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  1. (1 other version)Aristotelian constructivism.Mark LeBar - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):182-213.
    The Kantian strain of practical constructivism (through Rawls, Korsgaard, and others) has been so influential that it is tempting to identify the constructivist approach in practical domains with the Kantian development of the outlook. In this essay, I explore a different variety of practical constructivism, what I call “Aristotelian constructivism”. My aim is to establish conceptual space for this form of constructivism by indicating in what ways Aristotelian constructivism agrees with its Kantian counterparts and in what ways it differs. I (...)
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  • (1 other version)In defense of future Tuesday indifference : ideally coherent eccentrics and the contingency of what matters.Sharon Street - 2009 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Boston: Wiley Periodicals.
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  • (1 other version)Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    Crispin Wright offers an original perspective on the place of “realism” in philosophical inquiry. He proposes a radically new framework for discussing the claims of the realists and the anti-realists. This framework rejects the classical “deflationary” conception of truth yet allows both disputants to respect the intuition that judgments, whose status they contest, are at least semantically fitted for truth and may often justifiably be regarded as true. In the course of his argument, Wright offers original critical discussions of many (...)
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  • (1 other version)Constructivism about Reasons.Sharon Street - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Iii. Oxford University Press.
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  • Formalism and constitutivism in Kantian practical philosophy.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):163-176.
    Constitutivists have tried to answer Enoch’s “schmagency” objection by arguing that Enoch fails to appreciate the inescapability of agency. Although these arguments are effective against some versions of the objection, I argue that they leave constitutivism vulnerable to an important worry; namely, that constitutivism leaves us alienated from the moral norms that it claims we must follow. In the first part of the paper, I try to make this vague concern more precise: in a nutshell, it seems that constitutivism cannot (...)
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  • Authority as a contingency plan.Carla Bagnoli - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):130-145.
    Humean constructivists object to Kantian constructivism that by endorsing the constitutivist strategy, which grounds moral obligations in rational agency, this position discounts the impact of cont...
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  • Constitutivism and the virtues.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):98-116.
    In Self-Constitution, I argue that the principles governing action are “constitutive standards” of agency, standards that arise from the nature of agency itself. To be an agent is to be autonomousl...
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  • (1 other version)Kant: constitutivism as capacities-first philosophy.Karl Schafer - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):177-193.
    Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics. But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta- normative questions? And if so, in what sense? In this essay, I’ll argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context of a broader issue – namely, how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in general. The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant (...)
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  • (3 other versions)A Theory of Justice.John Rawls - unknown
    Since it appeared in 1971, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice has become a classic. The author has now revised the original edition to clear up a number of difficulties he and others have found in the original book. Rawls aims to express an essential part of the common core of the democratic tradition--justice as fairness--and to provide an alternative to utilitarianism, which had dominated the Anglo-Saxon tradition of political thought since the nineteenth century. Rawls substitutes the ideal of the (...)
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  • (4 other versions)Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle & John M. Armstrong - manuscript
    A new English translation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. This ongoing project aims to translate accurately the meaning of Aristotle's terse Greek into readable American English for students and the general reader.
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  • (1 other version)Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning.Onora O'neill - 1996 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 60 (3):624-624.
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  • Ethics Done Right: Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory.Elijah Millgram - 2006 - Philosophy 81 (318):685-690.
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  • (1 other version)Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action.David Enoch - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):169-198.
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  • Constructivism and Three Forms of Perspective‐Dependence in Metaethics 1.Karl Schafer - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):68-101.
    Discusses how to develop the idea that the normative truth is perspective-dependent with a broadly constructivist approach to metaethics - arguing in favor of developing this idea in terms of the idea that the normative truth is dependent upon the perspective of the assessor.
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  • Constructivism about Practical Reasons 1.Aaron James - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):302-325.
    Philosophers commonly wonder what a constructivist theory as applied to practical reasons might look like. For the methods or procedures of reasoning familiar from moral constructivism do not clearly apply generally, to all practical reasons. The paper argues that procedural specification is not necessary, so long as our aims are not first‐order but explanatory. We can seek to explain how there could be facts of the matter about reasons for action without saying what reasons we have. Explanatory constructivism must assume (...)
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  • Kantian Constructivism and the Moral Problem.Bagnoli Carla - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1229-1246.
    According to the standard objection, Kantian constructivism implicitly commits to value realism or fails to warrant objective validity of normative propositions. This paper argues that this objection gains some force from the special case of moral obligations. The case largely rests on the assumption that the moral domain is an eminent domain of special objects. But for constructivism there is no moral domain of objects prior to and independently of reasoning. The argument attempts to make some progress in the debate (...)
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  • Kant in Metaethics: The Paradox of Moral Autonomy, Solved by Publicity.Carla Bagnoli - 2017 - In M. Altman (ed.), Kant Handbook. Palgrave. pp. 355-377.
    This chapter aims to situate Kant’s account of practical reason in metaethical debates. First, it explains the reasons why it is legitimate and instructive to discuss Kant’s relevance in contemporary metaethics, hence addressing some issues about the intended scope of metaethics and its relation to practical reason and psychology. Second, it defends an interpretation of Kant’s conception of autonomy, which avoids some paradoxes traditionally associated with self-legislation. Third, it shows that constructivism best captures Kant’s conception of practical reason and of (...)
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  • Creating the Kingdom of Ends.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    Christine Korsgaard has become one of the leading interpreters of Kant's moral philosophy. She is identified with a small group of philosophers who are intent on producing a version of Kant's moral philosophy that is at once sensitive to its historical roots while revealing its particular relevance to contemporary problems. She rejects the traditional picture of Kant's ethics as a cold vision of the moral life which emphasises duty at the expense of love and value. Rather, Kant's work is seen (...)
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  • Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David Owen Brink - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundation of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalistic world view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational life plan. In striking contrast to many traditional authors and to other recent writers in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of (...)
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  • Early Forms of Metaethical Constructivism in John Dewey's Pragmatism.Pierre-Luc Dostie Proulx - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (9).
    This paper demonstrates the innovative character of the approach to metaethics underlying John Dewey’s pragmatism. Dewey's theory of evaluation is contrasted with one of the most dominant contemporary metaethical theses: constructivism. I show that the insistence placed by metaethical constructivists on the actor’s practical point of view, on the rejection of the subjective preferences model, and on a specific form of ethical antirealism and naturalism echoes some of the most crucial claims made by Dewey. This argumentation leads to my main (...)
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  • (6 other versions)Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1781 - Mineola, New York: Macmillan Company. Edited by J. M. D. Meiklejohn.
    Immanuel Kant was one of the leading lights of 18th-century philosophy; his work provided the foundations for later revolutionary thinkers such as Hegel and Marx. This work contains the keystone of his critical philosophy - the basis of human knowledge and truth.
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  • Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Fred Feldman & J. L. Mackie - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):134.
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  • Teleology and Normativity.Matthew Silverstein - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:214-240.
    Constitutivists seek to locate the metaphysical foundations of ethics in nonnormative facts about what is constitutive of agency. For most constitutivists, this involves grounding authoritative norms in the teleological structure of agency. Despite a recent surge in interest, the philosophical move at the heart of this sort of constitutivism remains underdeveloped. Some constitutivists—Foot, Thomson, and Korsgaard (at least in her recent *Self-Constitution*)—adopt a broadly Aristotelian approach. They claim that the functional nature of agency grounds normative judgments about agents in much (...)
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  • Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement.Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1165-1183.
    Constitutivists explicitly emphasize the importance of self-reflection for rational agency. Interestingly enough, there is no clear account of how and why self-reflection plays such an important role for these views. My aim in this paper is to address this underappreciated problem for constitutivist views and to determine whether constitutivist self-reflection is normatively oriented. Understanding its normative features will allow us to evaluate a potential way that constitutivism may meet its purported metaethical promise. I begin by showing why constitutivism, as exemplified (...)
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  • The Varieties of Moral Improvement, or why Metaethical Constructivism must Explain Moral Progress.Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):17-38.
    Among the available metaethical views, it would seem that moral realism—in particular moral naturalism—must explain the possibility of moral progress. We see this in the oft-used argument from disagreement against various moral realist views. My suggestion in this paper is that, surprisingly, metaethical constructivism has at least as pressing a need to explain moral progress. I take moral progress to be, minimally, the opportunity to access and to act in light of moral facts of the matter, whether they are mind-independent (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Language of Morals.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1952 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Hare has written a clear, brief, and readable introduction to ethics which looks at all the fundamental problems of the subject.
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  • (1 other version)Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy.Onora O'Neill - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Two centuries after they were published, Kant's ethical writings are as much admired and imitated as they have ever been, yet serious and long-standing accusations of internal incoherence remain unresolved. Onora O'Neill traces the alleged incoherences to attempt to assimilate Kant's ethical writings to modern conceptions of rationality, action and rights. When the temptation to assimilate is resisted, a strikingly different and more cohesive account of reason and morality emerges. Kant offers a `constructivist' vindication of reason and a moral vision (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics.Onora O'Neill - 1975 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    'Two things', wrote Kant, 'fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe: the starry heavens above and the moral law within'. Many would argue that since Kant's day, the study of the starry heavens has advanced while ethics has stagnated, and in particular that Kant's ethics offers an empty formalism that tells us nothing about how we should live. In Acting on Principle Onora O'Neill shows that Kantian ethics has practical as well as philosophical importance. First published (...)
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  • Kantian Ethics.Allen W. Wood - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, Allen Wood investigates Kant's conception of ethical theory, using it to develop a viable approach to the rights and moral duties of human beings. By remaining closer to Kant's own view of the aims of ethics, Wood's understanding of Kantian ethics differs from the received 'constructivist' interpretation, especially on such matters as the ground and function of ethical principles, the nature of ethical reasoning and autonomy as the ground of ethics. Wood does not hesitate to criticize and (...)
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  • The Autonomy of Morality.Charles E. Larmore - 2008 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    In The Autonomy of Morality Charles Larmore challenges two ideas that have shaped the modern mind. The world, he argues, is not a realm of value-neutral fact, nor does human freedom consist in imposing principles of our own devising on an alien reality. Rather, reason consists in being responsive to reasons for thought and action that arise from the world itself. Larmore shows that the moral good has an authority that speaks for itself. Only in this light does the true (...)
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  • What good is a diachronic will?Luca Ferrero - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):403-430.
    There are two standard conceptions of the functioning of and rationale for the diachronic will, i.e., for an agent's capacity to settle on her future conduct in advance. According to the pragmatic-instrumentalist view, the diachronic will benefits us by increasing the long-term satisfaction of our rational preferences. According to the cognitive view, it benefits us by satisfying our standing desire for self-knowledge and self-understanding. Contrary to these views, I argue for a constitutive view of the diachronic will: the rationale for (...)
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  • (1 other version)Facts and Principles.G. A. Cohen - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (3):211-245.
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  • Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    David Enoch develops, argues for, and defends a strongly realist and objectivist view of ethics and normativity more broadly. This view--according to which there are perfectly objective, universal, moral and other normative truths that are not in any way reducible to other, natural truths--is familiar, but this book is the first in-detail development of the positive motivations for the view into reasonably precise arguments. And when the book turns to defend Robust Realism against traditional objections, it mobilizes the original positive (...)
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  • The Shmagency Question.Matthew Silverstein - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1127-1142.
    Constitutivists hope to locate the foundations of ethics in the nature of action. They hope to find norms that are constitutive of agency. Recently David Enoch has argued that even if there are such norms, they cannot provide the last word when it comes to normativity, since they cannot tell us whether we have reason to be agents rather than shmagents. I argue that the force of the shmagency objection has been considerably overestimated, because philosophers on both sides of the (...)
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  • Introduction: Metaethics and normative ethics.David Copp - 2006 - In The Oxford handbook of ethical theory. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 3--35.
    This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in the volume. In meta-ethics, it focuses on explaining the different kinds of moral realism and anti-realism, including the divine command theory, naturalism, non-naturalism, relativism, nihilism, and non-cognitivism. Quasi-realism illustrates how the distinction between anti-realism and realism can become blurred. A variety of views about the relation between morality and practical (...)
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  • Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    It is often claimed that irreducibly normative truths would have unacceptable metaphysical implications, and are incompatible with a scientific view of the world. The book argues, on the basis of a general account of the relevance of ontological questions, that this claim is mistaken. It is also a mistake to think that interpreting normative judgments as beliefs would make it impossible to explain their connection with action. An agent’s acceptance of a normative judgment can explain that agent’s subsequent action because (...)
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  • Kantian Autonomy.Terence Irwin - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:137-164.
    Kant takes autonomy to be recognizably valuable. In claiming that non-Kantian views of morality treat the morally good will as heteronomous, he intends to present an objection to these views. He expects proponents of these views to recognize that the implication of heteronomy is a serious objection; his task is not to convince them that heteronomy is bad, but to convince them that their views imply heteronomy.
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  • Reason in its Practical Application.E. Sonny Elizondo - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-17.
    Is practical reason a cognitive faculty? Do practical judgments make claims about a subject matter that are appropriately assessed in terms of their agreement with that subject matter? According to Kantians like Christine Korsgaard, the answer is no. To think otherwise is to conflate the theoretical and the practical, the epistemic and the ethical. I am not convinced. In this paper, I motivate my skepticism through examination of the very figure who inspires Korsgaard’s rejection of cognitivism: Kant. For as I (...)
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  • Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
    This book continues and revises the ideas of justice as fairness that John Rawls presented in _A Theory of Justice_ but changes its philosophical interpretation in a fundamental way. That previous work assumed what Rawls calls a "well-ordered society," one that is stable and relatively homogenous in its basic moral beliefs and in which there is broad agreement about what constitutes the good life. Yet in modern democratic society a plurality of incompatible and irreconcilable doctrines--religious, philosophical, and moral--coexist within the (...)
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  • Constitutivism about Practical Reasons.Paul Katsafanas - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 367-394.
    This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature – a constitutive aim, principle, or standard – that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to derive normative claims. In short, the authority of certain (...)
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  • Coming to terms with contingency : Humean constructivism about practical reason.Sharon Street - 2012 - In James Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
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  • Constructivism and wise judgment.Valerie Tiberius - 2012 - In James Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 195.
    In this paper I introduce a version of constructivism that relies on a theory of practical wisdom. Wise judgment constructivism is a type of constructivism because it takes correct judgments about what we have “all-in” reason to do to be the result of a process we can follow, where our interest in the results of this process stems from our practical concerns. To fully defend the theory would require a comprehensive account of wisdom, which is not available. Instead, I describe (...)
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  • A Problem for Ambitious Metanormative Constructivism.Nadeem J. Z. Hussain - 2012 - In James Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    We can distinguish between ambitious metanormative constructivism and a variety of other constructivist projects in ethics and metaethics. Ambitious metanormative constructivism is the project of either developing a type of new metanormative theory, worthy of the label “constructivism”, that is distinct from the existing types of metaethical, or metanormative, theories already on the table—various realisms, non-cognitivisms, error-theories and so on—or showing that the questions that lead to these existing types of theories are somehow fundamentally confused. Natural ways of pursuing the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard's Rejection of Realism.Nadeem Hussain & Nishi Shah - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 265-94.
    Contemporary Kantianism is often regarded as both a position within normative ethics and as an alternative to metaethical moral realism. We argue that it is not clear how contemporary Kantianism can distinguish itself from moral realism. There are many Kantian positions. For reasons of space we focus on the position of one of the most prominent, contemporary Kantians, Christine Korsgaard. Our claim is that she fails to show either that Kantianism is different or that it is better than realism. Our (...)
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  • Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Are there such things as moral truths? How do we know what we should do? And does it matter? Constructivism states that moral truths are neither invented nor discovered, but rather are constructed by rational agents in order to solve practical problems. While constructivism has become the focus of many philosophical debates in normative ethics, meta-ethics and action theory, its importance is still to be fully appreciated. These new essays written by leading scholars define and assess this new approach in (...)
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  • Constructivism and the Error Theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2011 - In Christian Miller (ed.), Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum.
    This paper presents a comparative evaluation of constructivist and error theoretic accounts of moral claims. It is argued that constructivism has distinct advantages over error theory.
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  • The Fact of Reason. Kant’s Passage to Ordinary Moral Knowledge.Paweł Łuków - 1993 - Kant Studien 84 (2):204-221.
    The paper gives an interpretation of Kant's doctrine of the fact of reason against the background of a constructivist reading of his philosophy, which does not allow us to appeal to any indubitable facts. The fact of reason is the object of a philosophical account of the moral law forms the quid juris part of deduction or legitimization of the law. A more intuitive grasp of the fact is the phenomenon of reverence for duty which ordinary people grasp in form (...)
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  • Expressivism, constructivism, and the supervenience of moral properties.Chris Meyers - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):17-31.
    One of the most familiar arguments for expressivist metaethics is the claim that the rival theory, moral realism, cannot provide a satisfying explanation of why moral properties supervene on natural properties. Non-cognitivism, however, has its own problems explaining supervenience. Expressivists try to establish supervenience either by second-order disapproval of type-inconsistent moral evaluations or by pragmatic considerations. But disapproval of inconsistency is merely a contingent attitude that people happen to have; and pragmatic justification does not allow for appraisers to take their (...)
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  • Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (9999):99-122.
    In this paper I trace the development of one of the central debates of late twentieth-century moral philosophy—the debate between realism and what Rawls called “constructivism.” Realism, I argue, is a reactive position that arises in response to almost every attempt to give a substantive explanation of morality. It results from the realist’s belief that such explanations inevitably reduce moral phenomena to natural phenomena. I trace this belief, and the essence of realism, to a view about the nature of concepts—that (...)
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  • The Presidential Address: Constructivisms in Ethics.Onora O'Neill - 1989 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89:1 - 17.
    Onora O'Neill; I *—The Presidential Address: Constructivisms in Ethics, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 1–18, ht.
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