- Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.details
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Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.details
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Assertion and isolated second-hand knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 251--276.details
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How We Choose Our Beliefs.Gregory Salmieri & Benjamin Bayer - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):41–53.details
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Skeptics without borders.Kevin Meeker & Ted Poston - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):223.details
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How to be an expressivist about truth.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - In Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 282--298.details
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Sensitive Knowledge: Locke on Sensation and Skepticism.Jennifer Nagel - 2016 - In Matthew Stuart (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Locke. Blackwell. pp. 313-333.details
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(1 other version)Does Roush show that evidence should be probable?Damien Fennell & Nancy Cartwright - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):289 - 310.details
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Reply to Duncan Pritchard and John Campbell.Quassim Cassam - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):325-333.details
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Autonomy, agency, and the value of enduring beliefs.Jason Kawall - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 107-129.details
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Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality.Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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Assertion and its constitutive norms.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130.details
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Understanding the internalism-externalism debate: What is the boundary of the thinker?Brie Gertler - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):51-75.details
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A contrastivist manifesto.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):257 – 270.details
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Contrastivity and indistinguishability.Adam Morton & Antti Karjalainen - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):271 – 280.details
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Knowledge and Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):241 - 294.details
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The disunity of truth.Josh Dever - 2008 - In Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Compositionality, Context, and Semantic Values: Essays in Honor of Ernie Lepore. Springer. pp. 174-191.details
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Aiming at truth.Nicholas Unwin - 2007 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Epistemic and dialectical regress.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):43 – 60.details
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Epistemicism about vagueness and meta-linguistic safety.Stephen Kearns & Ofra Magidor - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):277-304.details
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An externalist's guide to inner experience.Benj Hellie - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 97–145.details
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Question-embedding and factivity.Paul Egré - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):85-125.details
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What does it take to "have" a reason?Mark Schroeder - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 201--22.details
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The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.details
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Dubious assertions.David Sosa - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272.details
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Contextualism, safety and epistemic relevance.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):383-394.details
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Aristotelian indeterminacy and the open future.Robert Williams - manuscriptdetails
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In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience.Kathrin Glüer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.details
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Knowledge, explanation, and lotteries.Alan Goldman - 2008 - Noûs 42 (3):466-481.details
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(1 other version)Common sense as evidence: Against revisionary ontology and skepticism.Thomas Kelly - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):53-78.details
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In defence of a perspectival semantics for 'know'.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):439 – 459.details
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Primitively rational belief-forming processes.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 180--200.details
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The degree of epistemic justification and the conjunction fallacy.Tomoji Shogenji - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):29-48.details
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(2 other versions)Contrastive knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.details
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(1 other version)Evidence: Fundamental concepts and the phenomenal conception.Thomas Kelly - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):933-955.details
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Non-individualism, rights, and practical reason.George Pavlakos - 2008 - Ratio Juris 21 (1):66-93.details
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Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity.Professor Adam Morton - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):481-502.details
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The mystery of the disappearing diamond.C. S. Jenkins - 2008 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 302--319.details
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Knowledge and credit.Jennifer Lackey - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.details
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(1 other version)What evidence do you have?Ram Neta - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):89-119.details
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The state of knowing.Alan Millar - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):179–196.details
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Philosphical 'intuitions' and scepticism about judgement.Timothy Williamson - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):109–153.details
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What good are counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.details
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Accidentally factive mental states.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.details
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Luminosity and the safety of knowledge.Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.details
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Is there a priori knowledge by testimony?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):199-241.details
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Closure principles.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.details
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(1 other version)Second-hand knowledge.Elizabeth Fricker - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):592–618.details
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(2 other versions)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.details
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Generalizing the lottery paradox.Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.details
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