias - 2009 - Neuroethics 4 (1):17-24.details
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Scientific Challenges to Free Will.Eddy Nahmias - 2010 - In C. Sandis & T. O'Connor (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 345-356.details
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It’s OK if ‘my brain made me do it’: People’s intuitions about free will and neuroscientific prediction.Eddy Nahmias, Jason Shepard & Shane Reuter - 2014 - Cognition 133 (2):502-516.details
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Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: Experiments on folk intuitions.Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.details
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The past and future of experimental philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.details
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The free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jason Shepard, Eddy Nahmias, Chandra Sripada & Lisa Thomson Ross - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 25:27-41.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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Positive Illusions, Perceived Control and the Free Will Debate.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Tatyana Matveeva - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (5):495-522.details
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On trying to save the simple view.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.details
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Intuitions About Free Will and the Failure to Comprehend Determinism.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Samuel Murray & Elise Dykhuis - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2515-2536.details
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Folk intuitions and the conditional ability to do otherwise.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Siyuan Yin & Rose Graves - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (7):968-996.details
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Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions : an essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 202–213.details
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Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions: An essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Adam Feltz - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):202-213.details
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Folk retributivism and the communication confound.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Saeideh Heshmati, Deanna Kaplan & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):235-261.details
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Effects of Manipulation on Attributions of Causation, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility.Dylan Murray & Tania Lombrozo - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (2):447-481.details
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Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.details
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A simple linguistic approach to the Knobe effect, or the Knobe effect without any vignette.Masaharu Mizumoto - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1613-1630.details
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Frankfurt and the folk: An experimental investigation of Frankfurt-style cases.Jason S. Miller & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):401-414.details
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Intuitions, reflective judgments, and experimental philosophy.Michael Hannon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4147-4168.details
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Holding Responsibility Hostage: Responsibility, Justification, and the Compatibility Question.Kelly McCormick - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (4):623-641.details
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