- The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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(1 other version)Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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Free will: a very short introduction.Thomas Pink - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Knobe effect: A brief overview.Adam Feltz - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (3-4):265-277.details
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Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: Experiments on folk intuitions.Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.details
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Are the folk agent-causationists?Jason Turner & Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):597-609.details
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(1 other version)Libertarianism and Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities.David Widerker - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.details
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The phenomenology of free will.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):162-179.details
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Folk intuitions on free will.Shaun Nichols - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):57-86.details
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(1 other version)Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.details
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(1 other version)Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style cases.Laura W. Ekstrom - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Metaphysics of Free Will: an Essay on Control.John Martin Fischer - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):373-381.details
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(1 other version)Responsibility, Luck, and Chance.Robert Kane - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-240.details
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(1 other version)Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.details
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Verbal reports as data.K. Anders Ericsson & Herbert A. Simon - 1980 - Psychological Review 87 (3):215-251.details
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Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (4):650-669.details
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(1 other version)Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2008 - In Joshua Michael Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):129-134.details
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(1 other version)Responsibility, Luck, and Chance.Robert Kane - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-240.details
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A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.Daniel Kahneman - 2003 - American Psychologist 58 (9):697.details
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Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.J. Knobe - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):190-194.details
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Intentional action : two-and-a-half folk concepts?Fiery Cushman & Alfred Mele - 2008 - In Joshua Michael Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 171.details
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The folk concept of intentional action: Philosophical and experimental issues.Edouard Machery - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (2):165–189.details
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Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases.Alfred R. Mele & David Robb - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):97-112.details
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Philosophy and the Folk: On Some Implications of Experimental Work For Philosophical Debates on Free Will.Manuel Vargas - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):239-254.details
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Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart.Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd & A. B. C. Research Group - 1999 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press USA. Edited by Peter M. Todd.details
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On the accuracy of personality judgment: A realistic approach.David C. Funder - 1995 - Psychological Review 102 (4):652-670.details
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A very brief measure of the Big-Five personality domains.Samuel D. Gosling, Peter J. Rentfrow & William B. Swann Jr - 2003 - Journal of Research in Personality 37 (6):504-528.details
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The fragmented folk: More evidence of stable individual differences in moral judgments and folk intuitions.A. Feltz & E. T. Cokely - 2008 - In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 1771--1776.details
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(1 other version)Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions : an essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 202–213.details
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(1 other version)The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control. [REVIEW]Randolph Clarke & John Martin Fischer - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (3):450.details
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Individual Differences, Judgment Biases, and Theory-of-Mind: Deconstructing the Intentional Action Side Effect Asymmetry.Edward Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2008 - Journal of Research in Personality 43:18-24.details
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In defense of the principle of alternative possibilities: Why I don't find Frankfurt's argument convincing.Carl Ginet - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:403-17.details
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(1 other version)Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Bringing moral responsibility down to earth.Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):371-388.details
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(1 other version)Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions: An essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Adam Feltz - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):202-213.details
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Intuitions and individual differences: The Knobe effect revisited.Shaun Nichols & Joseph Ulatowski - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (4):346–365.details
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(2 other versions)Free will, fundamental dualism,and the centrality of illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 489-505.details
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Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism.Robert Kane - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Why heuristics work.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2008 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 3 (1):20-29.details
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Responsibility, indeterminism and Frankfurt-style cases: A reply to Mele and Robb.Robert Kane - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 91--105.details
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An anomaly in intentional action ascription: More evidence of folk diversity.Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely - 2007 - In McNamara D. S. & Trafton J. G. (eds.), Proceedings of the 29th Annual Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society.details
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