- (1 other version)Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit.Sherry Turkle - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63:520.details
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(1 other version)Brains in a Vat.Hilary Putnam - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-21.details
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Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63-73.details
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Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality.Edward N. Zalta - 1988 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon.John L. Pollock - 1989 - MIT Press.details
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Cognitive wheels: The frame problem of AI.Daniel Dennett - 1984 - In Christopher Hookway (ed.), Minds, Machines And Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
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On the proper treatment of connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.details
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Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1988 - Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.details
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(1 other version)The symbol grounding problem.Stevan Harnad - 1990 - Physica D 42:335-346.details
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What’s Really Going On in Searle’s “Chinese room‘.Georges Rey - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (September):169-85.details
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(1 other version)Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.details
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Could a machine think?Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland - 1990 - Scientific American 262 (1):32-37.details
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(1 other version)Real patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.details
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(1 other version)Representations without Rules.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):147-174.details
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(1 other version)Real Patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.details
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SOAR: An architecture for general intelligence.John E. Laird, Allen Newell & Paul S. Rosenbloom - 1987 - Artificial Intelligence 33 (1):1-64.details
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Putting together connectionism – again.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):59-74.details
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Trial and error predicates and the solution to a problem of Mostowski.Hilary Putnam - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 30 (1):49-57.details
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(1 other version)Second thoughts about church's thesis and mathematical proofs.Elliott Mendelson - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (5):225-233.details
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(1 other version)Second Thoughts about Church's Thesis and Mathematical Proofs.Elliott Mendelson - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (5):225-233.details
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(1 other version)Limiting recursion.E. Mark Gold - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 30 (1):28-48.details
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(1 other version)Connectionism and rules and representation systems: Are they compatible?William Bechtel - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):5-16.details
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Representation without rules.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):147-74.details
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Cognition without classical architecture.James W. Garson - 1994 - Synthese 100 (2):291-306.details
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What Robots Can and Can’t Be.Selmer Bringsjord - 1992 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.details
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General Intensional Logic.C. Anthony Anderson, D. Gabbay & F. Guenthner - 1990 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 55 (2):892-894.details
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Some assumptions underlying Smolensky's treatment of connectionism.Eric Dietrich & Chris Fields - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):29-31.details
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Thinking may be more than computing.Peter Kugel - 1986 - Cognition 22 (2):137-198.details
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Some memory, but no mind.Lawrence E. Hunter - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):37-38.details
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