- Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):481-508.details
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Doxastic justification through dispositions to cause.Julius Schönherr - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-18.details
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Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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A limitation on agency in judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-21.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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From the agent’s point of view: the case against disjunctivism about rationalisation.Edgar Phillips - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):262-280.details
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Weak Non-Evidentialism.Tommaso Piazza - 2021 - In Luca Moretti & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Leiden: Brill.details
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Elusive Reasons and the Motivational Constraint.Benjamin Cohen Rossi - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (1).details
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A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):62-104.details
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On Nudging’s Supposed Threat to Rational Decision-Making.Timothy Houk - 2019 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 44 (4):403-422.details
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Attributing error without taking a stand.Caleb Perl & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1453-1471.details
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Rationality and Truth.Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality. Oxford University PRess.details
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Empirical justification and defeasibility.Juan Comesaña - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1771-1786.details
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Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - Synthese 198:1673-1689.details
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Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.details
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Right in some respects: reasons as evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.details
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Motivating Reason to Slow the Factive Turn in Epistemology.J. Drake - 2017 - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-22.details
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Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.details
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Reflective epistemological disjunctivism.J. J. Cunningham - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):111-132.details
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Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality.Maria Alvarez - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3293-3310.details
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Evidence and its Limits.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
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Perceptual reasons.Juan Comesana & Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):991-1006.details
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Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a Reply.Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):400-415.details
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On the Nature and Relationship of Individual and Collective Justification.Simon Graf - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Schroeder on reasons, experience, and evidence.Susanna Schellenberg & Juan Comesaña - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):607-616.details
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The matter of motivating reasons.J. J. Cunningham - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1563-1589.details
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Whither Evidentialist Reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 307-25.details
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La Verdad en el Gnosticismo.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica 3:217-241.details
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Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?Eyal Tal & Juan Comesaña - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):95-112.details
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The Truth in Gnosticism.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica.details
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Can We Believe for Practical Reasons?Juan Comesaña - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):189-207.details
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Knowledge Is NOT Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason.Daniel Whiting - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (2):237-243.details
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Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14 (2).details
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On the Normativity of Rationality and of Normative Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - manuscriptdetails
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Truthy psychologism about evidence.Veli Mitova - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1105-1126.details
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Epistemology in Latin America.Diego E. Machuca - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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