Functionalism would be mistaken if there existed a system of deviant relations (an “anti-mind”) that had the same functional roles as the standard mental relations. In this paper such a system is constructed, using “Quinean transformations” of the sort associated with Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. For example, a mapping m from particularistic propositions (e.g., that there exists a rabbit) to universalistic propositions (that rabbithood is manifested). Using m, a deviant relation thinking* is defined: x thinks* p iff (...) x thinks m(p). Such deviant relations satisfy the commonly discussed functionalist psychological principles. Finally, a more complicated system of deviant relations is constructed, one satisfying sophisticated principles dealing with the self-conscious rational mind. (shrink)

In this foundational work on the theory of linguistic and mental representation, Stephen Schiffer surveys all the leading theories of meaning and content in the philosophy of language and finds them lacking. He concludes that there can be no correct, positive philosophical theory or linguistic or mental representation and, accordingly advocates the deflationary "no-theory theory of meaning and content." Along the way he takes up functionalism, the nature of propositions and their suitability as contents, the language of thought and other (...) sententialist theories of belief, intention based semantics, and related issues in ontology. Stephen Schiffer is Professor of Philosophy at the City University of New York Graduate Center. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

It is argued that david lewis' account of convention in "convention" required too much self-Consciousness of parties participating in a convention. In particular, It need not be known that there are equally good alternatives to the convention. This point affects other features of the definition, And suggests that the account is too much guided by the "rational assembly" picture of human conventions. (edited).

Scientific essentialism is the view that some necessities can be known only with the aid of empirical science. The thesis of the paper is that scientific essentialism does not extend to the central questions of philosophy and that these questions can be answered a priori. The argument is that the evidence required for the defense of scientific essentialism is reliable only if the intuitions required by philosophy to answer its central questions is also reliable. Included is an outline of a (...) modal reliabilist theory of basic evidence and a concept-possession account of the reliability of a priori intuition. (shrink)

This is the only complete logic for properties, relations, and propositions (PRPS) that has been formulated to date. First, an intensional abstraction operation is adjoined to first-order quantifier logic, Then, a new algebraic semantic method is developed. The heuristic used is not that of possible worlds but rather that of PRPS taken at face value. Unlike the possible worlds approach to intensional logic, this approach yields a logic for intentional (psychological) matters, as well as modal matters. At the close of (...) the paper, the origin of incompleteness in logic is investigated. The culprit is found to be the predication relation, a relation on properties and relations that is expressed in natural language by the copula. (shrink)

It is argued that the distinction between the mental and the nonmental is at bottom logical. The paper begins by sketching and defending a theory of intensional logic in which the notion of logically and metaphysically basic relations (called connections) can be defined. This notion is then employed in an analysis of intentionality: a connection is intentional iff it can contingently connect some individual to some proposition or concept independently of whether it connects the individual to some necessarily equivalent proposition (...) or concept. After potential counterexamples have been explained away, the paper then extends the analysis to a general analysis of mentality. Finally, a "transcendental" argument is given for the thesis that at least some mental relations must be logically and metaphysically basic. (shrink)

This study provides a unified theory of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs). Two conceptions of PRPs have emerged in the history of philosophy. The author explores both of these traditional conceptions and shows how they can be captured by a single theory.

Higher-order theories of properties, relations, and propositions are known to be essentially incomplete relative to their standard notions of validity. It turns out that the first-order theory of PRPs that results when first-order logic is supplemented with a generalized intensional abstraction operation is complete. The construction involves the development of an intensional algebraic semantic method that does not appeal to possible worlds, but rather takes PRPs as primitive entities. This allows for a satisfactory treatment of both the modalities and the (...) propositional attitudes, and it suggests a general strategy for developing a comprehensive treatment of intensional logic. (shrink)

Expressions in a language, whether words, phrases, or sentences, have meanings. So it seems reasonable to suppose that there are meanings that expressions have. Of course, it is fashionable in some philosophical circles to deny this.

An axiomatic theory of abstract objects is developed and used to construct models of Plato's Forms, Leibniz's Monads, Possible Worlds, Frege's Senses, stories, and fictional characters. The theory takes six primitive metaphysical notions: object ; n-place relations ,G,...); x,...x exemplify F x...x); x exists ; it is necessary that "); and x encodes F "). Properties and propositions are one place and zero place relations, respectively.objects are objects which necessarily fail to exist E!x"). The two most important proper axioms are (...) that no possibly existing object encodes any properties E!x F)xF)), and for every expressible condition on properties, there is an abstract object which encodes just the properties satisfying the condition x) )), where has no free x's). Semantically, an abstract object encodes a property iff the property is an element of the set of properties correlated with the object. Two abstract objects will be identical just in case they encode the same properties. Abstract objects may exemplify properties as well--being non-red, not having spatial location, etc. ;The models of Forms, Monads, and Possible Worlds consist in: identifying these philosophical entities as different species of abstract objects through definitions of the object language, and either showing that there are consequences of the theory which are reasonable facsimiles of assertions made by important philosophers or showing that there are many interesting theorems which capture our own intuitions about these entities . The model for Frege's Senses consists in: developing a language in which the abstract objects generated by the theory serve as the senses of names and descriptions, and showing that the data may be consistently translated into the language preserving truth. Finally, the model for fictional characters consists in: assigning abstract objects to serve as the denotations of names of stories and characters, and showing that such an assignment allows us to understand how the intuitively true sentences about stories and characters have the truth value that they do. ;The material is structured as follows. In Chapters I, III, and V, the elementary, modal, and typed theories of abstract objects are developed, respectively. In Chapters II, IV, and VI, these theories are applied, respectively. Each of the theoretical chapters is subdivided as follows: 1--The Language; 2--The Semantics; 3--The Logic; and 4--The Proper Axioms. Thus, the proper axioms of the theory are couched in a precisely defined and interpreted language, and the logic allow us to prove the consequences of the theory. (shrink)