The Concept of Persons in Kant and Fichte

In Antonia LoLordo (ed.), Persons: A History. Oxford University Press (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is well known that Kant seeks to discredit rational psychology on the grounds that we cannot access the nature of the soul by reflecting upon the ‘I think’ of self-consciousness. What is far less understood, however, is why Kant still believes the theorems of rational psychology are analytically true insofar as they represent the ‘I’ through the categories of substance, reality, unity, and existence. Early post-Kantian thinkers like Fichte would abandon this restriction and approach the concept of the ‘I’ instead through the category of community or reciprocal interaction. The result was nothing less than a radical shift in thinking about persons after Kant, yet in a way that would bear a striking affinity to the substance monism of Spinoza. The aim of this chapter is to trace the origin of this shift and its aftermath in Fichte’s effort to defend a new conception of the ‘I’.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WARTCO-41
Upload history
First archival date: 2018-10-08
Latest version: 3 (2020-10-09)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-06-21

Total views
72 ( #44,268 of 57,123 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
28 ( #26,877 of 57,123 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.