- Gricean Quality.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):689-703.details
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Hope.John Patrick Day - 1969 - American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (2):89-102.details
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Two more for the knowledge account of assertion.Matthew Benton - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):684-687.details
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Embedding Epistemic Modals.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):867-914.details
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The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.details
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Hopes and Dreams.Adrienne M. Martin - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):148 - 173.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Fallibilism, epistemic possibility, and concessive knowledge attributions.Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):123-132.details
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Confusion about concessive knowledge attributions.Dylan Dodd - 2010 - Synthese 172 (3):381 - 396.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Assertion.Peter Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.details
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The value of hope.Luc Bovens - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):667-681.details
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Reasons and factive emotions.Christina H. Dietz - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1681-1691.details
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(1 other version)Having False Reasons.Juan Comesaña & Matthew McGrath - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 59-80.details
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Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: An Essay in Philosophical Science.John Turri - 2016 - Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.details
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On Folk Epistemology. How we think and talk about knowledge.Mikkel Gerken - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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(1 other version)Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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One Kind of Asking.Dennis Whitcomb - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266).details
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Fallibilism and concessive knowledge attributions.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Analysis 65 (2):126-131.details
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Possibly false knowledge.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (5):225-246.details
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Fallibilism and the flexibility of epistemic modals.Charity Anderson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):597-606.details
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Knowledge and epistemic necessity.John Hawthorne - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):493-501.details
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The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy.Robert Morris Gordon - 1987 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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How We Hope: A Moral Psychology.Adrienne Martin - 2013 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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How to be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.details
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What Is It to Be Happy That P?Jeremy Fantl - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.details
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Fallibilism.Trent Dougherty - 2010 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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Ambiguity.Adam Sennet - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Emotions and knowledge.Robert M. Gordon - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (July):408-413.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):557-567.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]Richard Feldman - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):211-226.details
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(1 other version)The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy.Robert M. Gordon - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):63-67.details
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(1 other version)The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy.Robert C. Roberts & Robert M. Gordon - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (2):266.details
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Fallibilism, epistemic possibility, and epistemic agency.Baron Reed - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):40-69.details
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Hope.R. S. Downie - 1963 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (2):248-251.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.details
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How to think about fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):143-157.details
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(1 other version)Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Assertion: An introduction and overview.Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-17.details
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``Must we Know What we Say?".Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Clarity about concessive knowledge attributions: reply to Dodd.Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):395-403.details
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