- The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Conscious Action/Zombie Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):419-444.details
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Intentions: The Dynamic Hierarchical Model Revisited.Elisabeth Pacherie & Myrto Mylopoulos - 2019 - WIREs Cognitive Science 10 (2):e1481.details
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Conscious Vision in Action.Robert Briscoe & John Schwenkler - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (7):1435-1467.details
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The Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Jorge Morales & Hakwan Lau - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 233-260.details
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Conscious vision guides motor action—rarely.Benjamin Kozuch - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (3):443-476.details
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The Neural Dynamics of Seeing-In.Gabriele Ferretti - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1285-1324.details
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Bodily awareness and novel multisensory features.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2021 - Synthese 198:3913-3941.details
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Dislocation, Not Dissociation: The Neuroanatomical Argument Against Visual Experience Driving Motor Action.Benjamin Kozuch - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):572-602.details
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Semantic and pragmatic integration in vision for action.Silvano Zipoli Caiani & Gabriele Ferretti - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:40-54.details
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A distinction concerning vision-for-action and affordance perception.Gabriele Ferretti - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 87:103028.details
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Two visual systems in Molyneux subjects.Gabriele Ferretti - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):643-679.details
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Visual phenomenology versus visuomotor imagery: How can we be aware of action properties?Gabriele Ferretti - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3309-3338.details
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Are visuomotor representations cognitively penetrable? Biasing action-guiding vision.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 17):1-19.details
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Perception and Cognition Are Largely Independent, but Still Affect Each Other in Systematic Ways: Arguments from Evolution and the Consciousness-Attention Dissociation.Carlos Montemayor & Harry Haroutioun Haladjian - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8:1-15.details
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The two-visual-systems hypothesis and the perspectival features of visual experience.Robert T. Foley, Robert L. Whitwell & Melvyn A. Goodale - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:225-233.details
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Perspectival content of visual experiences.Błażej Skrzypulec - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Between vision and action: introduction to the special issue.Gabriele Ferretti & Silvano Zipoli Caiani - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):3899-3911.details
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Spatial Content and Motoric Significance.Robert Briscoe - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 1 (2):199-216.details
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Does perceiving require perceptual experience?David John Bennett - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3):763-790.details
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The two visual systems hypothesis and contrastive underdetermination.Thor Grünbaum - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):4045-4068.details
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The Perception‐Action Model: Counting Computational Mechanisms.Thor Grünbaum - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (4):416-445.details
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An Agent of Attention: An Inquiry into the Source of Our Control.Aaron Henry - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Torontodetails
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Transitions Versus Dissociations: A Paradigm Shift in Unconscious Cognition.Luis M. Augusto - 2018 - Axiomathes (3):269-291.details
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The role of experience in demonstrative thought.Michael Barkasi - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):648-666.details
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In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.details
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Mental Imagery: Greasing the Mind's Gears.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23.details
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Visual Streams as Core Mechanisms.Benjamin Henke - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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The First-Person Perspective Is Not a Defining Feature of Consciousness.Dylan Ludwig - 2021 - Dialogue 60 (3):435-446.details
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Consciousness and mental causation: Contemporary empirical cases for epiphenomenalism, in Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch (ed.) - 2021 - Oxford University Press.details
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