- Doxastic freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.details
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Frankfurt’s Unwilling and Willing Addicts.Chandra Sripada - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):781-815.details
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Is a traumatic childhood just another abuse excuse?Ben Spiecker & Jan Steutel - 2003 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 35 (4):441–450.details
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Experimental philosophy and free will.Tamler Sommers - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):199-212.details
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Volitional excuses, self-narration, and blame.Marion Smiley - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):85-101.details
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Responsibility Without Identity.David Shoemaker - 2012 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (1):109-132.details
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Response-Dependent Responsibility; or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame.David Shoemaker - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (4):481-527.details
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Responsibility and Visioneering—Opening Pandora’s Box.Martin Sand - 2016 - NanoEthics 10 (1):75-86.details
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Percepción y emociones en la moralidad.Arleen Salles - 1999 - Isegoría 20:217-226.details
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Dennett on Free Will.Craig Ross - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (2):137-149.details
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When and why is it disrespectful to excuse an attitude?John W. Robison - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2391-2409.details
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Responsibility and the shallow self.Samuel Reis-Dennis - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):483-501.details
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Criminal Law and the Autonomy Assumption: Adorno, Bhaskar, and Critical Legal Theory.Craig Reeves - 2014 - Journal of Critical Realism 13 (4):339-367.details
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Rationality & Second‐Order Preferences.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):196-215.details
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Institutional wrongdoing and moral perception.Nigel Pleasants - 2008 - Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (1):96–115.details
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Morally Embedded Selves and Embedded Compatibilism.Guy Pinku - 2012 - Philosophica 85 (2):67-89.details
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Wanton responsibility.Marina A. L. Oshana - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (3):261-276.details
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Culture, responsibility, and affected ignorance.Michele M. Moody-Adams - 1994 - Ethics 104 (2):291-309.details
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Free will and mental disorder: Exploring the relationship.Gerben Meynen - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (6):429-443.details
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An unconnected Heap of duties?David McNaughton - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):433-447.details
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On Manipulated Agents and History-Sensitive Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2021 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (2):285-298.details
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Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism. [REVIEW]Michael McKenna - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):145-174.details
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Does Situationism Threaten Free Will and Moral Responsibility?Michael McKenna & Brandon Warmke - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (6):698-733.details
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Towards a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility.Benjamin Matheson - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):458-480.details
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Moral ignorance and blameworthiness.Elinor Mason - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3037-3057.details
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The mad, the bad, and the psychopath.Heidi L. Maibom - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (3):167-184.details
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Critical reflection, self-knowledge, and the emotions.Catriona Mackenzie - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):186-206.details
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The Lex Talionis, the Purgative Rationale, and the Death Penalty.Patrick Lenta - 2015 - Criminal Justice Ethics 34 (1):42-63.details
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Flanagan and Cartesian Free Will: A Defense of Agent Causation.John Lemos - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 22.details
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Autonomy, sanity and moral theory.Iain Law - 2003 - Res Publica 9 (1):39-56.details
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How not to argue for incompatibilism.Michael Kremer - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (1):1-26.details
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Kant and 'Ought Implies Can'.Markus Kohl - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):690-710.details
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Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: a Call for Nuance.Matt King & Joshua May - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (1):11-22.details
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Duties to Oneself and Their Alleged Incoherence.Yuliya Kanygina - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):565-579.details
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Solving the self-illness ambiguity: the case for construction over discovery.Sofia M. I. Jeppsson - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (3):294-313.details
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Free Will for the Long Run.Benjamin I. Huff - 2021 - The Monist 104 (3):352-365.details
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Moral Enhancement, Self-Governance, and Resistance.Pei-Hua Huang - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):547-567.details
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Explaining Free Will by Rational Abilities.Frank Hofmann - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):283-297.details
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What's Luck Got to do with the Luck Pincer?Jesse Hill - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (4):837-858.details
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Agency without autonomy: valuational agency.Ranjoo Seodu Herr - 2010 - Journal of Global Ethics 6 (3):239-254.details
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Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):165-183.details
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Historicism, Non-historicism, or a Mix?Ishtiyaque Haji - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):185-204.details
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Responsible psychopaths.Patricia S. Greenspan - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):417 – 429.details
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Demystifying the Deep Self View.August Gorman - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (4):390-414.details
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Unprincipled Ethics.Gerald Dworkin - 1995 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):224-239.details
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The Singleton case: enforcing medical treatment to put a person to death. [REVIEW]Mirko Daniel Garasic - 2013 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (4):795-806.details
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Kant's Conception of Personal Autonomy.Paul Formosa - 2013 - Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (3):193-212.details
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The illusion of the relevance of difficulty in evaluations of moral responsibility.Asia Ferrin - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo.David Faraci & David Shoemaker - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3): 319-332.details
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Good Selves, True Selves: Moral Ignorance, Responsibility, And The Presumption Of Goodness.David Faraci & David Shoemaker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):606-622.details
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