- A Teleofunctionalist Solution to the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains of Actions.Jakob Roloff - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy (3-4):247-261.details
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Beliefs as inner causes: the (lack of) evidence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):850-877.details
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Intention as action under development: why intention is not a mental state.Devlin Russell - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):742-761.details
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Towards a Definition of Efforts.Olivier Massin - 2017 - Motivation Science 3 (3):230-259.details
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Intending, acting, and doing.Luca Ferrero - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):13-39.details
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Attempting art: an essay on intention-dependence.Michel-Antoine Xhignesse - 2017 - Dissertation, Mcgill Universitydetails
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Imagination and the Will.Fabian Dorsch - 2005 - Dissertation, University College Londondetails
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Introduction: through contexts to actions.Anton Leist - 2007 - In .details
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Can I Only Intend My Own Actions?Luca Ferrero - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. (1) 70-94.details
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The Omissions Account of the Knobe Effect and the Asymmetry Challenge.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):550-571.details
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The Physical Action Theory of Trying.David-Hillel Ruben - 2015 - Methode 4 (6).details
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Action Unified.Yair Levy - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):65-83.details
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Beyond Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism.Lilian O’Brien - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):281-295.details
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Indispensability, the Discursive Dilemma, and Groups with Minds of Their Own.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2014 - In Gerhard Preyer, Frank Hindriks & Sara Rachel Chant (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 137-162.details
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Pluralists about Pluralism? Versions of Explanatory Pluralism in Psychiatry.Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In Thomas Uebel (ed.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Cham: Springer. pp. 105-119.details
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Omnirationality.Alexander R. Pruss - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (1):1-21.details
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Self-Movement and Natural Normativity: Keeping Agents in the Causal Theory of Action.Matthew McAdam - 2007 - Dissertation, Georgetown Universitydetails
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Intention.Sarah K. Paul - 2013 - International Encyclopedia of Ethics.details
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A Puzzle About Knowledge in Action.Iskra Fileva - 2013 - Logique Et Analyse 56 (223):287-301.details
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Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):626-652.details
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Intentional action first.Yair Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.details
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Intention and Intentional Action.Alfred Mele - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Agency and awareness.Chrisoula Andreou - 2012 - Ratio 26 (2):117-133.details
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Side-effect actions, acting for a reason, and acting intentionally.John Michael McGuire - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):317 - 333.details
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Agent-Causal Theories.Timothy O'Connor - 2011 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition. Oup Usa. pp. 309-328.details
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The accomplishment of plans: a new version of the principle of double effect.Alexander R. Pruss - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):49-69.details
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Reasons, Answers, and Goals.John Turri - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (4):491-499.details
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Revamping Action Theory.Gordon Park Stevenson - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):427 - 451.details
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Minimally Creative Thought.Dustin Stokes - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (5):658-681.details
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Deviant Formal Causation.Sarah K. Paul - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24.details
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Action individuation: a normative functionalist approach.Chauncey Maher - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):99-116.details
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Shared Agency.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe.Julia Driver - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Action.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 78-88.details
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Action.Luca Ferrero - 2009 - In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 137-151.details
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Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Personal autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Knowledge in intention.Kevin Falvey - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):21-44.details
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Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.details
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Shared agency and contralateral commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.details
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Is there a place for intention in an analysis of intentional action?Alfred Mele - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (3-4):419-432.details
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Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):355–393.details
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Connectionism and the causal theory of action explanation.Scott R. Sehon - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):511-532.details
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Decisions, intentions, and free will.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):146-162.details
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Action, control and sensations of acting.Benjamin Mossel - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (2):129-180.details
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Practical Reason in Historical and Systematic Perspective.James Conant & Dawa Ometto (eds.) - 2023 - De Gruyter.details
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Let me go and try.Kirk Ludwig - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):340-358.details
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Attempts.Jonathan D. Payton - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):363-382.details
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Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
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