Instances of epistemic injustice elicit resistance, anger, despair, frustration or cognate emotional responses from their victims. This sort of response to the epistemic injustices that accompanied historical systems of oppression such as colonialism, for example, is normal. However, if their victims have internalised these oppressive situations, we could get the counterintuitive response of appreciation. In this paper, I argue for the phenomenon of appreciative silencing to make sense of instances like this. This is a form of epistemic silencing that happens (...) when the accepted hegemonic intuitions of the oppressed are formed/influenced by the ideologies of the oppressors over time. Here, we have a resilient, oppressive and hegemonic epistemic system. Put together, it creates a variant of epistemic injustice and silencing that is obscure since its victims are neither resistant nor aware of the injustice they face but are appreciative. (shrink)

The topic of epistemic decolonisation is currently the locus of lively debate both in academia and in everyday life. The aim of this piece is to isolate a few main strands in the philosophical literature on the topic, and draw some new connections amongst them through the lens of epistemic injustice. I first sketch what I take to be the core features of epistemic decolonisation. I then philosophically situate the topic. Finally, I map it in relation to key epistemic-injustice concepts (...) and to the contributions in this special issue. (shrink)

The call to decolonise knowledge is gaining increasing popularity in African philosophy. But as scholarly attention to the topic intensifies, so do doubts about the usefulness of theorising it, especially in spaces – like Africa – that are riddled with deeper problems such as mass poverty and social disempowerment. I focus on three challenges that Bernard Matolino has recently issued. If these challenges are on the right track, they threaten to derail the whole project of epistemic decolonisation worldwide, since many (...) of the aspects of Africa that Matolino thinks make decolonial theorising unhelpful are shared by the rest of the Global South. In this paper, I develop a conception of epistemic decolonisation that is geared to withstanding such doubts in the contemporary African context, and can hopefully serve others in the Global South who share some of Africa’s problems. (shrink)

When an agent suffers in their capacity as a knower, they are a victim of epistemic injustice. Varieties of epistemic injustices have been theorised. A salient feature across these theories is that perpetrators and victims of epistemic injustice belong to different social groups. In this paper, I argue for a form of epistemic injustice that could occur between members of the same social group. This is a form of epistemic injustice where the knower is first a victim of historical and (...) continuing oppression. Secondly, they internalise and appreciate the systems that harm them as a knower. This is possible because the victim subscribes to perniciously formed epistemic systems. This form of epistemic injustice is a valuable explanatory tool for non-standard and obscure instances of epistemic injustice where the victim a) accepts and appreciates the injustice they experience and b) is even the seeming perpetrator of the injustice against themselves. (shrink)

Why should we decolonise knowledge? One popular rationale is that colonialism has set up a single perspective as epistemically authoritative over many equally legitimate ones, and this is a form of...

This paper is broadly concerned with the question of what epistemic decolonization might involve. It is divided into two parts. The first part begins by explaining the specifically epistemic problem to which calls for epistemic decolonization respond. I suggest that calls for decolonization are motivated by a perceived epistemic crisis consisting in the inadequacy of the dominant Eurocentric paradigm to properly theorize our modern world. I then discuss two general proposals, radical and moderate, for what epistemic decolonization might involve. In (...) the second part, I argue that the inadequacy of Eurocentric epistemic resources constitutes a hermeneutical injustice caused by an irreducible form of epistemic oppression. I then argue that addressing this form of epistemic oppression requires thinking ‘outside’ of the Eurocentric paradigm because the paradigm might fail to reveal and address the epistemic oppression sustaining it. This lends further plausibility to the radical proposal that epistemic decolonization must involve thinking from ‘outside’ the Eurocentric paradigm, but also accommodates the moderate proposal that adopting critical perspectives on Eurocentric thought is an important part of epistemic decolonization. (shrink)

Recently there has been more attention to the cultural aspects of social robots. This paper contributes to this effort by offering a philosophical, in particular Wittgensteinian framework for conceptualizing in what sense and how robots are related to culture and by exploring what it would mean to create an “Ubuntu Robot”. In addition, the paper gestures towards a more culturally diverse and more relational approach to social robotics and emphasizes the role technology can play in addressing the challenges of modernity (...) and in assisting cultural change: it argues that robots can help us to engage in cultural dialogue, reflect on our own culture, and change how we do things. In this way, the paper contributes to the growing literature on cross-cultural approaches to social robotics. (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between epistemic freedom, and epistemic injustice and epistemic oppression. I situate epistemic freedom within the larger project of epistemic decolonisation and argue that epistemic freedom is central to both its positive and negative programme. Through exploring the intersections of the notion of epistemic freedom and the scholarship on epistemic injustice and oppression, I argue that one can think of epistemic injustices and oppression as infringements on epistemic freedom. I identify shared themes between the theorisation of (...) epistemic freedom and the literature on epistemic injustice and epistemic oppression, including silencing, active ignorance, and epistemic exploitation. I briefly explore each of these themes, identifying both intersections and divergences. Lastly, I draw on the literature on epistemic injustice and oppression to sharpen Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2018. Epistemic Freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and Decolonization. London: Routledge) general conception of epistemic freedom and develop a tripartite structure for what substantial epistemic freedom entails. I argue that being epistemically free entails being able to choose one’s epistemic endeavours, having the means to pursue them, as well as being able to meaningfully partake in the shared endeavours of the epistemic communities that one belongs to. (shrink)

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 60, Issue 2, Page 304-319, June 2022.

This article makes a case for wide reflective equilibrium in doing African epistemology. It argues that on the issue of formulating a viable theory of knowledge, such an approach is more promising than the extant dominant approaches, namely the method of ethno-epistemology and the method of particularistic studies. More specifically, wide reflective equilibrium articulates a proper balance between philosophy and culture and endows a theory of knowledge with multiple sources of normativity.

In this article, I offer concrete suggestions about which topics, texts, positions, arguments and authors from the African philosophical tradition one could usefully put into conversation with ones from the Western, especially the Anglo-American. In particular, I focus on materials that would make for revealing and productive contrasts between the two traditions. My aim is not to argue that one should teach by creating critical dialogue between African and Western philosophers, but rather is to provide strategic advice, supposing that is (...) a sensible goal to adopt. (shrink)

Ethnophilosophy is widely regarded as a disreputable orientation in African philosophy. For example, critics of ethnophilosophy think of it as a ‘defective philosophy’, a ‘semi-anthropological paraphrase’, a merely ‘implicit philosophy ’, a ‘crazed language’ and so on. Although these negative portrayals were made in the 1980s and 1990s (roughly, 1981–1997), and some of these critics softened their position with time, they persist in the thoughts of some contemporary African philosophers. This is visible in the rather inarticulate unease about ethnophilosophy in (...) many quarters today, witnessed in the characteristic disposition of some African philosophers to distance themselves from the works of Placide Tempels, John S. Mbiti, Léopold Sédar Senghor and Alexis Kagame, and in the talk of a post-ethnophilosophy among some contemporary African philosophers rooted in the belief about the inadequacy of ethnophilosophy. Call those who today still think of ethnophilosophy in this fashion the ethnophilosophy holdouts. The aim of this paper is to give reasons to think that the position of the ethnophilosophy holdouts is not tenable. More positively, I defend a thesis that makes a claim about the positive status of ethnophilosophy as a philosophical orientation. (shrink)

Analysis has always been a core part of humanistic studies. In the domain of philosophical research, where it has assumed a larger-than-life status in the analytic tradition, analysis is a methodological device for conceptual clarification, the unpacking of loaded terms and expressions, and the achievement of overall understanding in every sphere of philosophical discourse. Scholars have expressed doubt about whether reductive analysis is an attractive methodological framework for African philosophy. In a recent article, Balogun raises the need for African philosophy (...) to evolve its own unique method of analysis with the aim of decolonising analysis in the context of African philosophical investigations. This article advances this need by proposing a genre of philosophical analysis called “ethnolysis”. Coined from two words, “ethnography” and “analysis”, ethnolysis is a kind of analysis rooted in the search for ethnographical materials as a means of opening up an array of insights into the proper meaning of African concepts, terms, or expressions. The article defends “ethnolysis” in the light of the inappropriateness of mainstream analysis in producing an understanding of some philosophically interesting African concepts, terms and expression which are not completely amenable to the reductive analysis or fragmentation of the kind central to the analytic approach in African philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter examines the three projects that constitute contemporary African epistemology and suggests various ways in which they can be put on a firmer footing, and by so doing advance the epistemic goal of the discipline. These three projects include ethno-epistemology, analytic African epistemology and what one might call ameliorative African epistemology. Ethno-epistemology is the study of the phenomenon of knowledge from the perspective of particular African communities as revealed in their cultural heritage, proverbs, folklores, traditions, and practices. Analytic African (...) epistemology involves the philosophical study of concepts such as ‘knowledge,’ ‘justification,’ ‘belief’ and ‘truth’ from the African perspective using the methods of analysis, criticism, arguments, ordinary language philosophy, and so on. And finally, ameliorative African epistemology addresses the predicament of African knowledge systems and voices in the global knowledge and credibility economy within the broader context of the problem of epistemic injustice suffered by historically marginalized groups. (shrink)

Kwasi Wiredu defines conceptual decolonisation as an activity in which Africans divest themselves of undue colonial influences, but his descriptions of this process are either unrelated to divesting or work quite generally, and not in favour of an African point of view. Wiredu's approach to decolonisation appears to be largely indistinguishable from the business of philosophy.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 60, Issue 2, Page 154-172, June 2022.

The development and deployment of machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) engender “AI colonialism”, a term that conceptually overlaps with “data colonialism”, as a form of injustice. AI colonialism is in need of decolonization for three reasons. Politically, because it enforces digital capitalism’s hegemony. Ecologically, as it negatively impacts the environment and intensifies the extraction of natural resources and consumption of energy. Epistemically, since the social systems within which AI is embedded reinforce Western universalism by imposing Western colonial values on (...) the global South when these manifest in the digital realm is a form of digital capitalism. These reasons require a new conceptualization of AI decolonization. First this paper draws from the historical debates on the concepts of colonialism and decolonization. Secondly it retrieves Achille Mbembe’s notion of decolonization as disenclosure to argue that the decolonization of AI will have to be the abolishment of political, ecological and epistemic borders erected and reinforced in the phases of its design, production, development of AI in the West and drawing from the knowledge from the global South. In conclusion, it is discussed how conceiving of decolonial AI as form of disenclosure opens up new ways to think about and intervene in colonial instantiations of AI development and deployment, in order to empower “the wretched of AI”, re-ecologise the unsustainable ecologies AI depends on and to counter the colonial power structures unreflective AI deployment risks to reinforce. (shrink)

An instance of the use of a version of the analytic method known as the “ordinary-language approach” in African philosophy is characterised by a systematic examination (for the purpose of clarity) of philosophically significant concepts in an African language as used in ordinary discourse contexts among a local linguistic community. Central to this approach is the idea that the meaning of concepts depends on the ways ordinary people use them, and that this may form the basis of a philosophy. This (...) article examines Barry Hallen and Olubi Sodipo’s critical engagements with the epistemological concepts of ìmọ (knowledge) and ìgbàgbọ (belief) as an instance of this analytic methodological orientation in African philosophy. The article finds the resultant analysis of these Yoruba concepts theoretically faulty because it defeats both the rational structure of complex concept formation in Yoruba language and the logical presupposition embedded in every language. The article concludes that in order to correct this, African philosophy needs to evolve its own unique method of analysis, or otherwise reject altogether the analytic method and erect in its place its own peculiar method suitable for what it does, and consistent with the general nature of philosophy. (shrink)

The paper argues that some tools from the epistemic injustice literature can be fruitfully applied to the debate on epistemic decolonisation. The first step for such a project is to defuse recent misgivings about the liberatory potential of epistemic injustice scholarship. I group these misgivings under the slogan ‘Epistemic injustice is white-people stuff’, or ‘the WPS challenge’, for short, and use them to set desiderata for good theorising with epistemic injustice tools. I then look at three such tools – epistemic (...) oppression, white ignorance, and contributory injustice – and argue that they advance theorising epistemic decolonisation while meeting the three desiderata. If the argument works, its implications for the topic of this special issue are that we don’t need to decolonise epistemic injustice; we can instead use the tools of the epistemic injustice literature to advance the decolonisation project. (shrink)

In this paper we, an epistemologist and a machine learning scientist, argue that we need to pursue a novel area of philosophical research in AI – the ethics of belief for AI. Here we take the ethics of belief to refer to a field at the intersection of epistemology and ethics concerned with possible moral, practical, and other non-truth-related dimensions of belief. In this paper we will primarily be concerned with the normative question within the ethics of belief regarding what (...) agents – both human and artificial – ought to believe, rather than with questions concerning whether beliefs meet certain evaluative standards such as being true, being justified, constituting knowledge, etc. We suggest four topics in extant work in the ethics of (human) belief that can be applied to an ethics of AI belief: doxastic wronging by AI (morally wronging someone in virtue of beliefs held about them); morally owed beliefs (beliefs that agents are morally obligated to hold); pragmatic and moral encroachment (cases where the practical or moral features of a belief is relevant to its epistemic status, and in our case specifically to whether an agent ought to hold the belief); and moral responsibility for AI beliefs. We also indicate two relatively nascent areas of philosophical research that haven’t yet been generally recognized as ethics of AI belief research, but that do fall within this field of research in virtue of investigating various moral and practical dimensions of belief: the epistemic and ethical decolonization of AI; and epistemic injustice in AI. (shrink)

This paper has two objectives. The first objective is a decoupling of the African body from ‘blackness’—a discursive formation—that was attached to the body by the slave and the colonial regimes. The second aim is a critique of modern epistemic and epistemological regimes that give ‘blackness’ its modern currency. To achieve these goals, I use phenomenology, a philosophy of self-responsible beginning according to Edmund Husserl, to return to the African body before colonialism and slavery. Through phenomenology I can ‘bracket’ what (...) the above regimes and their legacies have been conditioning the African to see and know about the body. The paper is therefore an attempt at a liberatory epistemology aimed at overcoming what Achille Mbembe has referred to as a ‘dungeon of appearance’. Since ‘blackness’ is continental and diaspora Africans (CADA) seen through discursive colonial eyes, phenomenology provides an epistemological freedom to observe the body in-time. (shrink)

Botswana’s history is one of an unwavering exercise of self-determination and quest for self-rule. Post-independence, self-government prioritized an overarching philosophy of Kagisano or social harmony within which the aims of education were framed, in conjunction with a political commitment to Botho through democracy. For economic and social reasons the current educational policy of Botswana is driven by outcome-based education (OBE), with its metrics of quantifiable outcomes. This article argues that Olúfemi Táíwò’s analysis of decolonization provides a philosophical lens through which (...) to interpret Botswana’s current educational pathway within the prevailing decolonization discourse. OBE clearly exhibits features of neocolonialism, as it pertains to the national value principles. We draw on Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s decolonial epistemic perspective to frame the discussions. Insofar as OBE can be integrated with Botswana’s ethnically inclusive, community-based view of democracy and associated virtues, this is a worthy goal for education, and it could lead to a particular form of indigenized democracy. Substantive distinctions among the concepts of decolonization, neocolonialism, and decoloniality underwrite this thesis. We see the project of envisaging a future of education in Botswana as having to do with disentangling colonialist–imperialist cultural reproduction from indigenous aspirations. (shrink)

To liberate African philosophy from the remnants of the colonial style of thought, Kwesi Wiredu promotes the idea of the conceptual decolonization of African philosophy. He argues that, to accomplish this project, African philosophers must theorize in African vernaculars. This article attempts to show that the project of the conceptual decolonization of African philosophy by recourse to theorizing in African vernaculars is challenging. It examines a particular strategy that Wiredu deploys in “Conceptual Decolonization as an Imperative in Contemporary African Philosophy,” (...) in which he hopes to demonstrate that the Akan conception of mind is superior to the Cartesian conception of mind. It demonstrates that Wiredu’s attempt to show the superiority of the Akan conception of mind is unsuccessful and that his project of conceptual decolonization fails. Nevertheless, it concludes that Wiredu’s conceptual decolonization project still shows promise even in light of our criticisms. (shrink)

In its attempt to deflate of the pretensions of ‘Western knowledge’, the epistemic decolonisation movement carries on the work of Socrates, who sought to persuade those who thought that they were wise but were not, that they were not. Yet in its determination to recover and elevate indigenous systems of thought, decolonisation seems opposed to this very work, which is always corrosive of inherited belief. Decolonisation both expresses and contradicts the spirit of Socratic philosophy.

Studies of non-standard, project-based forms of work prevalent in the creative industries have typically theorized the relational dynamics of work as a competitive process of social capital accumulation involving an individualistic, self-enterprising, zero-sum, and winner-takes-all struggle for favourable social network-positioning. Problematizing this prevailing conceptualization, our empirical case study draws on fifty in-depth interviews and two focus groups with creative workers in Ghana to show how relations of mutual aid, including elaborate efforts to live harmoniously with others, are intricately intertwined with (...) economic practices of getting by and getting ahead. Our analysis abductively mobilizes insights from Afro-communitarian ethics to theorize the mutual aid we observed as a complex socio-economic practice of relational resource redistribution contingent on degrees of social proximity. In applying “a theory from the South” to foreground the role of moral obligations, social harmony, and hands-on practices of mutual aid in non-standard forms of work, we contribute a “decolonial critique” of relationality of relevance to scholars of creative work and business ethicists. (shrink)

Delphine Abadie Malgré une historiographie riche de plusieurs orientations, les imaginaires, la recherche et les débats académiques semblent parfois demeurer enfermés dans l’exigence d’un devoir-être de la philosophie africaine tout à fait caractéristique du seul moment ethnophilosophique. Pourtant, les avenues les plus récentes en philosophie africaine partagent un ensemble de présupposés qui rendent inopérante cette confrontation stérile entre un type de philosophie qui désignerait la « véritable » manière de décoloniser les épistémologies africaines, et toutes les autres formes de la (...) philosophie en Afrique. Depuis les années 1980, on doit constater pourtant que la plupart des philosophes du continent ont emprunté des avenues qui nous éloignent de ce premier moment décolonial de l’« authenticité africaine » en internalisant les critiques développées durant les plusieurs décennies qu’a duré la fameuse querelle de la philosophie africaine. Éclairé par la distinction entre approche décoloniale et approche postcoloniale, cet article propose une relecture des chemins parcourus, des détours et des mutations opérées par la philosophie africaine telle qu’elle s’est développée dans l’espace francophone depuis les années 1940 jusqu’à nos jours. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the marginalisation of women, specifically in African philosophy, with the aim of cautioning and inspiring a reconfiguration of African philosophy that takes seriously the discourse of gender as it does the discourse of race. I employ Charles Taylor's notion of recognition to understand some of the effects of a lack of recognition, which I then extend to the lack of recognition of women in African philosophy. I present this understanding against the background of the ongoing (...) debates and efforts of decolonisation by illustrating how the marginalisation of women in African philosophy places the discipline at odds with decolonisation and its emancipatory objective. African philosophy, in the process of legitimising its existence, has adopted a male-centred framework which has not only undermined the existence of women but also failed to recognise their contributions. This has influenced the practice and discourse of African philosophy, resulting in the underrepresentation of women therein. (shrink)

In philosophy, the decolonization of knowledge is marked by a number of “quarrels” related to its history, its geography, its location, its modality of production, its subjects and its objects. There are usually questions about the existence of non-Western philosophies, their place in the canons of the historiography of philosophy, and the curricula of philosophy in the West and elsewhere. There is also the question of the methodological and conceptual modalities according to which the philosophical discourses of the colonized people (...) are constructed when it comes to being situated in relation to the philosophies of the dominant societies. African philosophy is a laboratory to illustrate the dead ends of any decolonization of knowledge and also to examine the conditions of possibility of such a decolonial approach. (shrink)

James Baldwin and Ludwig Wittgenstein were both concerned with what language use is capable of and what the duty of the thinker should be. This essay examines, via Italo Calvino’s ideas on the relationship between writing and world, what the contrast Wittgenstein/Baldwin tells us about the ethics of meaning. Wittgenstein’s ‘leaves everything as it is’ conception of thought is contrasted with Baldwin’s thoughts on racism, language and the duty of the writer. It is concluded that Baldwin drives Wittgenstein’s philosophical position (...) further than Wittgenstein could do himself and that ethically neutral language use is itself a linguistic confusion. (shrink)

This paper sets upon the elaboration of two inter-related enquiries: What do being and otherness look like beyond the margins of metanarrativity? What would the crossing of such margins entail? It takes as its basic assumption that prejudice arises from out of the historicity of being. A thesis of prejudice as a pre-reflexive operation or heuristic of the understanding a subject employs in order to arrive upon the conscious inclination to intuit that p is presented. Furthermore, it is posited that (...) human understanding and rational inquiry are a fortiori grounded upon antecedent onto-phenomenological, hermeneutic and epistemic projects of being disclosed in metanarrativity. Metanarrativity, it is here maintained, constrains the horizon of intelligibility and truth in the discursive encounter of being with the “other” of alterity. It precludes the conditions of possibility for a non- prejudiced and value-neutral view in cross-cultural discourse. As such, it may be argued that an understanding of being and otherness cannot ascend the horizon of intelligibility without the sublating operation of prejudice. Prejudice, it is here argued, is sublating in the sense that it prefigures the possibilities for signification, subverting our interrogations from what is the state of affairs to mere intuitends of the form what it is like. Given that metanarrative discourses are invested in prejudice, it is therefore the task of decoloniality, set upon the cross-cultural discursive encounter between being and alterity, to take the physical appearance of an eschatology of liberation enacted in the everyday, performative praxis of non-domination. (shrink)

Concepts of mutual interdependence, process, creative advance, and God occupy key areas in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Process metaphysics lays emphasis on a naturalism of rigorous rational and empirical methodology with far-reaching implications. Process thinkers have compared Whiteheadian thought to Buddhism, Christianity, and many other religions. However, African religious beliefs have yet to be considered in this area of study. Based on the gap in the literature, this article attempts to reconcile such seemingly different spheres. First, I offer (...) an account of Whitehead's process metaphysics regarding the concepts mentioned above. Second, I argue that nonconventional sources of African philosophy offer conceptual understandings of philosophies of African groups and their place in the metaphysical debate. Third, I discuss these key areas of process thought in Anlo traditional pragmatic philosophy. I illustrate their like-mindedness with process metaphysics through language, religious rites, and historical accounts. I conclude that, although process philosophy overlaps in prominent areas with Anlo belief systems, questions regarding the causal nature of God distinguish the Anlo conception of divinity from that of process philosophy. (shrink)