- Where Frankfurt and Strawson meet.Michael McKenna - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):163-180.details
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Frankfurt-style counterexamples and begging the question.Stewart Goetz - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):83-105.details
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Luck, the Range of Obligations, and Frankfurt Examples.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (3):317-344.details
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Why Frankfurt-Examples Don’t Need to Succeed to Succeed.Felipe Leon & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):551-565.details
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Responsibility.Neal A. Tognazzini - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell. pp. 4592-4602.details
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Power and moral responsibility.Thomas Pink - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):127 – 149.details
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A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.details
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Introduction: Responsibility for action and belief.Carlos J. Moya & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):81 – 86.details
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Fischer’s Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Argument.Yishai Cohen - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):121-140.details
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Blameworthiness, non-robust alternatives, and the principle of alternative expectations.David Widerker - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):292–306.details
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Editors’ Overview: Moral Responsibility in Technology and Engineering.Ibo van de Poel, Jessica Fahlquist, Neelke Doorn, Sjoerd Zwart & Lambèr Royakkers - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):1-11.details
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The Dialectic Role of the Flickers of Freedom.Kevin Timpe - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):337-368.details
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A critique of Frankfurt-libertarianism.Kevin Timpe - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):189-202.details
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A Pilgrimage Through John Martin Fischer’s Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value.Hannah Tierney - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (1):179-196.details
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Blame and the Humean Theory of Motivation.Adam R. Thompson - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1345-1364.details
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Dealing with Wayward Desire.Stephen P. Garvey - 2009 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (1):1-17.details
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Guest Editor’s Introduction: Leading the Way.Daniel Speak - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (2):123-128.details
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Free Will and Moral Responsibility: The Trap, the Appreciation of Agency, and the Bubble. [REVIEW]Saul Smilansky - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):211-239.details
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Robustness Revised: Frankfurt Cases and the Right Kind of Power to Do Otherwise.Seth Shabo - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):89-106.details
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It wasn’t up to Jones: unavoidable actions and intensional contexts in Frankfurt examples.Seth Shabo - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):379-399.details
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Weak reasons-responsiveness meets its match: in defense of David Widerker’s attack on PAP.Ira M. Schnall - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):271 - 283.details
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Weak reasons-responsiveness meets its match: in defense of David Widerker’s attack on PAP.Ira M. Schnall - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):271-283.details
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Making a Difference in a Deterministic World.Carolina Sartorio - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (2):189-214.details
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A Partial Defense of the Actual-Sequence Model of Freedom.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):107-120.details
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The limits of limited-blockage Frankfurt-style cases.Michael Robinson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):429-446.details
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Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):93-111.details
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Irrelevant alternatives and Frankfurt counterfactuals.Dana K. Nelkin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (1):1-25.details
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Do we have a coherent set of intuitions about moral responsibility?Dana K. Nelkin - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):243–259.details
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Crossing the Line: New Intuitions Behind Frankfurt-Type Cases.Aleksandr Mishura - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (4):393-402.details
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Free will and mental disorder: Exploring the relationship.Gerben Meynen - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (6):429-443.details
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Free will and psychiatric assessments of criminal responsibility: a parallel with informed consent. [REVIEW]Gerben Meynen - 2010 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 13 (4):313-320.details
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An ability-based theory of responsibility for collective omissions.Joseph Metz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2665-2685.details
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Whose Argumentative Burden, which Incompatibilist Arguments?—Getting the Dialectic Right.Michael McKenna - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):429-443.details
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Source compatibilism and that pesky ability to do otherwise: comments on Dana Nelkin’s making sense of freedom and responsibility. [REVIEW]Michael McKenna - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):105-116.details
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Frankfurt's argument against alternative possibilities: Looking beyond the examples.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):770-793.details
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Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
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‘Brain-Malfunction’ Cases and the Dispositionalist Reply to Frankfurt's Attack on PAP.Greg Janzen - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):646-657.details
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Frankfurt cases and the (in)significance of timing: a defense of the buffering strategy.David Hunt & Seth Shabo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):599-622.details
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The principle of alternate possibilities and a defeated dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):179 – 201.details
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Disenabling Levy's Frankfurt-style enabling cases.Ishtiyaque Haji & Michael Mckenna - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):400-414.details
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A Sketch for a Levinasian Theory of Action.Martin Gak - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (3):421-435.details
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Frankfurt cases and overdetermination.Eric Funkhouser - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 341-369.details
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Neo-Frankfurtians and buffer cases: The new challenge to the principle of alternative possibilities.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.details
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Everyone thinks that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for free will and moral responsibility.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.details
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Responsibility and the Kinds of Freedom.John Martin Fischer - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):203 - 228.details
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Blame and Avoidability: A Reply to Otsuka.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):43 - 51.details
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Nonconsensual neurocorrectives, bypassing, and free action.Gabriel De Marco - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1953-1972.details
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Financial Returns of Corporate Social Responsibility, and the Moral Freedom and Responsibility of Business Leaders.Peter Demacarty - 2009 - Business and Society Review 114 (3):393-433.details
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Is agentive experience compatible with determinism?Oisín Deery - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):2-19.details
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Semicompatibilism: no ability to do otherwise required.Taylor W. Cyr - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):308-321.details
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