- Better Not to Know: On the Possibility of Culpable Knowledge.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.details
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The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Against Phenomenal Conservatism.Nathan Hanna - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.details
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The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - manuscriptdetails
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In Defence of State-Based Reasons to Intend.James Morauta - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228.details
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Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.details
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Refusing the COVID-19 vaccine: What’s wrong with that?Anne Meylan & Sebastian Schmidt - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (6):1102-1124.details
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Agency and Responsibility.Pamela Hieronymi - 2022 - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias.Lindsay Rettler & Bradley Rettler - 2020 - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. pp. 125-145.details
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Freier Wille, Personale Identität und epistemische Ungewissheit.Dagmar Kiesel & Sebastian Schmidt - 2017 - In Geert Keil (ed.), Willensfreiheit. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 221-258.details
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The Epistemological Subject(s) of Mathematics.Silvia De Toffoli - 2021 - In Bharath Sriraman (ed.), Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Springer. pp. 1-27.details
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
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Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (1):1-24.details
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Doxastic Dilemmas and Epistemic Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues.details
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Epistemic Authority, Preemption and Normative Power.Benjamin McMyler - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4):101--119.details
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Introduction: Responsibility for action and belief.Carlos J. Moya & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):81 – 86.details
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Introduction: responsibility for action and belief.Carols Moya & Steffan Cuypers - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):81-86.details
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Descriptor Revision: Belief Change Through Direct Choice.Sven Ove Hansson - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
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The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy.Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Toth (eds.) - 2017 - Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press.details
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Deflationism about Truth-Directedness.Luca Zanetti - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (4):2022-0069.details
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The Point of Mens Rea: The Case of Willful Ignorance.Gideon Yaffe - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):19-44.details
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Suspiciously Convenient Beliefs and the Pathologies of (Epistemological) Ideal Theory.Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47:237-268.details
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Against Voluntarism about Doxastic Responsibility.Stephen J. White - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 44:33-51.details
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Action and Production.Stephen White - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22 (2):271-294.details
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Rational 'ought' implies 'can'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):70-92.details
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Managing Vice. [REVIEW]Denise Vigani - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):871-874.details
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Transparency belongs to action, not to belief.Nikolai Viedge - forthcoming - South African Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):217-228.details
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Reasons to Desire and Desiring at Will.Victor M. Verdejo - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (3):355-369.details
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Knowledge without credit, exhibit 4: Extended cognition. [REVIEW]Krist Vaesen - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):515-529.details
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Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology.John Turri, David Rose & Wesley Buckwalter - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2507-2537.details
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Staying true with the help of others: doxastic self-control through interpersonal commitment.Leo Charles Townsend - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):243-258.details
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Groups with Minds of Their Own Making.Leo Townsend - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (1):129-151.details
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Active desire.Uku Tooming - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):945-968.details
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The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.details
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Weighing the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395-405.details
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Voluntarism and Transparent Deliberation.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):171-176.details
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No Norm needed: On the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.details
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Integrity as Incentive-Insensitivity: Moral Incapacity Means One can’t be Bought.Etye Steinberg - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.details
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Acceptance and the ethics of belief.Laura K. Soter - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2213-2243.details
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The importance of what they care about.Matthew Noah Smith - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):297-314.details
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Control, responsibility, and moral assessment.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.details
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Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget.Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Karen Kovaka, Jiin Jung & William J. Berger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5373-5394.details
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Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget.Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Karen Kovaka, Jiin Jung & William Berger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5373-5394.details
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Why we reason the way we do.Nishi Shah - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):311-325.details
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Epistemic agency: Some doubts.Kieran Setiya - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):179-198.details
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Believing at Will.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):36-52.details
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Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
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Können wir uns entscheiden, etwas zu glauben? Zur Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit eines doxastischen Willens.Sebastian Schmidt - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):571-582.details
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Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
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Freedom and (theoretical) reason.Margaret Schmitt - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):25-41.details
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