Valor de verdad

In Luis Vega and Paula Olmos (ed.), Compendio de Lógica, Argumentación y Retórica. Editorial Trotta. pp. 627--629 (2011)
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Abstract

Down through the ages, logic has adopted many strange and awkward technical terms: assertoric, prove, proof, model, constant, variable, particular, major, minor, and so on. But truth-value is a not a typical example. Every proposition, even if false, no matter how worthless, has a truth-value:even “one plus two equals four” and “one is not one”. In fact, every two false propositions have the same truth-value—no matter how different they might be, even if one is self-contradictory and one is consistent. It is not such a big surprise that every true proposition, no matter how worthless, has a truth-value. Every proposition, whether valuable or worthless, has a truth-value.But it is a little strange that every two true propositions, no matter how different they might be, have the same truth-value. The Pythagorean Theorem has the same truth-value as the proposition that one is one. It is a stretch to think of truth-values as values in any of the normal senses of the word ‘value’.

Author's Profile

John Corcoran
PhD: Johns Hopkins University; Last affiliation: University at Buffalo

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