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Reasoning in attitudes.Franz Dietrich & Antonios Staras - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1–31.details
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Scientific uncertainty and decision making.Seamus Bradley - 2012 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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Strategic manipulation in judgment aggregation under higher-level reasoning.Zoi Terzopoulou & Ulle Endriss - 2021 - Theory and Decision 92 (2):363-385.details
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Are non-accidental regularities a cosmic coincidence? Revisiting a central threat to Humean laws.Aldo Filomeno - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5205-5227.details
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How to Believe Long Conjunctions of Beliefs: Probability, Quasi-Dogmatism and Contextualism.Stefano Bonzio, Gustavo Cevolani & Tommaso Flaminio - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):965-990.details
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Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
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Parentheticality, assertion strength, and polarity.Todor Koev - 2019 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (1):113-140.details
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How feasible is the rapid development of artificial superintelligence?Kaj Sotala - 2017 - Physica Scripta 11 (92).details
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(1 other version)Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)The Ethics of Nudge.Luc Bovens - 2008 - In Mats J. Hansson & Till Grüne-Yanoff (eds.), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology. Springer, Theory and Decision Library A. pp. 207-20.details
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Credence for conclusions: a brief for Jeffrey’s rule.John R. Welch - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2051-2072.details
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The psychological representation of modality.Jonathan Phillips & Joshua Knobe - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (1):65-94.details
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For True Conditionalizers Weisberg’s Paradox is a False Alarm.Franz Huber - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):111-119.details
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Degrees all the way down: Beliefs, non-beliefs and disbeliefs.Hans Rott - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 301--339.details
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Compact Representations of Extended Causal Models.Joseph Y. Halpern & Christopher Hitchcock - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):986-1010.details
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Expressing Credences.Daniel Rothschild - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.details
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A new resolution of the Judy Benjamin Problem.Igor Douven & Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):637 - 670.details
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Degrees of belief.Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) - 2009 - London: Springer.details
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Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer.details
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Varieties of Bayesianism.Jonathan Weisberg - 2011details
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The Consistency Argument for Ranking Functions.Franz Huber - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):299-329.details
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Non-Ideal Decision Theory.Sven Neth - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeleydetails
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Knowledge representation and acquisition for ethical AI: challenges and opportunities.Vaishak Belle - 2023 - Ethics and Information Technology 25 (1):1-12.details
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Respecting Evidence: Belief Functions not Imprecise Probabilities.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (475):1-30.details
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Preference Change: Approaches From Philosophy, Economics and Psychology.Till Grüne-Yanoff & Sven Ove Hansson - 2009 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Representing credal imprecision: from sets of measures to hierarchical Bayesian models.Daniel Lassiter - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1463-1485.details
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Formal Nonmonotonic Theories and Properties of Human Defeasible Reasoning.Marco Ragni, Christian Eichhorn, Tanja Bock, Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Alice Ping Ping Tse - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):79-117.details
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Decision Theory.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Better Foundations for Subjective Probability.Sven Neth - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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A Basis for AGM Revision in Bayesian Probability Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (6):1535-1559.details
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Measure Semantics and Qualitative Semantics for Epistemic Modals.Wesley H. Holliday & Thomas F. Icard - 2013 - Proceedings of SALT 23:514-534.details
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Acting on belief functions.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2023 - Theory and Decision 95 (4):575-621.details
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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Non-Classical Probabilities for Decision Making in Situations of Uncertainty.Dominik Klein, Ondrej Majer & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2020 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 68 (4):315-343.details
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Tracking probabilistic truths: a logic for statistical learning.Alexandru Baltag, Soroush Rafiee Rad & Sonja Smets - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9041-9087.details
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Vagueness in Medicine: On Disciplinary Indistinctness, Fuzzy Phenomena, Vague Concepts, Uncertain Knowledge, and Fact-Value-Interaction.Bjørn Hofmann - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (6):1151-1168.details
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Bisimulation for Conditional Modalities.A. Baltag & G. Cinà - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (1):1-33.details
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Epistemic justification: its subjective and its objective ways.Wolfgang Spohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3837-3856.details
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Applied Logic without Psychologism.Gregory Wheeler - 2008 - Studia Logica 88 (1):137-156.details
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State-morphism MV-algebras.Antonio Di Nola & Anatolij Dvurečenskij - 2010 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 161 (2):161-173.details
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