- Thinking is Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):55-96.details
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Believing without Reason, or: Why Liberals Shouldn’t Watch Fox News.Eric Mandelbaum & Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 22:42-52.details
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Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias.Eric Mandelbaum - 2015 - Noûs 50 (3):629-658.details
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Why implicit attitudes are (probably) not beliefs.Alex Madva - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8).details
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Logic for equivocators.David K. Lewis - 1982 - Noûs 16 (3):431-441.details
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Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements.Neil Levy - 2014 - Noûs 49 (4):800-823.details
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The Fregoli Delusion: A Disorder of Person Identification and Tracking.Robyn Langdon, Emily Connaughton & Max Coltheart - 2014 - Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (4):615-631.details
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(1 other version)Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & Nora Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):133-158.details
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Superstitious Confabulations.Anna Ichino - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):203-217.details
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Troubles with stereotypes for spinozan minds.Bryce Huebner - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1):63-92.details
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VIII—What Do We Want from a Model of Implicit Cognition?Jules Holroyd - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (2):153-179.details
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Delusions as Forensically Disturbing Perceptual Inferences.Jakob Hohwy & Vivek Rajan - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):5-11.details
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Believe It or Not: On the possibility of suspending belief.Uri Hasson, Joseph P. Simmons & Alexander Todorov - 2005 - Psychological Science 16 (7):566-571.details
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Fragmentation and information access.Adam Elga & Agustin Rayo - 2021 - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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You can’t not believe everything you read.Daniel T. Gilbert, Romin W. Tafarodi & Patrick S. Malone - 1993 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65 (2):221-233.details
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Unbelieving the Unbelievable: Some problems in the rejection of false information.Daniel T. Gilbert, Douglas S. Krull & Patrick S. Malone - 1990 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59 (4):601-613.details
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Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.details
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Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.details
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When Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):1-18.details
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Reduced autonomic responses to faces in Capgras delusion.Hadyn Ellis, Young D., W. Andrew, Angela Quayle, De Pauw H. & W. Karel - 1997 - Proceedings: Biological Sciences 264 (1384):1085–92.details
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Seeing and believing: perception, belief formation and the divided mind.Andy Egan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):47 - 63.details
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Nondoxasticism about Self‐Deception.Sophie Archer - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (3):265-282.details
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Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings.Richard Dub - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):27-60.details
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In Defence of Modest Doxasticism about Delusions.Lisa Bortolotti - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):39-53.details
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(1 other version)Monothematic delusions: Towards a two-factor account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & Nora Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.details
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(3 other versions)Incoherence and irrationality.Donald Davidson - 1985 - Dialectica 39 (4):345-54.details
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(2 other versions)Imagination, delusion and hallucinations.Gregory Currie - 1991 - In Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (eds.), Pathologies of Belief. Blackwell. pp. 168-183.details
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(2 other versions)Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations.Gregory Currie - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):168-183.details
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(2 other versions)Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations.Gregory Currie - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):168-183.details
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Delusion, Rationality, Empathy: Commentary on Martin Davies et al.Gregory Currie & Jon Jureidini - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):159-162.details
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On the Distinction between Monothematic and Polythematic Delusions.Max Coltheart - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):103-112.details
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In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions.Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.details
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Computing and cognitive science.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1989 - In Michael I. Posner (ed.), Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.details
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Beliefs and subdoxastic states.Stephen P. Stich - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499-518.details
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Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion.John Campbell - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.details
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Delusions as 'wrong beliefs': A conceptual history.German E. Berrios - 1991 - British Journal of Psychiatry 159 (S14):6-13.details
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The Fragmentation of Belief.Joseph Bendana & Eric Mandelbaum - 2021 - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.details
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(1 other version)Betwixt life and death: Case studies of the Cotard delusion.Andrew W. Young & Kate M. Leafhead - 1996 - In P. W. Halligan & J. C. Marshall (eds.), Method in Madness: Case Studies in Cognitive Neuropsychiatry. Psychology Press. pp. 147–171.details
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Mad Belief?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):13-17.details
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(2 other versions)Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Synthese 79 (1):171-189.details
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(1 other version)Delusions and Brain Injury: The Philosophy and Psychology of Belief.Tony Stone & Andrew W. Young - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):327-364.details
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Attributional style in a case of Cotard delusion.Ryan McKay & Lisa Cipolotti - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):349-359.details
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You don’t have to believe everything you read: background knowledge permits fast and efficient validation of information.T. Richter, S. Schroeder & B. Wöhrmann - 2009 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 96 (3):538–58.details
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Wondrous strange: The neuropsychology of abnormal beliefs.Andrew W. Young - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):47–73.details
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