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Irresolvable Disagreement, Objectivist Antirealism and Logical Revision.Manfred Harth - 2020 - Erkenntnis:1-20.details
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Alethic Pluralism and the Value of Truth.Filippo Ferrari - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1):1–25.details
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Logical pluralism and normativity.Stewart Shapiro & Teresa Kouri Kissel - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):389-410.details
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Relativism, realism, and subjective facts.Giovanni Merlo & Giulia Pravato - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8149-8165.details
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Maddy On The Multiverse.Claudio Ternullo - 2019 - In Stefania Centrone, Deborah Kant & Deniz Sarikaya (eds.), Reflections on the Foundations of Mathematics: Univalent Foundations, Set Theory and General Thoughts. Springer Verlag. pp. 43-78.details
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On the Insufficiency of Taste Expressivism.Marián Zouhar - 2019 - Filozofia Nauki 27 (3):5-27.details
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Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2969-2983.details
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Reconsidering Devitt on Realism and Truth.Michael Gifford - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1367-1380.details
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Cognitivism and Metaphysical Weight: A Dilemma for Relaxed Realism.Annika Böddeling - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):546-559.details
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Publishing without belief.Alexandra Plakias - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):638-646.details
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Hume’s principle: a plea for austerity.Kai Michael Büttner - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3759-3781.details
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A Common-Sense Pragmatic Theory of Truth.John Capps - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):463-481.details
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Moral Disagreement and Arational Convergence.Patrick Hassan - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (2):145-161.details
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Does Logical Pluralism Imply, or Suggest, Truth Pluralism, or Vice Versa?Stewart Shapiro & Michael Lynch - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4925-4936.details
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Why logical pluralism?Colin R. Caret - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4947-4968.details
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Putnam, Peano, and the Malin Génie: could we possibly bewrong about elementary number-theory?Christopher Norris - 2002 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (2):289-321.details
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Review of Douglas Edwards, The Metaphysics of Truth. [REVIEW]Mark Jago - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):970–976.details
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Davidson on Reference.Robert Williams - 2013 - In Ernie Lepore & Kurt Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson. Blackwell.details
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Faultless Disagreement, Realism and Moral Objectivity.Manfred Harth - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1085-1108.details
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An account of truthmaking.Noël Blas Saenz - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3413-3435.details
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Knowing how things might have been.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 8):1-19.details
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Ecumenical alethic pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):368-393.details
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Normative Alethic Pluralism.Filippo Ferrari - 2018 - In Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Cham, Switzerland and Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 145-168.details
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The function of modal judgment and the Kantian gap.Jessica Leech - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3193-3212.details
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How to solve the knowability paradox with transcendental epistemology.Andrew Stephenson - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3253-3278.details
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A Commitment-Theoretic Account of Moore's Paradox.Jack Woods - forthcoming - In An Atlas of Meaning: Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface).details
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Epistemic Schmagency?A. K. Flowerree - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 289-310.details
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Disagreement about Taste as Disagreement about the Discourse: Problems and Limitations.Natalia Karczewska - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46 (1):103-117.details
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Truth and assertion: rules vs aims.Neri Marsili - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):638–648.details
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Truth : a concept unlike any other.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Supplement issue 2):S605-S630.details
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The unattainability of the true world: the Putnamian and Kripkensteinian interpretation of Nietzsche’s The History of an Error.Henrik Sova - 2016 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (2):1-19.details
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Extended Rationality: Some Queries about Warrant, Epistemic Closure, Truth and Scepticism.Giorgio Volpe - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):258-271.details
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Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth.Stephen Barker - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2):183-199.details
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A Pragmatic Argument for a Pragmatic Theory of Truth.John Capps - 2017 - Contemporary Pragmatism 14 (2):135-156.details
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Fragmented Truth.Andy Demfree Yu - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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From one to many: recent work on truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.details
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A Notion of Logical Concept Based on Plural Reference.Carrara Massimiliano & Martino Enrico - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):19-33.details
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Pluralism about Knowledge.Robin McKenna - 2017 - In Coliva Annalisa & Pedersen Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 171-198.details
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Truth: explanation, success, and coincidence.Will Gamester - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1243-1265.details
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Scanlon’s modal metaphysics.Gideon Rosen - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):856-876.details
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The Duck Quacks Back: A Reply to A. Minh Nguyen.Rockney Jacobsen - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (3):655-663.details
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Talking with Vultures.Filippo Ferrari & Crispin Wright - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):911-936.details
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Contractualism as Restricted Constructivism.Jussi Suikkanen - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):571-579.details
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When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - 2019details
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Quantifier Variance and Indefinite Extensibility.Jared Warren - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (1):81-122.details
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The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation.Harald R. Wohlrapp - 2014 - Dordrecht NL: Springer.details
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Truth as a relational property.Douglas Edwards - 2016 - Synthese 198 (2):735-757.details
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Why realists must reject normative quietism.Daniel Wodak - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2795-2817.details
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A Simple Notion of Validity for Alethic Pluralism.Andrea Strollo - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1529-1546.details
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