- Intentions are mental states.Jing Zhu & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242.details
|
|
The Conceptual Foundation of Morality.Gal Yehezkel - 2021 - Springer.details
|
|
Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
|
|
‘Ought’: The correct intention account.Heath White - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):297-317.details
|
|
Intention and Predicition in Means-End Reasoning.Stephen J. White - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):251-266.details
|
|
Moving Stories: Agency, Emotion and Practical Rationality.Dave Ward - 2019 - In Laura Candiotto (ed.), The Value of Emotions for Knowledge. Springer Verlag. pp. 145-176.details
|
|
Kant’s Deductions of Morality and Freedom.Owen Ware - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):116-147.details
|
|
What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.details
|
|
The Guise of the Good.J. David Velleman - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):3 - 26.details
|
|
Michael Bratman’s planning, time, and self-governance.J. David Velleman - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (9):913-925.details
|
|
Motivation by Ideal.J. David Velleman - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):89-103.details
|
|
Practical Knowledge and Foreseen Side Effects.Niels Van Miltenburg - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):1-7.details
|
|
Intentions and self-referential content.Tomis Kapitan - 1995 - Philosophical Papers 24 (3):151-166.details
|
|
We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency.Deborah Tollefsen & Shaun Gallagher - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2):95-110.details
|
|
What is the Hallé?Thomas H. Smith - 2005 - Philosophical Papers 34 (1):75-109.details
|
|
Knowing the Good and Knowing What One is Doing.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):91-117.details
|
|
Toward an ethics of professional understanding.Nicolas Tanchuk, Carly Scramstad & Marc Kruse - 2016 - Ethics and Education 11 (1):5-16.details
|
|
Paternalistic Lying and Deception.Andreas Stokke - 2018 - In Kalle Grill & Jason Hanna (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternalism. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Mental action and the epistemology of mind.Matthew Soteriou - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):83-105.details
|
|
Basic Action and Practical Knowledge.Will Small - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
|
|
Teleology and Normativity.Matthew Silverstein - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:214-240.details
|
|
Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good.Kieran Setiya - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.details
|
|
Internal Reasons.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - In Internal Reasons.details
|
|
Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.details
|
|
Anscombe on Practical Knowledge.Kieran Setiya - 2016 - In Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays. New York, New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
|
|
Endorsement and Autonomous Agency.François Schroeter - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):633-659.details
|
|
Epistemic ownership and the practical/epistemic parallelism.Jesús Navarro - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):163.details
|
|
Transparency and introspective unification.Kateryna Samoilova - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
|
|
Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):626-652.details
|
|
Is it rational to carry out strategic intentions?Michael H. Robins - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):191-221.details
|
|
‘Fine, Invisible Threads’: Schopenhauer on the Cognitively Mediated Structure of Motivation.Sean T. Murphy - 2022 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 4 (1):1-22.details
|
|
Epistemicism and Moral Vagueness.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Emotion.Charlie Kurth - 2022 - New York, NY: Routledge.details
|
|
Bounded Reflectivism and Epistemic Identity.Nick Byrd - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (1):53-69.details
|
|
How Humeans can make normative beliefs motivating.William Ratoff - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1245-1265.details
|
|
Intention: Hyperintensional Semantics and Decision Theory.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
|
|
Are Events Things of the Past?Julian Bacharach - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):381-412.details
|
|
Success and Knowledge in Action: Saving Anscombe’s Account of Intentionality.Markus Kneer - 2021 - In Tadeusz Ciecierski & Paweł Grabarczyk (eds.), Context Dependence in Language, Action, and Cognition. De Gruyter. pp. 131-154.details
|
|
Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):95-115.details
|
|
A plea for mental acts.Joëlle Proust - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):105-128.details
|
|
The Limits of Partial Doxasticism.Facundo M. Alonso - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):326-345.details
|
|
Authoritative Knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2475-2502.details
|
|
What Are Our Options?Douglas W. Portmore - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Acts, Attitudes, and Rational Choice.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Promêtheia as Rational Agency in Plato.Christopher Moore - 2020 - Apeiron 54 (1):89-107.details
|
|
Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.details
|
|
Trying Cognitivism: A Defence of the Strong Belief Thesis.Avery Archer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (2):140-156.details
|
|
On not getting out of bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.details
|
|