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Who's afraid of undermining?

Erkenntnis 57 (2):151-174 (2002)

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  1. Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: The Old Principal Principle Reconciled with the New.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):368–382.
    David Lewis (1980) proposed the Principal Principle (PP) and a “reformulation” which later on he called ‘OP’ (Old Principle). Reacting to his belief that these principles run into trouble, Lewis (1994) concluded that they should be replaced with the New Principle (NP). This conclusion left Lewis uneasy, because he thought that an inverse form of NP is “quite messy”, whereas an inverse form of OP, namely the simple and intuitive PP, is “the key to our concept of chance”. I argue (...)
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  • The Old Principal Principle Reconciled with the New.Peter B. M. Vranas - unknown
    [1] You have a crystal ball. Unfortunately, it’s defective. Rather than predicting the future, it gives you the chances of future events. Is it then of any use? It certainly seems so. You may not know for sure whether the stock market will crash next week; but if you know for sure that it has an 80% chance of crashing, then you should be 80% confident that it will—and you should plan accordingly. More generally, given that the chance of a (...)
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  • The Relation Between Credence and Chance: Lewis' "Principal Principle" Is a Theorem of Quantum Probability Theory.John Earman - unknown
    David Lewis' "Principal Principle" is a purported principle of rationality connecting credence and objective chance. Almost all of the discussion of the Principal Principle in the philosophical literature assumes classical probability theory, which is unfortunate since the theory of modern physics that, arguably, speaks most clearly of objective chance is the quantum theory, and quantum probabilities are not classical probabilities. Given the generally accepted updating rule for quantum probabilities, there is a straight forward sense in which the Principal Principle is (...)
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  • Principled Chances.Jonathan SchaAer - unknown
    There are at least three core principles that define the chance role: ill the Principal Principle, l21 the Basic Chance Principle, and l31 the Humean Principle. These principles seem mutually incompatible. At least, no extant account of chance meets more than one of them. I ofier an account of chance which meets all three: L~-chance. So the good news is that L~-chance meets ill — l31. The bad news is that L~-chance turns out unlawful and unstable. But perhaps this is (...)
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  • Varieties of Bayesianism.Jonathan Weisberg - manuscript
    Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 10, eds. Dov Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann, and John Woods, forthcoming.
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  • Chance and the Dynamics of de Se Beliefs.Christopher G. J. Meacham - 2007 - Dissertation, Rutgers
    How should our beliefs change over time? The standard answer to this question is the Bayesian one. But while the Bayesian account works well with respect to beliefs about the world, it breaks down when applied to self-locating or de se beliefs. In this work I explore ways to extend Bayesianism in order to accommodate de se beliefs. I begin by assessing, and ultimately rejecting, attempts to resolve these issues by appealing to Dutch books and chance-credence principles. I then propose (...)
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  • The Hume Literature, 2002.William Edward Morris - 2003 - Hume Studies 29 (2):381-400.
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  • Additivity Requirements in Classical and Quantum Probability.John Earman - unknown
    The discussion of different principles of additivity for probability functions has been largely focused on the personalist interpretation of probability. Very little attention has been given to additivity principles for physical probabilities. The form of additivity for quantum probabilities is determined by the algebra of observables that characterize a physical system and the type of quantum state that is realizable and preparable for that system. We assess arguments designed to show that only normal quantum states are realizable and preparable and, (...)
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  • Two Mistakes Regarding the Principal Principle.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):407-431.
    This paper examines two mistakes regarding David Lewis’ Principal Principle that have appeared in the recent literature. These particular mistakes are worth looking at for several reasons: The thoughts that lead to these mistakes are natural ones, the principles that result from these mistakes are untenable, and these mistakes have led to significant misconceptions regarding the role of admissibility and time. After correcting these mistakes, the paper discusses the correct roles of time and admissibility. With these results in hand, the (...)
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  • Three Proposals Regarding a Theory of Chance.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):281–307.
    I argue that the theory of chance proposed by David Lewis has three problems: (i) it is time asymmetric in a manner incompatible with some of the chance theories of physics, (ii) it is incompatible with statistical mechanical chances, and (iii) the content of Lewis's Principal Principle depends on how admissibility is cashed out, but there is no agreement as to what admissible evidence should be. I proposes two modifications of Lewis's theory which resolve these difficulties. I conclude by tentatively (...)
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  • Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance.Ned Hall - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.
    David Lewis's influential work on the epistemology and metaphysics of objective chance has convinced many philosophers of the central importance of the following two claims: First, it is a serious cost of reductionist positions about chance (such as that occupied by Lewis) that they are, apparently, forced to modify the Principal Principle--the central principle relating objective chance to rational subjective probability--in order to avoid contradiction. Second, it is a perhaps more serious cost of the rival non-reductionist position that, unlike reductionism, (...)
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  • On Background: Using Two-Argument Chance.Kevin Nelson - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):165-186.
    I follow Hájek (Synthese 137:273–323, 2003c) by taking objective probability to be a function of two propositional arguments—that is, I take conditional probability as primitive. Writing the objective probability of q given r as P(q, r), I argue that r may be chosen to provide less than a complete and exact description of the world’s history or of its state at any time. It follows that nontrivial objective probabilities are possible in deterministic worlds and about the past. A very simple (...)
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  • Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: The Old Principal Principle Reconciled with the New.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):368-382.
    David Lewis proposed the Principal Principle and a “reformulation” which later on he called ‘OP’. Reacting to his belief that these principles run into trouble, Lewis concluded that they should be replaced with the New Principle. This conclusion left Lewis uneasy, because he thought that an inverse form of NP is “quite messy”, whereas an inverse form of OP, namely the simple and intuitive PP, is “the key to our concept of chance”. I argue that, even if OP should be (...)
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  • Justifying Lewis’s Kinematics of Chance.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz009.
    In his ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’, Lewis argued that a particular kinematical model for chances follows from his principal principle. According to this model, any later chance function is equal to an earlier chance function conditional on the complete intervening history of non-modal facts. This article first investigates the conditions that any kinematical model for chance needs to satisfy to count as Lewis’s kinematics of chance. Second, it presents Lewis’s justification for his kinematics of chance and explains why (...)
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  • Chance, Resiliency, and Humean Supervenience.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):1-19.
    This paper shows how a particular resiliency-centered approach to chance lends support for two conditions characterizing chance. The first condition says that the present chance of some proposition A conditional on the proposition about some later chance of A should be set equal to that later chance of A. The second condition requires the present chance of some proposition A to be equal to the weighted average of possible later chances of A. I first introduce, motivate, and make precise a (...)
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  • The Anatomy of the Big Bad Bug.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):428-449.
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