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  1. Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn’t Behave Like Believing.Nichols Shaun - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (4):459-474.
    According to recent accounts of the imagination, mental mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination‐based inputs (pretense representations) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. That is, such a mechanism should produce similar outputs whether its input is the belief that p or the pretense representation that p. Unfortunately, there seem to be clear counterexamples to this hypothesis, for in many cases, imagining that p and believing that p have quite different psychological (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
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  • (1 other version)Recreative Minds.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):329-334.
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  • (2 other versions)Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (3):425-448.
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  • The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
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  • The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.Tamar Gendler - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):55.
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  • (1 other version)Thought Experiments.Roy A. Sorensen - 1992 - Oxford and New York: Oup Usa.
    In this book, Sorensen presents the first general theory of the thought experiment. He analyses a wide variety of thought experiments, ranging from aesthetics to zoology, and explores what thought experiments are, how they work, and what their positive and negative aspects are. Sorensen also sets his theory within an evolutionary framework and integrates recent advances in experimental psychology and the history of science.
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  • Distinguishing Belief and Imagination.Neil Sinhababu - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):152-165.
    Some philosophers (including Urmson, Humberstone, Shah, and Velleman) hold that believing that p distinctively involves applying a norm according to which the truth of p is a criterion for the success or correctness of the attitude. On this view, imagining and assuming differ from believing in that no such norm is applied. I argue against this view with counterexamples showing that applying the norm of truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for distinguishing believing from imagining and assuming. Then I argue (...)
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  • The Heterogeneity of the Imagination.Amy Kind - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):141-159.
    Imagination has been assigned an important explanatory role in a multitude of philosophical contexts. This paper examines four such contexts: mindreading, pretense, our engagement with fiction, and modal epistemology. Close attention to each of these contexts suggests that the mental activity of imagining is considerably more heterogeneous than previously realized. In short, no single mental activity can do all the explanatory work that has been assigned to imagining.
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  • The Puzzle of Imaginative Desire.Amy Kind - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):421-439.
    The puzzle of imaginative desire arises from the difficulty of accounting for the surprising behaviour of desire in imaginative activities such as our engagement with fiction and our games of pretend. Several philosophers have recently attempted to solve this puzzle by introducing a class of novel mental states—what they call desire-like imaginings or i-desires. In this paper, I argue that we should reject the i-desire solution to the puzzle of imaginative desire. The introduction of i-desires is both ontologically profligate and (...)
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  • Imaginative resistance revisited.Tamar Szabo Gendler - 2006 - In Shaun Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 149-173.
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  • (1 other version)Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality (I).Kendall Lewis Walton - 2015 [1994] - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:27-50.
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  • (1 other version)Mimesis as make-believe: on the foundations of the representational arts.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Mimesis as Make-Believe is important reading for everyone interested in the workings of representational art.
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  • Of the Standard of Taste.David Hume - 1985 - Liberty Fund. Edited by E. Miller.
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  • Of the standard of taste.David Hume - 1875 - In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Indianapolis: Liberty Press. pp. 226-249.
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  • The expression of feeling in imagination.Richard Moran - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):75-106.
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  • (1 other version)Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds.Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich - 2003 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephen P. Stich.
    The everyday capacity to understand the mind, or 'mindreading', plays an enormous role in our ordinary lives. Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich provide a detailed and integrated account of the intricate web of mental components underlying this fascinating and multifarious skill. The imagination, they argue, is essential to understanding others, and there are special cognitive mechanisms for understanding oneself. The account that emerges has broad implications for longstanding philosophical debates over the status of folk psychology. Mindreading is another trailblazing volume (...)
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  • Imagine that!Jonathan M. Weinberg & Aaron Meskin - 2005 - In Mathew Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 222-235.
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  • Imagining: A Phenomenological Study.Edward S. Casey - 1976 - Indiana University Press.
    Drawing on his own experiences of imagining, Edward S. Casey describes the essential forms that imagination assumes in everyday life. In a detailed analysis of the fundamental features of all imaginative experience, Casey shows imagining to be eidetically distinct from perceiving and defines it as a radically autonomous act, involving a characteristic freedom of mind. A new preface places Imagining within the context of current issues in philosophy and psychology.
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  • Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology.Gregory Currie & Ian Ravenscroft - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Christoph Hoerl.
    Recreative Minds develops a philosophical theory of imagination that draws upon the latest work in psychology. This theory illuminates the use of imagination in coming to terms with art, its role in enabling us to live as social beings, and the psychological consequences of disordered imagination. The authors offer a lucid exploration of a fascinating subject.
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  • (2 other versions)The Concept of Mind: 60th Anniversary Edition.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - New York: Hutchinson & Co.
    This is a new release of the original 1949 edition.
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  • Seeing And Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
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  • White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1993 - MIT Press.
    This collection of essays serves both as an introduction to Ruth Millikan’s much-discussed volume Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories and as an extension and application of Millikan’s central themes, especially in the philosophy of psychology. The title essay discusses meaning rationalism and argues that rationality is not in the head, indeed, that there is no legitimate interpretation under which logical possibility and necessity are known a priori. In other essays, Millikan clarifies her views on the nature of mental representation, (...)
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  • An Essay on Belief and Acceptance.Laurence Jonathan Cohen - 1992 - New York: Clarendon Press.
    In this incisive new book one of Britain's most eminent philosophers explores the often overlooked tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. He seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied, at its best, in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily believe or what they voluntarily accept? And (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
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  • Seeing and Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):121-124.
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  • (1 other version)Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality.Kendall L. Walton & Michael Tanner - 1994 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68 (1):27-66.
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  • (1 other version)Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading.Alvin I. Goldman - 2006 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts (...)
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  • Mind and Supermind.Keith Frankish - 2004 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Mind and Supermind offers an alternative perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the resulting account sheds light on a number (...)
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  • (1 other version)Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading.Alvin I. Goldman - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts (...)
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  • La varietà e l'unità dell'immaginazione.Kevin Mulligan - 1999 - Rivista di Estetica 11 (2):53-67.
    Attribuiamo l’esercizio dell’immaginazione a ogni genere di persona, in ogni tipo di circostanza e per ogni sorta di ragione. Le ipotesi e gli esperimenti men- tali dello scienziato, le visioni del folle, le fantasie quotidiane, le costruzioni del metafisico, il romanzo – sia per quanto riguarda l’autore che per quanto riguar- da il lettore –: in ognuno di questi casi riconosciamo di solito l’attività dell’im- maginazione. Così, tutto sembra indicare che l’unità dell’immaginazione sia qualcosa di davvero labile, se non addirittura (...)
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  • The Work of the Imagination.Paul L. Harris - 2000 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    This book demonstrates how children's imagination makes a continuing contribution to their cognitive and emotional development.
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  • Believing in things.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):584–611.
    I argue against the standard view that ontological debates can be fully described as disagreements about what we should believe to exist. The central thesis of the paper is that believing in Fs in the ontologically relevant sense requires more than merely believing that Fs exist. Believing in Fs is not even a propositional attitude; it is rather an attitude one bears to the term expressed by 'Fs'. The representational correctness of such a belief requires not only that there be (...)
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  • Practical reasoning and acceptance in a context.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):1-16.
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  • The Language of Imagination.Alan R. White - 1990 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  • Putting the image back in imagination.Amy Kind - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):85-110.
    Despite their intuitive appeal and a long philosophical history, imagery-based accounts of the imagination have fallen into disfavor in contemporary discussions. The philosophical pressure to reject such accounts seems to derive from two distinct sources. First, the fact that mental images have proved difficult to accommodate within a scientific conception of mind has led to numerous attempts to explain away their existence, and this in turn has led to attempts to explain the phenomenon of imagining without reference to such ontologically (...)
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  • Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning.Colin McGinn - 2004 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    The guiding thread of this book is the distinction Colin McGinn draws between perception and imagination.
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  • (2 other versions)Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (4):515-519.
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  • Mental images, a defence.Alastair Hannay - 1971 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 162:463-464.
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  • Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading.Amy Coplan - 2008 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66 (1):94-97.
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  • Mental Images: A Defence.Alastair Hannay - 1971 - Routledge.
    First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  • (1 other version)Believing, accepting, and holding true.Pascal Engel - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):140-151.
    Belief is not a unified phenomenon. In this paper I argue, as a number of other riters argue, that one should distinguish a variety of belief-like attitudes: believing proper - a dispositional state which can have degrees - holding true - which can occur without understanding what one believes - and accepting - a practical and contextual attitude that has a role in deliberation and in practical reasoning. Acceptance itself is not a unified attitude. I explore the various relationships and (...)
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  • (1 other version)L'Imagination. [REVIEW]G. B. & J. P. Sartre - 1937 - Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):25.
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  • Imagination.Roland Hall - 1962 - Philosophical Quarterly 12 (49):374.
    First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  • Images, Supposing, and Imagining.Annis Flew - 1953 - Philosophy 28 (106):246 - 254.
    In this paper I shall do three things. Firstly , I shall distinguish between three senses of “imagine”: one in which the word is used to report the occurrence of mental imagery; a second in which “imagined” is used as substantially equivalent to “thought”; and a third in which “imagine” is used as substantially equivalent to “suppose.” Secondly , I shall discuss Hume's thesis about imagination: both because, although this is set out as a plausible generalization about psychology, it nevertheless (...)
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  • Belief versus acceptance.Raimo Tuomela - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):122 – 137.
    In this paper the problem of the relation between belief and acceptance is discussed in view of recent literature on the topic. Belief and acceptance are characterized in terms of a number of properties, which show both the similarities and the dissimilarities between these notions. In particular it is claimed - contrary to some recently expressed views - that acceptance need not be intentional action and that the differences between belief and acceptance do not boil down to the simple view (...)
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  • Wanting things you don't want: The case for an imaginative analogue of desire.Tyler Doggett & Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophers' Imprint 7:1-17.
    You’re imagining, in the course of a different game of make-believe, that you’re a bank robber. You don’t believe that you’re a bank robber. You are moved to point your finger, gun-wise, at the person pretending to be the bank teller and say, “Stick ‘em up! This is a robbery!”.
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  • Puzzling over the imagination: Philosophical problems, architectural solutions.Jonathan M. Weinberg & Aaron Meskin - 2006 - In Shaun Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 175-202.
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  • Imagining and believing: The promise of a single code.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (2):129-39.
    Recent cognitive accounts of the imagination propose that imagining and believing are in the same “code”. According to the single code hypothesis, cognitive mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination-based inputs (“pretense representations”) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. In this paper, I argue that the single code hypothesis provides a unified and independently motivated explanation for a wide range of puzzles surrounding fiction.
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  • (1 other version)Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49 (2):161-166.
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