Abstract
Although the later Wittgenstein appears as one of the most influential
figures in Davidson’s later works on meaning, it is not,
for the most part, clear how Davidson interprets and employs
Wittgenstein’s ideas. In this paper, I will argue that Davidson’s
later works on meaning can be seen as mainly a manifestation of
his attempt to accommodate the later Wittgenstein’s basic ideas
about meaning and understanding, especially the requirement
of drawing the seems right/is right distinction and the way this
requirement must be met. These ideas, however, are interpreted
by Davidson in his own way. I will then argue that Davidson
even attempts to respect Wittgenstein’s quietism, provided that
we understand this view in the way Davidson does. Having argued
for that, I will finally investigate whether, for Davidson at
least, his more theoretical and supposedly explanatory projects,
such as that of constructing a formal theory of meaning and
his use of the notion of triangulation, are in conflict with this
Wittgensteinian quietist view.