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Experiences are Representations: An Empirical Argument (forthcoming Routledge).Adam Pautz - 2016 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. New York: Routledge.details
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The adverbial approach to visual experience.Michael Tye - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (April):195-226.details
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Phenomenal character.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):21-38.details
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Phenomenal Character Revisited.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):465-467.details
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The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.details
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Do the benefits of naïve realism outweigh the costs? Comments on fish, perception, hallucination and illusion.Adam Pautz - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):25-36.details
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The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience.Neil Mehta - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (6):311-331.details
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The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.details
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The limits of self-awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.details
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Setting things before the mind.Michael G. F. Martin - 1998 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 157--179.details
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What should the naïve realist say about total hallucinations?Heather Logue - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):173-199.details
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Good News for the Disjunctivist about (one of) the Bad Cases.Heather Logue - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.details
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Color Illusion.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):751-775.details
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The obscure object of hallucination.Mark Johnston - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.details
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Symposium: The adverbial theory of perception. On the adverbial analysis of visual experience.Frank Jackson - 1975 - Metaphilosophy 6 (2):127–135.details
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Appearance and Illusion.James Genone - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):339-376.details
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On the Particularity of Experience.Anil Gomes & Craig French - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):451-460.details
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Perception, hallucination, and illusion: reply to my critics. [REVIEW]William Fish - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):57-66.details
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Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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Rethinking naive realism.Ori Beck - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):607-633.details
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The openness of illusions.Louise Antony - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):25-44.details
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Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion.William Fish - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument.John McDowell - 2006 - In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 376-389.details
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Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge.John McDowell - 1983 - In Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 68: 1982. Oxford University Press. pp. 455-79.details
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Type materialism for phenomenal consciousness.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 431--444.details
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The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.details
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Disjunctivism about visual experience.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 112--143.details
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On being alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.details
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Disjunctivism, indistinguishability, and the nature of hallucination.William Fish - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 144--167.details
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Better Than Mere Knowledge? The Function of Sensory Awareness.Mark Johnston - 2006 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 260--290.details
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On the Way Things Appear.Sydney Shoemaker - 2006 - In John Hawthorne (ed.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 461--480.details
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Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):490-494.details
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The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument.J. Mcdowell - 2006 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (1).details
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Demonstrative Reference, the Relational View of Experience, and the Proximality Principle.John Campbell - 2010 - In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford University Press.details
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Comparing the major theories of consciousness.Ned Block - 2009 - In Michael Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences IV. pp. 1111-1123.details
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