Teza o "neskrivljenom neznanju" je instrument u okviru teorije pravednog rata koja sluzi da se moralno opravda ucesce u ratu za pripadnike one strane koja je porazena; uslovi za neskrivljenost su da su porazeni borci iskreno verovali da brane pravednu stvar i da su takodje iskreno verovali da imaju nekih izgleda da pobede. Bez ovog instrumenta teorija pravednog rata, jedna teorija koja opravdava rat preko pravednog uzroka rata, bi porazenoj strani narocito ako je slabija, morala da unapred pripise krivicu sto (...) je uopste usla u rat. Medjutim, u savremenoj situaciji rasirene kriminalizacije rata sam pojam rata se menja i postaje izuzetno neodredjen. Kako ratovi postaju sve vise i vise "asimetricni", pre svega u snazi sukobljenih strana, cini se da se teorija pravednog rata suocava sa teskocom da u svoje okvire uopste situira "neskrivljeno neznanje", ali to povlaci teskocu te teorije da pokaze da pravda ide sa pobedom, otvarajuci tako pitanje artikulacije pravednog mira. (shrink)

The paper has three parts. The first is a discussion of the values as goals and means. This is a known Moorean distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values, with one other Moorean item - the doctrine of value wholes. According to this doctrine the value wholes are not simply a summation of their parts, which implies a possibility that two evils might be better than one (e. g. crime + punishment, two evils, are better than either one of them taken (...) separately). In this first part I will discuss peace as an end value, and war as a means value. The second part dicsusses briefly the issue of sincerity. The third, last and for me the most important part of the paper explores the issue of moral integrity in pacifism: could a pacifist preserve the integrity of the attacker, or, for that matter her own integrity, or must she destroy anyone’s integrity and dehumanize the attacker and also herself? (shrink)

This paper addresses the ethical challenges raised by the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Using aspects of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, the paper demonstrates that lethal autonomous weapons systems create ethical problems because of the lack of moral agency in an autonomous system, and the inauthentic nature of the deaths caused by such a system. The paper considers potential solutions for these issues before arguing that from a Heideggerian standpoint they cannot be overcome, and thus the development and (...) use of lethal autonomous weapons systems should be resisted and prohibited. (shrink)

At the beginning of the Russian Federation’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union put up massive resistance, but due to its sudden overload, it was unable to deal with the situation adequately. It was in a state of paralysis for some time. Therefore, five explanatory models for the Russian actions are presented: an offensive, a defensive, a situational, a socio-cultural, and an ideological-historical one. It is then shown that the German term Gewalt, which combines the English terms (...) violence, power, and force ontologically, is best suited to summarize and describe all these models. It is also shown that Gewalt is a neutral, fundamental human concept that can be described as one of the basic driving forces of man. By piercing society, Gewalt constitutes an impulse, a motivation that stimulates and fuels the individual and society in toto. This leads to what we call Progressus, which depends on four variables – group desire, potential means of violence and force, group aims and objectives, as well as group comparison and evaluation. Progressus is inherent in all persons and in all societies. It can be analyzed and managed in a variety of different ways. Combined with the foundation of Gewalt, seen as neutral agent in varying levels of intensity, Progressus forms a matrix for efficient analysis to describe positive and frictional interaction, establishes social relations from friendship up to war; and this between individuals, groups and/or states. How this is possibly implemented in practice is described at the end using an example from the previously presented explanatory models. (shrink)

This paper presents the real case of a military surgeon who is the only one working at a small hospital in Iraq. The military surgeon can only operate on one wounded soldier due to limited medical resources. The first wounded soldier to arrive is the enemy. The second wounded soldier to arrive shortly after the enemy is a compatriot. Both soldiers will die without lifesaving surgery. The military surgeon is ordered by his superior not to operate on the enemy. Under (...) the Geneva Conventions, physician-soldiers are legally required to give medical attention impartially. The only exception is urgent medical need. Both soldiers, friend and foe, have an urgent medical need. Dual-loyalty dilemmas such as this one can arise for military medical practitioners when loyalty to patients comes into conflict with loyalty to third parties such as the state. In this paper, several solutions to the dual-loyalty dilemma are considered and rejected. Solutions to the dual-loyalty dilemma ultimate fail because they rest on the physician-as-healer model which grounds contemporary medical ethics. The view that the ultimate objective of physicians and medicine is winning battles is defended. Physicians are non-neutral and partial fighters who sometimes must do harm. Medicine is a weapon that physicians use to fight an enemy. The only relevant differences between a soldier and physician are the kind of enemy, location of the enemy, and the type of weapons used against the enemy. The paper concludes that physician-soldiers are doctors with borders. There is no dual-loyalty dilemma on the physician-as-fighter model. The military surgeon should obey his orders and not operate on the enemy. Implications of the physician-as-fighter model for mass casualty triage and physician-soldier participation in non-lethal weapons development are considered. (shrink)

In June of 1945, the International Military Tribunal (ITM) formed in London, faced the problem of a non-yet existing legal armor for the Nazi crimes. Two new rules were widely accepted there. First, a new category of war crimes, the “crimes against humanity” was legally defined. Second, the ex-ante rejection of the defense line “I was following orders” or Führerprinzip (the principle of the duty to obey every order given by the military leader). In the first part of this paper, (...) I will present in brief, the historical and legal context of the rejection of Führerprinzip as a defense line of the Nazi defendants in Nuremberg trials as also in Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, where the same legal context was enacted. Next, I will expose a short history of conscientious objection in war ethics and the International Law on Human Rights that supports it. This exposition reveals that objection to criminal orders has the status not only of a right, but also of a duty for the soldiers on either side of the war. In the third part, the Rawlsian view on conscientious objector will be exposed as the meeting point of a broadly Kantian conception of war ethics and the existing International Law frame. In the final part I will present some philosophical aspects of jus in bello theory, as also the critique of its importance, and its contribution to the reification of the moral importance of conscientious objection in wartime and the rejection of Führerprinzip. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Just War Theory and its philosophical foundations, which are conventionally positioned in opposition to pacifism and nonviolent conflict. This paper, however, takes the view that both, Just War Theory as well as pacifism and nonviolent conflict, are equally necessary and complementary approaches to living with the possibilities and tragedies of the human condition. Its approach is grounded in feminist theory and methodology and their connections with Galtung’s models of violence and peace. The paper argues that the (...) weaknesses of Just War Theory are intrinsic to the concept and its intent. The inherent contradiction of Just War Theory being that it intended to translate universal moral principles into reality, which makes them context dependent. Fundamentally, Just War Theory is derived from an ethic of justice ultimately centred on the right to use violence and kill. The right is conditional but means that a path to peace inevitably starts from death. An ethic of care is a philosophy where feminist thought meets pacifism and nonviolent conflict. It starts from the creation of life and charts paths to positive peace through the nurture of the conditions for lives in dignity. If we seek to contain the destructive and give space to the creative aspects of the human condition and understand its two extremes, life and death, in their relation to human agency, better we need to complement the traditional ethic of justice (of war and violence) with an ethic of care. (shrink)

Military activities with the framework of the IDF [Israel Defense Force] is carried out by citizens in a variety of positions. In addition to the ordinary positions of career officers and NCOs, the IDF consists of conscripted men and women as well as reservists. Some of the latter serve under an ordinary command to serve for a certain relatively short period. Other reservists, including pilots and special forces officers have served since they volunteered to serve. Facing the political clash between (...) the government, who have been viewed as trying to change the democratic nature of the state, and the popular opposition, who have tried to protect the judiciary and other elements of democracy, many officers who belong to the latter reservist group have suspended their voluntary service or even retired. Their decision has raised the obvious issue of whether such decisions can be justified, morally, ethically, and democratically. This is the topic of the present paper. (shrink)

In this article, I raise the question of whether economic sanctions are morally legal. I present the jus ad bellum principles and the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) as the theoretical basis for analyzing the ethical foundations of this political instrument. I show that economic sanctions are an instrument of war, that can be morally legitimized through the DDE and the just war principles. Using the example of the EU-sanctions against Russia I show how proponents of the DDE justify the (...) use of economic sanctions and what negative side effects result from their application. From a critical perspective, I want to show that this kind of moral justification is wrong. My critique is based on the assumption that the individual intention of an acting person/government can be misdirected by various external factors. As the groupthink concept illustrates, dissenting opinions are neglected in the consensus-building process. In addition, advisors, experts and employees influence the opinion of government officials to a considerable extent. This leads to the formation of specific moral concepts. This is particularly evident regarding the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian government has created its own moral code based on historical events, individual opinions and fantasies of maintaining power. This is contrary to the moral codes of Western states. The difference in moral concepts also results in different intentions to act. These different views make it difficult to evaluate sanctioning procedures as morally good or bad. Consequently, the mere focus on intention is insufficient as an assessment standard for the moral status of an action. (shrink)

The conduct of hostilities is very bad for the environment, yet relatively little attention has been focused on environmental military ethics by just war theorists and revisionist philosophers of war. Contemporary ecological concerns pose significant challenges to jus in bello. I begin by briefly surveying existing literature on environmental justice during wartime. While these jus in bello environmental issues have been addressed only sparsely by just war theorists, environmental jus ad bellum has rarely been tackled within JWT or the morality (...) of war. In line with the theme of this special issue, I focus my discussion of war and the natural environment primarily on the jus ad bellum level. I set out with the presumption against the use of force, and its possible exceptions. The principal question raised is whether environmental harm can trigger a new justification for war. Beyond just cause, I consider what might be a proportionate response to “environmental aggression,” or negligent harm to nature. The use of force is clearly justified in response to military attacks, against the natural environment or otherwise. Where harm to nature or its inhabitants are not caused by military aggression, just war theory criteria point in favor of responding via measures short of war. Finally, I suggest that responding by means that are not themselves harmful to nature serves to fulfill the further jus ad bellum criterion of “right intention.”. (shrink)

The traditional definition of war given by classical authors is, that war is a violent conflict between sovereigns. This means that war cannot be outlawed by any higher authority, since the sovereign is the uppermost authority upon the lives of the persons that are subject to them. Only the sovereign has the right and the power to forbid the violent resolution of conflicts among their subjects, and as sovereign they are not subject to any higher worldly power, but only to (...) the power of God. The obligations to God are for the most classical authors not of legal nature but constitute the realm of morality. Thus, the main question for the classical authors on war theory is the clarification of the moral conditions that justify a sovereign to wage war against another sovereign, the so-called theory of just war. Since the classical authors subordinate the concept of war under the concept of justice, the theory of just war includes reflections about the proper means of conducting a war from the point of view of justice. In other words, the theory of just war also formulates criteria for such acts that are considered as war crimes. In this essay I will not challenge the theory of just war itself, but the traditional definition of war in terms of exertion of legitimate violence. My alternative definition will be given in the third section of the essay, and relies on the Platonic concept of peace, and on the Aristotelian concepts of privation and analogy. I think that violence is not a constitutive characteristic of war, but the conceptual, i.e., logical consequence of its definition. In other words, the state of war can be declared and persist without any acts of violence. The use of violence is justified by the manifestation of the state of war. (shrink)

My starting point is the first major American military action in World War II in Europe, “Operation Torch.” The action was controversial because the American military regarded it as militarily useless, if not counterproductive. But the military was overruled by President Roosevelt on the grounds that, while it was not militarily necessary, it was politically justified. This indifference to military necessity seems to violate standard rules about the legitimacy of military force. The larger question it raises is the relation between (...) military concerns and political ones in warfare. Much of this essay explores the relation between these two dimensions in war: the military dimension and the political dimension. I argue that the second dimension is the most important one, as well as the most problematic one for the legitimacy of war. Yet it is ignored by standard just war theories. I then return at the end to consider again the problems raised by “Operation Torch,” and especially the question of the harms inflicted on a country’s own soldiers – in the name of killing and dying for public relations. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the Stoic view on attachment to external goods, or what the Stoics call “indifferents.” Attachment is problematic, on the Stoic view, because it exposes us to loss and exacerbates the fragility that comes with needing others and things. The Stoics argue that we can build resilience through a robust reeducation of ordinary emotions and routine practice in psychological risk management techniques. Through a focus on selected writings of Seneca as well as Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations and (...) Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations, I nonetheless ask whether Stoicism leaves any room for grief and distress. I argue that it does, and that consolation comes not from a retreat to some inner citadel, but from the support and sustenance of social connections. (shrink)

The First World War was supposed to end all wars, though soon followed WWII. Since 1945 wars continued to abound; now we confront a real prospect of a third world war. Many armed struggles and wars arise in attempts to end repressive government; still more are fomented by repressive governments, few of which acknowledge their repressive character. It is historically and culturally naive to suppose that peace is normal, and war an aberration; war, preparations for war and threats of war (...) belong to ‘normal’ human life. Our tolerance, acceptance or fostering of such repeated injustices and atrocities indicate pervasive failures to understand fundamentals of justice, and what we owe morally to ourselves and to all others, together with our responsibilities to preserve the biosphere, not merely our own store(s) of reserves. As matters both of justice and prudence we must re-orient ourselves, individually and collectively, to promote justice, peace and ecological responsibilities by identifying and instituting just forms of social cooperation, domestically and internationally. All of these are our problems, whether we recognize them or continue our pervasive negligence. We urgently require cogent understanding of the social dimensions of human judgment, rational assessment, right action, and public reason. This requires understanding (inter alia) how Kant’s explication of rational judgment and justification is fundamentally social, how these features of rational judgment and justification are constitutive of Kant’s account of individual autonomy, and how they are central to Kant’s account of proper public use of reason. Reasoning publically remains precarious, not because – as often alleged – the ‘Enlightenment project’ has failed. It has not failed, it has been thwarted, and in our public responsibilities we have too often failed it. (shrink)

In this article, I present a two-pronged argument for the immorality of contemporary, asymmetric drone warfare, based on my new interpretations of the just war principles of “proportionality” and “moral equivalence of combatants” (MEC). The justification for these new interpretations is that drone warfare continues to this day, having survived despite arguments against it that are based on traditional interpretations of just war theory (including one from Michael Walzer). On the basis of my argument, I echo Harry Van der Linden’s (...) call for “an international treaty banning all weaponized UAV [uninhabited aerial vehicles].”. (shrink)

The article traces the evolution and key characteristics of the German Sonderweg – Germany’s special path starting from the end of the 19th – the middle of the 20th century. The article considers geopolitical, ideological, and historical reasons for its emergence, transformation, and the specificity of its normative constitution, designed to morally justify the use of military force as an indispensable lever for Germany to achieve its goal of creating a “German Europe.” We develop a hypothesis of a possible remake (...) at the beginning of the 21st century of a new German Sonderweg, focused on creation of the “European Germany,” stemming from liberalism and just war theory. It is demonstrated that Zeitenwende, announced in 2022, facilitated the possible resort to arms and made militant solution of political dilemmas a reality again. The discourse analysis of the German political speeches makes it possible to claim that the political elites in Germany are preconcerted with normative justification of the possible war. The article considers two major lines of transformation of the contemporary just war theory and their possible implication in the German military and defense policy. One of these is the emergence of human rights paradigm of the just war doctrine, another – the growing tendency of the theory to stick to national cultural tradition instead of moral universalism. The combination of the two tendencies may trigger an array of very special and unpredictable normative developments of the military policy in Germany. The further movement alongside the idea of jus ad bellum may provoke specific national perceptions of the justice of the war, which may merge the idea of just war with traditional German realism if not militarism. This tendency may lure Germany into a trap of, what we term, “human rights militarism.” To what extent the trap is viable depends on the normative constitution of the key elements of Sonderweg. (shrink)

The article analyzes the issues of the legitimacy of war, the relationship between war and morality in the context of different ethical concepts. It is shown that the somewhat ‘fashionable’ notion of the ethics of war is actually problematic and does not clearly express the peculiarities of the relationship between war and morality. Analyzing the main conceptual discourses about war, it is argued that in some of them the acceptance of the legitimacy of war does not make sense with the (...) logic of the watershed between war and morality. Analyzing the 44-day War separately for the first time in the context of the principles of the conception of just wars, it is argued that Azerbaijan’s military aggression against Artsakh was actually accompanied by a gross violation of many of these principles, despite the propaganda efforts of the Azerbaijani side to claim the opposite. (shrink)

This article articulates a framework for normatively assessing influence operations, undertaken by national security institutions. Section I categorizes the vast field of possible types of influence operations according to the communication’s content, its attribution, the rights of the target audience, the communication’s purpose, and its secondary effects. Section II populates these categories with historical examples and section III evaluates these cases with a moral framework. I argue that deceptive or manipulative communications directed at non-liable audiences are presumptively immoral and illegitimate (...) for liberal states, as are deceptive operations aimed at an unjust end, or even operations aimed at a just end where secondary effects are forecast to be disproportionate to the proximate end. (shrink)

The subject of this article is the Orthodox Christianity’s approach to war. Christians of other denomination have developed an elaborate theory of war, so-called “Just War Theory” (JWT), which has also been accepted by non-Christians and even secular thinkers regarding the nature and justification of war. A vast literature has been produced in a dire attempt to render perfect the world by insisting on the claim that war is the act of punishment for breaking the law. The result is an (...) epistemological ease from which everything seems evident in advance including who is right and who at fault, who is and who is not favored by God. By removing from war an essential feature – that it is a form of conflict – JWT takes away the concept of reciprocity and introduces an in advance declared inequality which enables removal of uncertainty about the war’s outcome. In Orthodox Christianity, the situation is different. With still live debate whether to persevere or abandon original Christian pacifism, for Orthodox Christianity, war is always a combination of cataclysm and temptation and far less Manichean than anything present in JWT. The aim of war is peace; but, however necessary, justice is an insufficient condition for justification. The difference between “justness” and “justification” is preserved through the uncertainty whom God, at war’s end, loves more, because both victors and vanquished remain and continue to be in His grace. Losing a war, as such, does not turn the vanquished into criminals, nor does victory give the vanquisher the right of revenge for defending oneself. The latter approach to war has significant potentialities: preserving the distinction of ius ad bellum and ius in bello, preserving reciprocity, mutual respect and trust, impossibility of incrimination of war per se, the possibility of honorable defeat, etc. (shrink)

This paper analytically reflects and x-rays the African perspective of just war using human act valuation as the basis of argument. In the wake of time, philosophers, psychologists and ethicists have differentiated between two kinds of actions, namely human action and action of man. Accordingly, man is convinced that he is different from the rest of the animal family; hence he acts at a level which dogs, for example, cannot attain. In any case, man does not always act as a (...) man; his activity is not always stamped by what distinguishes him from other beings, namely rationality. Sometimes, he acts at the level he shares with other living beings; in other words, his activity at this level is ruled by a natural necessity or determined in the sense that doings at this sphere are not called actions, for they are ‘instinctive, thoughtless movement, mannerisms, reflex actions, or what is done under the influence of psychic constraints, hypnotic suggestions or demented frenzy etc.’ Such actions are rightly called actions of a human being, since their source is that bodily and spiritual individual who is called Peter, Paul, etc., but they are not human actions per se. They do not express the individual being; they do not proceed from him precisely as a human being. The only genuinely human action is the one which a human being performs in virtue of what distinguishes him from other beings. Since this is nothing other than reason, or rather, rationality, human actions are the actions which are performed when he acts as a rational being. Therefore, human acts are those actions of man that have their source in man’s rationality or spirituality, understood in terms of human’s interiority from which his activities flow. Beyond this, the African has got another sense of human act valuation, which is community-based or community-centered. In line with this, an attempt is made here to demonstrate how just war can be determined through human act valuation using the Igbo-African perspective as a case study. (shrink)

The paper examines the justification of warfare. The main thesis is that war is very difficult to justify, and justification by invoking “justice” is not the way to succeed it. Justification and justness are very different venues: while the first attempts to explain the nature of war and offer possible schemes of resolution, the second aims to endorse a specific type of warfare as correct and hence allowed – which is the crucial part of “just war theory.” However, “just war (...) theory,” somewhat Manichean in its nature, has very deep flaws. Its final result is criminalization of war, which reduces warfare to police action, and finally implies a very strange proviso that one side has a right to win. All that endangers the distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and destroys the collective character of warfare. Justification of war is actually quite different – it starts from the definition of war as a kind of conflict which cannot be solved peacefully, but for which there is mutual understanding that it cannot remain unresolved. The aim of war is not justice, but peace, i.e. either a new articulation of peace, or a restoration of the status quo ante. Additionally, unlike police actions, the result of war cannot be known or assumed in advance, giving war its main feature: the lack of control over the future. Control over the future, predictability, is a feature of peace. This might imply that war is a consequence of failed peace, or inability to maintain peace. The explanation of this inability forms the justification of war. Justice is always an important part of it, but justification cannot be reduced to it. The logic contained here refers to ius ad bellum, while ius in bello is relative to various parameters of sensitivity prevalent in a particular time, with the purpose to make warfare more humane and less expensive. (shrink)

Emotions are a much-neglected aspect of contemporary peace ethics, which is surprising if only because the concept of positive peace encompasses a certain emotional commitment. Moreover, some emotions explicitly promote separation, conflict, and even violence. Anger is an ambivalent emotion that, on the one hand, evokes conflict but, on the other hand, expresses a sense of justice. Anger can be soothed by forgiveness, and forgiveness can lead to reconciliation. However, in individual ethics, the conceptual and factual connections are easier to (...) explain than in political contexts, where collectives must be considered as actors. Martha Nussbaum recently subjected both anger and forgiveness to a well-founded critique. In contrast to this, however, a qualified defense will be made in the following. (shrink)

The dynamics of warfare have undergone significant transformations, necessitating a comprehensive reevaluation of the study of wars. It is no longer sufficient to solely focus on analyzing military operations; instead, a broader perspective is required. Postcolonial research has shed light on the changing forms of warfare that emerged after the era of military colonialism. This shift in the nature of conflicts demands the development and application of new research methods to effectively comprehend and address contemporary warfare. Of particular significance is (...) the emergence of informational and hybrid warfare, which blurs the traditional boundaries between states of war and peace. Consequently, the concept of peace, as the desired state of coexistence, warrants closer examination from multidimensional angles. While peace has historically been considered from moral and religious viewpoints, it is imperative to critically evaluate the applicability of these perspectives and explore alternative approaches. This article seeks to unravel the complex nature of peace by integrating insights from diverse disciplines. By adopting a multidisciplinary approach, encompassing moral, religious, and other disciplinary lenses, a more comprehensive understanding of peace can be achieved. Moreover, this interdisciplinary exploration enables a nuanced analysis of the intricate dynamics between war and peace, facilitating the development of effective strategies for conflict resolution. By critically examining the concept of peace and reevaluating the nature of war from this perspective, this article aims to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on conflicts and their potential resolutions. By combining theoretical reflections with empirical evidence, it offers a valuable resource for researchers, policymakers, and practitioners interested in comprehending the complexities of contemporary conflicts and working towards the attainment and sustenance of lasting peace. (shrink)

The introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) challenges much of our traditional understanding of military ethics. What virtues and what sort of ethics education are needed as we move into an ever more AI-driven military reality? In this article we suggest and discuss key virtues that are needed, including the virtue of prudence and the accompanying virtue of good and proper storytelling. We also reflect on the ideal of “explainable AI,” and philosophize about the role of fear in helping us understand (...) what is actually at stake in a military infused with AI-enabled and AI-driven weapons. (shrink)

This paper explores the topic of military ethics, what we mean by that term, what it covers, how it is understood, and how it is taught. It suggests that the unifying factor that makes this a coherent subject beyond individual national interpretations of it is the core idea of military professionalism. The paper draws out the distinction between training and education and draws on research conducted by a number of different people and agencies, including the International Committee of the Red (...) Cross, to establish what factors contribute to effective pedagogy and the inculcation of appropriate attitudes and behaviours. The paper concludes by looking at the way military ethics contributes to military outcomes from protecting civilians and the vulnerable to building resilience in our own military personnel to protect their mental health, through to the strategic costs of losing the moral high ground if behaviour is seen to fall short of that expected from military professionals. (shrink)

Existential threat is often mentioned in political rhetoric. While it is mostly used to denote threats to humanity as a whole, like climate change or AI, it is also used on a smaller scale. Existential threat to a state or a similar entity is often evoked too. Such a threat is considered grave enough to justify war and – possibly – the use of nuclear weapons. In the present article, the author aims to deconstruct the notion of “existential threat” in (...) relation to the state and show that it should not be used as a reason to go to war. The main argument is that the state has a specific mode of existence which makes it impossible to speak of state death unambiguously. Therefore, there can be no apparent threats to its existence. The author proposes a normative interpretation of the state. The state is understood as a project of a certain group, or even an individual, therefore the discussion of “existential threat” to a state should be dropped in favor of a more grounded evaluation of potential gains and losses by different social groups and political parties. (shrink)

This brief paper is a general treatment of war – its morality and its political and social effects. Accordingly, we discuss primarily those armed interactions between nations, or, in “civil” wars, those aimed at securing the reins of government. These must, we contend, be inherently immoral on one side – the one which “starts” the war in question – and inherently moral on the other, who after all are defending their lives against the first. To say this requires a moral (...) theory, which we briefly develop. It proceeds on Hobbesian-contractarian lines: if mankind occupies a “state of nature,” then we will all be worse off than if we join with each other in adopting the restrictions of morality – fundamentally, and primarily, of nonviolence, of living at peace with each other. This raises a question about the very rationality of war, to be sure. And yet, war we have, in considerable and unfortunate abundance. How can this be? Some tentative answers are suggested. (shrink)

In the Democracy in America’s chapters on war and armies in the transition from the aristocratic to the democratic social state (état social), Tocqueville briefly draws on Machiavelli regarding the conquest of a country with or without intermediary powers between political leadership and the people by which he primarily understands the existence of local nobilities. In this reference, Tocqueville is quick to express skepticism about the overstated importance of Machiavelli in the history of political philosophy. In different places of his (...) work though a more mitigated stance is documented. A comparative approach of Machiavelli and Tocqueville on war may seem odd, even inappropriate. In this paper I argue that the “brief encounter,” in Melvin Richter’s terms, of Tocqueville with Machiavelli can be fruitfully explored in order to make sense of the key importance for modern warfare of the collapse of nobility in Europe. Concomitantly, Machiavelli ‘s intuitions about conquering an absolutist state without intermediary powers compared to a state endowed with “prince” and “barons” can be further elaborated to better grasp its impact on wars including civil strife. In this paper I first explore Machiavelli’s perception of the intermediary powers in conquest and broadly in warfare paying due attention to the importance for the preservation of liberty of latent or open civil discord between social powers or classes; then I turn to Tocqueville’s rich analysis of the transformation of modern warfare due to democratic centralization and obsession with private welfare. Democratic armies constantly challenge democratic liberty and they can sometimes successfully albeit perversely integrate democratic ambition and turn it against democracy. I conclude with some reflections on the connection between war and politics regarding latent civil conflicts in democracies. (shrink)

Machiavelli believes that the expansion of a state is inevitable. Human affairs are characterized by constant movement and change, and expansion is the necessary stage of a state moving towards its prosperity. But there are historical examples of states that tried to stand stable for centuries and resist movement and expansion, but ultimately failed, because they were not prepared to grow by themselves or to deal with the growth of their enemies. This article tries to interpret the Machiavellian arguments that (...) support the thesis that the expansion of a state is inevitable and argue that its entrenchment within its borders is something contrary not only to the nature of human affairs but also to the proper constitution of the state. Also, the crucial question is whether Machiavelli's positions have ethical foundations rooted either in human natural right or in the modes or means of expansion. From this point of view, the terms hegemony and empire acquire a different meaning and a different moral dimension. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence in military operations comes in two kinds. First, there is narrow or specific intelligence – the autonomous ability to identify an instance of a species of target, and to track its changes of position. Second, there is broad or general intelligence – the autonomous ability to choose a species of target, identify instances, track their movements, decide when to strike them, learn from errors, and improve initial choices. These two kinds of artificial intelligence raise ethical questions mainly because (...) of two features: the physical distance they put between the human agents deploying them and their targets, and their ability to act independently of those agents. The main ethical questions these features raise are three. First, how to maintain the traditional martial virtues of fortitude and chivalry while operating lethal weapons at a safe distance? Second, how much autonomy to grant a machine? And third, what risks to take with the possibility of technical error? This paper considers each of these questions in turn. (shrink)

This short discussion paper proposes a non-traditional view to ethics and war, and aims to highlight new perspectives on how we view and understand war. Images, images, images are everywhere in the virtual sphere of the internet, YouTube, ads, and social media. This process of expressing oneself via the virtual image accelerates the fight for the aesthetic virtual beauty when people are trying to create an image of glorified, ideal, and perfect life. This is a mode of fight which aims (...) to narcissistically show off their grandiosity and desire for recognition, admiration, and fascination, fighting for the viewers and followers. Such mode of hedonistic desire seems to shun ethics away from the screen. However, Maurice Blanchot, a 20th century French philosopher, who was prone to denounce the issues of his contemporary time in a rather obscure and distant way, may give us the opportunity to understand this war of aesthetics in social media and ethics. (shrink)

This paper discusses Thucydides’ analysis of the disintegration of the political community under the unbearable stress in cases of the plague epidemic in Athens and civil war in Kerkyra. Due attention is paid to Thucydides’ methodology: the application of the art of medicine and antilogies. The destruction of the morality, fading away of virtue and neglect of both human and divine laws caused by the enormous fear of plague are presented through contrasting the state of lawlessness to the picture of (...) the ideal order from the famous Pericles’ speech in honor of the fallen Athenians. It is being analyzed marked similarity between the state of lawlessness in Athens and the destruction of the political order in stasis in Kerkyra concerning the destruction of the public morality, disappearing of lawfulness, and cancelling of the common good, despite the difference in predominant motivating passions – fear and lust for power, and different ways of corruption of the order in polis – apolitical stance and apathy vs. radical politicization. Finally, it is underlined Thucydides’ understanding of repetition of the historical events after the same pattern because of the changelessness of human nature. It is milder in peace and regular ordered state of affairs, so that people are usually sensible and honest, acquire moral stance and embrace lawfulness, whereas when it is exposed to danger and faces the hardest challenges, it loses its considerations and restraints and shows its evil, violent and cruel side. (shrink)

In this paper the author aims to explain the consequences of the implicit application of the zero-sum game model of distribution of moral responsibility for war, i.e., for causing war, within the context of the dominant perspective of modern-day ethics of war – Just War Theory. The main criterion of the jus ad bellum concept of Just War Theory, “just cause,” recognizes the possibility of only one “cause” of war, and every attempt to further analyze and investigate deeper causes of (...) war is automatically perceived through the zero-sum lens, as an attempt to justify or excuse the unjust side in war. No such thing happens when analyzing other, extremely morally troubling and disturbing phenomena as we invest significant effort into attempting to explain evil without this effort ever being understood as a justification attempt. The author demonstrates how the described approach in Just War Theory prevents us from fully understanding war, and thus implicitly from how to normatively prescribe human actions in and regarding war. The author also asserts that this perspective actually represents a presupposition concerning the possibility of justness of war. The author concludes that, in order to fully understand war and properly morally evaluate it, ethics of war must adopt a non-zero-sum model of distribution of moral responsibility and acknowledge the existence of a wide variety of causes of war. (shrink)

Political leaders, philosophers, sociologists, historians, political scientists, law scholars and economists approach terrorism in diverse ways, especially its definition. Politicians assign the meaning to the term terrorism that best suits them. Political scientists analyze the actions of those in the geopolitical framework. Moral philosophers look at terrorism from the viewpoint of fairness. Historians make a comparative assessment of the phenomenon through its evolution over time, and scholars of law simply dissect counterterrorism measures and assess their consistency with customs and current (...) legislation. Sociologists stress the importance of culture, social relationships and social interactions. Eventually, politicians and lawmakers are not immune to the influence of the common ethics and morals of their own societies and the uses and habits of their own cultures, including religious aspects. Morals and ethics relate to “right” and “wrong” conduct; the first provides guiding principles, and the latter refers to rules provided by an external source, e.g., codes of conduct in workplaces or principles in religions. While morals are concerned with principles of right and wrong, ethics are related to right and wrong conduct of an individual in a particular situation. Ethics, morals and religion are intertwined in the antithetical principles “good and evil.” This work aims to scrutinize the crucial concept of just and unjust war, and just and unjust combatants, and to elaborate on some critical moral and ethical elements within the modern understanding of the interplay between terrorism, counterterrorism, fundamental human rights, and international humanitarian law. Through the examination of all pertinent theoretical positions the paper seeks to shed light on the limits of the use of force and the justification of the violation of fundamental rights in the War on Terror. (shrink)

Numerous factors are known to impact human decision-making: fatigue, stress, fear, sleep deprivation, organizational culture, ethics, and even substances consumed, among others. Making decisions within the context of a military operation poses exceptional challenges. Time constraints are consistently tight, and military personnel often contend with physical and mental exhaustion, along with substantial stress and fear. Our proactive strategies for addressing these hurdles predominantly revolve around educating military personnel, incorporating both theoretical training and immersive simulations that may include different types of (...) war games, role playing and VR applications that mimic real-world challenges. However, can we extend our efforts further to ensure that military personnel surmount difficulties and consistently make morally and legally sound decisions amidst exceptional situations? Moreover, where does trust lie: in the insights of a comrade, a commanding officer, or the guidance provided by sophisticated algorithms and Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems? Could AI potentially outperform human guidance when it comes to elevating the ethical and legal discernment of military personnel amid the intensity of combat situations? (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to highlight the issue of the changed nature of warfare in the last few decades of the 20th and 21st centuries, with a special emphasis on ethical aspects and the problem of using an increasing number of child soldiers. The main thesis of the paper is that the practice of using and recruiting children in armed conflicts around the world is the least recognized and most neglected form of child abuse in modern society, and (...) that it is less a matter of culture and the lack of society’s attitude towards the values of the child, and more a matter of pragmatism and generally socioeconomic phenomenon. Several key events on the world scene played a crucial role in recognizing the problem of the existence and recruitment of children in armed conflicts around the world. But what is significant is that even in these cases it is nowhere clear and visible where the girls are in armed conflicts, what is happening to them and what are their rights? By revealing the militarization of girls’ everyday lives in armed conflicts and their role, girls must first and foremost become visible. The expected contribution of the paper will therefore move in the direction of highlighting and recognizing the ethical aspects of conflict-related sexual violence, of grave violations against children and ethical aspects of most severe forms of child abuse and the consequences of abuse, such as poor health outcomes and the destruction of their lives, and highlight the possible solutions to the mentioned problem within theoretical but also practical framework. (shrink)

Due to natural processes of movements of opposites that interact with one another in equal forces, the universe is naturally considered an arena of conflicts. As the law of the universe continues to maintain everything in motion, each matter in the ecosystem strives to protect itself in given existential struggles within necessary conflicts. Therefore, the fundamental law of nature is the protection of life (self-preservation) which is often realized through self-defence. It then explains why humans engage themselves in conflicts; not (...) necessarily to bring peace but to survive and maintain themselves in existence. Hence, war is motivated by the innate drive for self-defence and maintenance of self in existence guided by a natural instinct for survival. From conception to death, humans continue to struggle for survival and that entails overcoming conflicts and adversities of life. Thus, war can be considered as having a genetic foundation. This is evidenced in the works of evolutionary theorists. The Darwinian ethological theory tenaciously holds that humans, just like other organisms, struggle to survive, but this is influenced by natural selection which favours the stronger species against the weaker ones. While the stronger ones pass on their inheritable genes to the next generation for maintenance of their species in existence, the weaker ones die off. Hence, the survival of the fittest. This position was very much supported by the Malthusian theory of over-population alert against the limited human resources which demonstrates the constant fight for food in order to survive. The Nietzschean Superman, Marxian class struggle, Heraclitan notion of change, and so on, all cling to the idea that the universe is a violent arena. Consequently, the protection of life has an important moral value. By implication, self-defence is right and justified even if it involves war. Therefore, it is ethical to push through; to defeat the adversary. (shrink)