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  1. Knowledge From Falsehood, Ignorance of Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-13.
    According to the safety account of knowledge, one knows that p only if one’s belief could not easily have been false. An important issue for the account is whether we should only examine the target belief when evaluating whether a belief is safe or not. In this paper, it is argued that, if we should only examine the target belief, then the account fails to account for ignorance of necessary truths. But, if we should also examine beliefs in other relevant (...)
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  • Ways to Knowledge-First Believe.Simon Wimmer - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-17.
    On a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief, to believe p is to phi as if one knew p. I challenge this view by arguing against various regimentations of it. I conclude by generalizing my argument to alternative knowledge-first views suggested by Williamson and Wimmer.
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  • Dependent Reliability: Why And How Conditional Reliability Schould Be Replaced By It.Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-16.
    According to Alvin Goldman, reliabilists need to distinguish between uncondi-tionally and conditionally reliable processes. The latter category is used to account for processes such as reasoning or memory. In this paper, I will argue that Gold-man’s account of conditional reliability needs substantial revision in two respects. First, conditional reliability must be reinterpreted in terms of dependent reliability to avoid serious problems. Second, we need a more liberal account that allows dependently reliable processes to operate not only on doxastic but also (...)
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