- Determinism, ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and Moral Obligation.Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (1):35-62..details
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From Modal Collapse to Providential Collapse.Joseph C. Schmid - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (3):1413-1435.details
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(1 other version)Luck and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):543-557.details
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The phenomenology and metaphysics of the open future.Derek Lam - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):3895-3921.details
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There is no “I” in “AI”.Ashkan Farhadi - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-12.details
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Taking Hobart Seriously.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (4):1407-1426.details
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To be able to, or to be able not to? That is the Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Nadine Elzein & Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):13-32.details
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(1 other version)The Trouble with Tracing.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269-291.details
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Folk Intuitions, Science Fiction and Philosophy: Comment on Experimental Philosophy.Renia Gasparatou - 2010 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 10 (3-4):377-382.details
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Self-forming actions, contrastive explanations, and the structure of the will.Neil Campbell - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1225-1240.details
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The Two‐Stage Luck Objection.Seth Shabo - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):3-23.details
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Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will: Agentless Agency?Rick Repetti (ed.) - 2016 - London, UK: Routledge / Francis & Taylor.details
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Moral Responsibility, Luck, and Compatibilism.Taylor W. Cyr - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):193-214.details
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(3 other versions)Identification, situational constraint, and social cognition: Studies in the attribution of moral responsibility.Robert L. Woolfolk, John M. Doris & John M. Darley - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):283-301.details
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Bringing moral responsibility down to earth.Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):371-388.details
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The complex tapestry of free will: striving will, indeterminism and volitional streams.Robert Kane - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):145-160.details
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The Psychology of Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Morality.Fiery Cushman & Liane Young - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):9-24.details
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Events, agents, and settling whether and how one intervenes.Jason D. Runyan - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1629-1646.details
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The Two-Stage Solution to the Problem of Free Will.Robert O. Doyle - 2013 - In Antoine Suarez Peter Adams (ed.), Is Science Compatible with Free Will? Springer. pp. 235-254.details
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The Relevance of Folk Intuitions to Philosophical Debates.Adam Feltz - 2008 - Dissertation, Florida State Universitydetails
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The Lesson of Bypassing.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):599-619.details
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Modest libertarianism and practical reason.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):201-216.details
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A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.details
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Empirical Work in Moral Psychology.Joshua May - 2017 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will.John Lemos - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):31-48.details
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(1 other version)Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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How (not) to attack the luck argument.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.details
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Mental Causation and Free Will after Libet and Soon: Reclaiming Conscious Agency.Alexander Batthyany - 2009 - In Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.details
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(1 other version)More work for hard incompatibilism.Tamler Sommers - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.details
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Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
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Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board.Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.details
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Freedom and trying: Understanding agent-causal exertions. [REVIEW]Meghan Griffith - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (1):16-28.details
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Moral psychology: Empirical approaches.John Doris & Stephen Stich - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Variantism about responsibility.John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.details
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The past and future of experimental philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.details
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(3 other versions)Experimental philosophy.Joshua Knobe - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):81–92.details
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Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility.Adina Roskies - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (9):419-423.details
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(1 other version)Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.details
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Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions : an essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 202–213.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):342-350.details
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Experimental philosophy and free will.Tamler Sommers - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):199-212.details
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Moral luck: Optional, not brute.Michael Otsuka - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):373-388.details
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From Neuroscience to Law: Bridging the Gap.Tuomas K. Pernu & Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
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Free Will and Desire.Brian Looper - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1347-1360.details
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Why Christians Should Not Be Kaneans about Freedom.Michael D. Bertrand & Jack Mulder - 2017 - Philosophia Christi 19 (2):315 - 329.details
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Czy wnioski z eksperymentów naukowych badających wolną wolę są uzasadnione? Przegląd i analiza krytyki eksperymentów Benjamina Libeta i Johna-Dylana Haynesa.Michał Marzec-Remiszewski - 2016 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 6 (2):475-492.details
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Compatibilism can be natural.John Turri - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 51:68-81.details
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