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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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Trust Responsibly: Non-Evidential Virtue Epistemology.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2023 - New York City: Routledge.details
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Action-Awareness and the Active Mind.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):133-156.details
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Extending Introspection.Lukas Schwengerer - 2021 - In Inês Hipólito, Robert William Clowes & Klaus Gärtner (eds.), The Mind-Technology Problem : Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artefacts. Springer Verlag. pp. 231-251.details
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On self-deception: from the perspective of Zhu Xi’s moral psychology.Kaili Wang - 2021 - Asian Philosophy 31 (4):414-429.details
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Subjective Reasons.Eric Vogelstein - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.details
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The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents.Agustín Vicente & Marta Jorba - 2017 - Noûs (3):737-759.details
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How to Express Implicit Attitudes.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):251-272.details
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Silencing without Convention.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):573-598.details
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The chronometrics of confirmation bias: Evidence for the inhibition of intuitive judgements.Edward Jn Stupple & Linden J. Ball - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):89-90.details
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Towards a dual process epistemology of imagination.Michael T. Stuart - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-22.details
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Higher-order preferences and the master rationality motive.Keith E. Stanovich - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (1):111 – 127.details
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Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?Julia Staffel - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.details
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Conscious belief as constructed memory: an empirical challenge to dispositionalism.Vishnu Sridharan - 2015 - Mind and Society 14 (1):21-33.details
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Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.details
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Credal accuracy and knowledge.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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The apparent illusion of conscious deciding.Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.details
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Cognitive access and cognitive phenomenology: conceptual and empirical issues.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):188-204.details
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Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.details
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Answering the Bayesian Challenge.Mark Sargent - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):237-252.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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Must cognition be representational?William Ramsey - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4197-4214.details
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The norms of acceptance.Joëlle Proust - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):316-333.details
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Requirements of intention in light of belief.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2471-2492.details
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Why are you talking to yourself? The epistemic role of inner speech in reasoning.Wade Munroe - 2022 - Noûs 56 (4):841-866.details
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The Quietest Challenge to the Axiology of God: A Cognitive Approach to Counterpossibles.Joshua Mugg - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (4):441-460.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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Introduction: Cognitive attitudes and values in science.Daniel J. McKaughan & Kevin C. Elliott - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:57-61.details
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Evaluación del razonamiento y la argumentación: procesos competentes, productos correctos y función propia.Fabián Bernache Maldonado - 2018 - Logos: Revista de Lingüística, Filosofía y Literatura 28 (2):308-324.details
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Inner Speech and Metacognition: In Search of a Connection.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):511-533.details
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Bayes and the first person: consciousness of thoughts, inner speech and probabilistic inference.Franz Knappik - 2017 - Synthese:1-28.details
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Bayes and the first person: consciousness of thoughts, inner speech and probabilistic inference.Franz Knappik - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2113-2140.details
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Self-building technologies.François Kammerer - 2020 - AI and Society 35 (4):901-915.details
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The Belief Illusion.J. Christopher Jenson - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):965-995.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Wherein is Human Cognition Systematic?Antoni Gomila, David Travieso & Lorena Lobo - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):101-115.details
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On the adaptive advantage of always being right (even when one is not).Nathalia L. Gjersoe & Bruce M. Hood - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):521-522.details
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Rational Action without Knowledge (and vice versa).Jie Gao - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):1901-1917.details
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Belief’s minimal rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282.details
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Evolutionary psychology, learning, and belief signaling: design for natural and artificial systems.Eric Funkhouser - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14097-14119.details
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Illusionism is no trick.Keith Frankish - 2022 - Human Affairs 32 (3):321-327.details
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How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts.Keith Frankish - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):145-146.details
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Dual systems and dual attitudes.Keith Frankish - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):41-51.details
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Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-doxastic Acceptances.Keith Frankish - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):23-27.details
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Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning.Keith Frankish - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):914-926.details
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Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
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The origins of mindreading: how interpretive socio-cognitive practices get off the ground.Marco Fenici & Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2020 - Synthese (9):1-23.details
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