Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Unjust Equal Relations.Andreas Bengtson - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-21.
    According to relational egalitarianism, justice requires equal relations. In this paper, I ask the question: can equal relations be unjust according to relational egalitarianism? I argue that while on some conceptions of relational egalitarianism, equal relations cannot be unjust, there are conceptions in which equal relations can be unjust. Surprisingly, whether equal relations can be unjust cuts across the distinction between responsibility-sensitive and non-responsibility-sensitive conceptions of relational egalitarianism. I then show what follows if one accepts a conception in which equal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Responsibility and the recursion problem.Ben Davies - 2021 - Ratio 35 (2):112-122.
    A considerable literature has emerged around the idea of using ‘personal responsibility’ as an allocation criterion in healthcare distribution, where a person's being suitably responsible for their health needs may justify additional conditions on receiving healthcare, and perhaps even limiting access entirely, sometimes known as ‘responsibilisation’. This discussion focuses most prominently, but not exclusively, on ‘luck egalitarianism’, the view that deviations from equality are justified only by suitably free choices. A superficially separate issue in distributive justice concerns the two–way relationship (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Luck egalitarianism and what valuing responsibility requires.Alexandra Couto - 2018 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 21 (2):193-217.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Tensions in Piketty’s Participatory Socialism: Reconciling Justice and Democracy.Andreas Albertsen & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2021 - Analyse & Kritik 43 (1):71-88.
    In the final parts of Piketty’s Capital and Ideology, he presents his vision for a just and more equal society. This vision marks an alternative to contemporary societies, and differs radically both from the planned Soviet economies and from social democratic welfare states. In his sketch of this vision, Piketty provides a principled account of how such a society would look and how it would modify the current status of private property through co-managed enterprises and the creation of temporary ownership (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Tough Luck and Tough Choices: Applying Luck Egalitarianism to Oral Health.Andreas Albertsen - 2015 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (3):342-362.
    Luck egalitarianism is often taken to task for its alleged harsh implications. For example, it may seem to imply a policy of nonassistance toward uninsured reckless drivers who suffer injuries. Luck egalitarians respond to such objections partly by pointing to a number of factors pertaining to the cases being debated, which suggests that their stance is less inattentive to the plight of the victims than it might seem at first. However, the strategy leaves some cases in which the attribution of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The Luck Egalitarianism of G.A. Cohen - A Reply to David Miller.Andreas Albertsen - 2017 - SATS 18 (1):37-53.
    The late G.A. Cohen is routinely considered a founding father of luck egalitarianism, a prominent responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. David Miller argues that Cohen’s considered beliefs on distributive justice are not best understood as luck egalitarian. While the relationship between distributive justice and personal responsibility plays an important part in Cohen’s work, Miller maintains that it should be considered an isolated theme confined to Cohen’s exchange with Dworkin. We should not understand the view Cohen defends in this exchange as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Shlomi Segall , Equality and opportunity: Oxford University Press, ISBN: 9780199661817. 240 pages, £ 35.Andreas Albertsen - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1345-1347.
    Review: Shlomi Segall (2013) Equality and opportunity.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Rare diseases in healthcare priority setting: should rarity matter?Andreas Albertsen - 2022 - Journal of Medical Ethics 48 (9):624-628.
    Rare diseases pose a particular priority setting problem. The UK gives rare diseases special priority in healthcare priority setting. Effectively, the National Health Service is willing to pay much more to gain a quality-adjusted life-year related to a very rare disease than one related to a more common condition. But should rare diseases receive priority in the allocation of scarce healthcare resources? This article develops and evaluates four arguments in favour of such a priority. These pertain to public values, luck (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Drinking in the last chance saloon: luck egalitarianism, alcohol consumption, and the organ transplant waiting list.Andreas Albertsen - 2016 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 19 (2):325-338.
    The scarcity of livers available for transplants forces tough choices upon us. Lives for those not receiving a transplant are likely to be short. One large group of potential recipients needs a new liver because of alcohol consumption, while others suffer for reasons unrelated to their own behaviour. Should the former group receive lower priority when scarce livers are allocated? This discussion connects with one of the most pertinent issues in contemporary political philosophy; the role of personal responsibility in distributive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Discrimination Based on Personal Responsibility: Luck Egalitarianism and Healthcare Priority Setting.Andreas Albertsen - 2024 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 33 (1):23-34.
    Luck egalitarianism is a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. Its application to health and healthcare is controversial. This article addresses a novel critique of luck egalitarianism, namely, that it wrongfully discriminates against those responsible for their health disadvantage when allocating scarce healthcare resources. The philosophical literature about discrimination offers two primary reasons for what makes discrimination wrong (when it is): harm and disrespect. These two approaches are employed to analyze whether luck egalitarian healthcare prioritization should be considered wrongful discrimination. Regarding (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A vaccine tax: ensuring a more equitable global vaccine distribution.Andreas Albertsen - 2022 - Journal of Medical Ethics 48 (10):658-661.
    While COVID-19 vaccines provide light at the end of the tunnel in a difficult time, they also bring forth the complex ethical issue of global vaccine distribution. The current unequal global distribution of vaccines is unjust towards the vulnerable living in low-income countries. A vaccine tax should be introduced to remedy this. Under such a scheme, a small fraction of the money spent by a country on vaccines for its own population would go into a fund, such as COVAX, dedicated (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • When bad things happen to good people: Luck egalitarianism and costly rescues.Jens Damgaard Thaysen & Andreas Albertsen - 2017 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 16 (1):93-112.
    According to luck egalitarianism, it is not unfair when people are disadvantaged by choices they are responsible for. This implies that those who are disadvantaged by choices that prevent disadvantage to others are not eligible for compensation. This is counterintuitive. We argue that the problem such cases pose for luck egalitarianism reveals an important distinction between responsibility for creating disadvantage and responsibility for distributing disadvantage which has hitherto been overlooked. We develop and defend a version of luck egalitarianism which only (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • When bad things happen to good people.Jens Damgaard Thaysen & Andreas Albertsen - 2017 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 16 (1):93-112.
    According to luck egalitarianism, it is not unfair when people are disadvantaged by choices they are responsible for. This implies that those who are disadvantaged by choices that prevent disadvantage to others are not eligible for compensation. This is counterintuitive. We argue that the problem such cases pose for luck egalitarianism reveals an important distinction between responsibility for creating disadvantage and responsibility for distributing disadvantage which has hitherto been overlooked. We develop and defend a version of luck egalitarianism which only (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Being Responsible and Holding Responsible: On the Role of Individual Responsibility in Political Philosophy.Lasse Nielsen & David V. Axelsen - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (4):641-659.
    This paper explores the role individual responsibility plays in contemporary political theory. It argues that the standard luck egalitarian view—the view according to which distributive justice is ensured by holding people accountable for their exercise of responsibility in the distribution of benefits and burdens—obscures the more fundamental value of being responsible. The paper, then, introduces an account of ‘self-creative responsibility’ as an alternative to the standard view and shows how central elements on which this account is founded has been prominently (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Abandoning the Abandonment Objection: Luck Egalitarian Arguments for Public Insurance.Carl Knight - 2015 - Res Publica 21 (2):119-135.
    Critics of luck egalitarianism have claimed that, far from providing a justification for the public insurance functions of a welfare state as its proponents claim, the view objectionably abandons those who are deemed responsible for their dire straits. This article considers seven arguments that can be made in response to this ‘abandonment objection’. Four of these arguments are found wanting, with a recurrent problem being their reliance on a dubious sufficientarian or quasi-sufficientarian commitment to provide a threshold of goods unconditionally. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Luck vs. Capability? Testing Egalitarian Theories.Akira Inoue, Kazumi Shimizu, Daisuke Udagawa & Yoshiki Wakamatsu - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):809-823.
    The issue of distributive justice receives substantial amount of attention in our society. On the one hand, we are sensitive to whether and the extent to which people are responsible for being worse off. On the other hand, we are mindful of society’s worst-off members. There has been a debate over luck egalitarianism, which relates to the former concern, and relational egalitarianism, which echoes the latter. By investigating the psychological processes of these two concerns, this paper examines the reliability of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • When Is Inequality Fair?Gideon Elford - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1205-1218.
    Recent literature on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism has suggested that an opposition to unchosen inequality on the grounds of unfairness is compatible with a range of accounts as to which inequalities are fair. I argue that forms of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism face a challenge in the construction of such accounts; namely to explain the fairness of such inequalities specifically, as opposed to their being merely justified in a broader sense. I illustrate the nature of this challenge through an interesting parallel with an issue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation