- Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Our entitlement to self-knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):91-116.details
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Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.details
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Dissonant beliefs.Fred Sommers - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):267-274.details
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In-between believing.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82.details
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):249-275.details
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Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.details
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Reason and the First Person u knjizi Wright, C., Smith, B: C. and Macdonald, C.T. Burge - 2002 - In Michael McKinsey (ed.), On Knowing Our Own Minds. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Alienated Belief.David Hunter - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (2):221-240.details
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Controlling attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.details
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Reason and the first person.Tyler Burge - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.details
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Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge & Christopher Peacocke - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):91-116.details
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'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2007 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):131-137.details
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A Dispositional Approach to the Attitudes.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - In Nikolaj Nottelmann (ed.), New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure. New York: Palgrave. pp. 75-99.details
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Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.Brie Gertler - 2008 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.details
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The nature of belief.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):61-82.details
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