- What Are Structural Properties?†.Johannes Korbmacher & Georg Schiemer - 2018 - Philosophia Mathematica 26 (3):295-323.details
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(1 other version)To Be F Is To Be G.Cian Dorr - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):39-134.details
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The A-Theory of Time, The B-Theory of Time, and ‘Taking Tense Seriously’.Dean W. Zimmerman - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):401-457.details
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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(1 other version)Intuition as a Second Window.Nenad Miscevic - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):87-112.details
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017details
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Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism.Arvid Båve - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):1-21.details
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The Limitations of Perceptual Transparency.Laura Gow - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):723-744.details
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Lewis, David: Nuevo Trabajo para una Teoría de los Universales [Translation] - Parte I.David Lewis & Diego Morales - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (157):251-267.details
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Fine-Grained Type-Free Intensionality.George Bealer - 1989 - In Gennero Chierchia, Barbara H. Partee & Raymond Turner (eds.), Properties, Types, and Meaning, Volume 1. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 177-230.details
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Magnitudes: Metaphysics, Explanation, and Perception.Christopher Peacocke - 2015 - In Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 357-388.details
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Deep Platonism.Chad Carmichael - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):307-328.details
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Non‐Analytic Logic.Hartley Slater - 2014 - Philosophical Investigations 37 (3):195-207.details
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The meaning of 'ought'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 127-160.details
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On Meaningfulness and Truth.Brian Edison McDonald - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (5):433 - 482.details
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Internalist Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma.Ali Hasan - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):171-184.details
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Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes?Sean Crawford - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):179-210.details
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Intentionality and Compound Accounts of the Emotions.Reid D. Blackman - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):67-90.details
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Modal Property Comprehension.Ulrich Meyer - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):693-707.details
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Not All Attitudes are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.details
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Identity, continuity and consciousness.Mark R. Whittington - unknowndetails
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Ontology - Bibliographical Guide.Raul Corazzon - unknowndetails
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Know-How and Concept Possession.Bengson John & Moffett Marc - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.details
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The existence of God and the creation of the universe.Jack C. Carloye - 1992 - Zygon 27 (2):167-185.details
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Resembling Particulars: What Nominalism?Matteo Morganti - 2007 - Metaphysica 8 (2):165-178.details
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On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions.Jeff Speaks - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):528-562.details
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A New Framework for Conceptualism.John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.details
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Universals.Chad Carmichael - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):373-389.details
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Recent work on propositions.Peter Hanks - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):469-486.details
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A semantic resolution of the paradox of analysis.Dennis Earl - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (3):189-205.details
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Paradoxes of intensionality.Dustin Tucker & Richmond H. Thomason - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):394-411.details
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A repair of Frege’s theory of thoughts.Mark Textor - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):105 - 123.details
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The underdetermination of typings.Jan Westerhoff - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (3):379 - 414.details
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How ontology might be possible: Explanation and inference in metaphysics.Chris Swoyer - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):100–131.details
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Structural representation and surrogative reasoning.Chris Swoyer - 1991 - Synthese 87 (3):449 - 508.details
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Propositional attitudes without propositions.Friederike Moltmann - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):77 - 118.details
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Intrinsic/extrinsic.I. L. Humberstone - 1996 - Synthese 108 (2):205-267.details
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Complex predicates and logics for properties and relations.Chris Swoyer - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (3):295-325.details
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A new perspective on the problem of applying mathematics.Christopher Pincock - 2004 - Philosophia Mathematica 12 (2):135-161.details
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Against propositionalism.Michelle Montague - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):503–518.details
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On meaningfulness and truth.BrianEdison McDonald - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (5):433-482.details
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Possible-worlds semantics for modal notions conceived as predicates.Volker Halbach, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):179-223.details
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Standard quantification theory in the analysis of English.Stephen Donaho - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (6):499-526.details
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On the identification of properties and propositional functions.George Bealer - 1989 - Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1):1 - 14.details
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Property theory: The Type-Free Approach v. the Church Approach.George Bealer - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (2):139 - 171.details
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Completeness in the theory of properties, relations, and propositions.George Bealer - 1983 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (2):415-426.details
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Fregean equivocation and ramsification on sparse theories: Response to McCullagh.George Bealer - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (5):500-510.details
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Can the physicalist explain colour structure in terms of colour experience?1.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.details
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(1 other version)The nature of epistemic space.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):205-240.details
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