- Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.details
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Phenomenal concepts and the materialist constraint.Joseph Levine - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.details
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Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism, and on the sesmet theory of subjectivity.Galen Strawson - 2009 - In D. Skrbina (ed.), Mind that abides: panpsychism in the new millennium. pp. 33-65.details
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Against the Middle Ground: Why Russellian Monism is Unstable.Brian Cutter - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (2):109-129.details
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Russellian Physicalism and its Dilemma.Lok-Chi Chan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178:2043-2062.details
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Consciousness and Categorical Properties.Christopher Devlin Brown - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):365-387.details
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In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.details
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Russellian monism and mental causation.Torin Alter & Sam Coleman - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):409-425.details
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Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion.Michael Tye - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):705-25.details
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Revelation and physicalism.Kelly Trogdon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2345-2366.details
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Two Conceptions of the Physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-281.details
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Note on the Completeness of ‘Physics’.David Spurrett & David Papineau - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):25-29.details
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Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.details
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A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.details
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A defense of the via negativa argument for physicalism.Barbara Montero & David Papineau - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):233-237.details
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Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation.Barry Loewer & Jaegwon Kim - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (6):315.details
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Revelation and the intuition of dualism.Michelle Liu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11491-11515.details
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Once More Unto the Breach: Type B Physicalism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Epistemic Gap.Janet Levin - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):57-71.details
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Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem.François Kammerer - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):44-67.details
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The Russellian monist’s problems with mental causation.R. Howell - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):22-39.details
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Panpsychism and the Depsychologization of Consciousness.Keith Frankish - 2021 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 95 (1):51-70.details
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A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):474-500.details
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A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection.Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):474-500.details
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Do a Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong?E. Diaz-Leon - 2013 - Ratio 27 (1):1-16.details
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Thinking about Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):333-335.details
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The Phenomenal Concept Strategy Cannot Explain Problem Intuitions.Marcelino Botin - 2022 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 29 (7-8):7-31.details
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Underestimating the Physical.G. Strawson - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):228-240.details
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What is Russellian Monism?Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):67–95.details
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Response to Chalmers' 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness'.D. Papineau - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):173-181.details
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A Russellian Response to the Structural Argument Against Physicalism.Barbara Montero - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):70-83.details
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The Meta-Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61.details
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Russellian Physicalism, Bare Structure, and Swapped Inscrutables.Kevin Morris - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):180-198.details
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Russellian Monism, Introspective Inaccuracy, and the Illusion Meta- Problem of Consciousness.D. Pereboom - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):182-193.details
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Consciousness: Here, There and Everywhere?Giulio Tononi & Christof Koch - 2015 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 370 (1668):20140167.details
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The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy.E. Diaz-Leon - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):62-73.details
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A Properly Physical Russellian Physicalism.Christopher Devlin Brown - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (11-12):31-50.details
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The Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness.Tom McClelland - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):125 - 151.details
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