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A capacity theory of comprehension: Individual differences in working memory.Marcel A. Just & Patricia A. Carpenter - 1992 - Psychological Review 99 (1):122-149.details
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(2 other versions)Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All these Years.Jerry Fodor - 1997 - Noûs 31 (S11):149-163.details
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The Functional Unity of Special Science Kinds.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):233-258.details
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Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research.William Bechtel & Robert C. Richardson - 2010 - Princeton.details
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Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States.William Bechtel - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (2):175-207.details
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(3 other versions)Natural Kinds.W. V. O. Quine - 1970 - In Carl G. Hempel, Donald Davidson & Nicholas Rescher (eds.), Essays in honor of Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht,: D. Reidel. pp. 5.details
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Explanatory fictions—for real?Samuel Schindler - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1741-1755.details
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Has the last decade of challenges to the multiple realization argument provided aid and comfort to psychoneural reductionists?John Bickle - 2010 - Synthese 177 (2):247 - 260.details
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Two Approaches to the Distinction between Cognition and 'Mere Association'.Cameron Buckner - 2011 - International Journal for Comparative Psychology 24 (1):1-35.details
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Are there mental indexicals and demonstratives?Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):217-234.details
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Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective.David Michael Kaplan & Carl F. Craver - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (4):601-627.details
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Models and mechanisms in psychological explanation.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):313-338.details
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Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches.Gualtiero Piccinini & Carl Craver - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):283-311.details
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(1 other version)Neural reuse: A fundamental organizational principle of the brain.Michael L. Anderson - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):245.details
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(3 other versions)Natural kinds.Willard V. Quine - 1969 - In Willard van Orman Quine (ed.), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press. pp. 114-38.details
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Philosophy of Chemistry: Between the Manifest and the Scientific Image.Jap van Brakel - 2000 - Leuven University Press..details
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Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation.James F. Woodward - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Explaining the brain: mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.details
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(2 other versions)Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis).J. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.details
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Scientific explanation and the sense of understanding.J. D. Trout - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):212-233.details
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Dissecting explanatory power.Petri Ylikoski & Jaakko Kuorikoski - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):201–219.details
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How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less A d Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions.Malcolm R. Forster & Elliott Sober - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):1-35.details
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The Nature of Psychological Explanation.Robert Cummins - 1983 - MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing.Andy Clark - 1989 - MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing.Andy Clark - 1989 - Cambridge: MIT Press.details
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Content and Its vehicles in connectionist systems.Nicholas Shea - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (3):246–269.details
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What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories.Paul E. Griffiths - 1997 - University of Chicago Press.details
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(2 other versions)Special sciences: Still autonomous after all these years.Jerry Fodor - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:149-63.details
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The Mind Incarnate.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2004 - MIT Press.details
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Kinds, complexity, and multiple realization.Robert Boyd - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):67-98.details
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Concepts are not a natural kind.Edouard Machery - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (3):444-467.details
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Multiple realizability revisited.Jennifer Mundale & William P. Bechtel - 1997details
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In search of mechanisms: discoveries across the life sciences.Carl F. Craver - 2013 - London: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Lindley Darden.details
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Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds.Richard Boyd - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1):127-148.details
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(1 other version)ALCOVE: An exemplar-based connectionist model of category learning.John K. Kruschke - 1992 - Psychological Review 99 (1):22-44.details
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Review of M aking Things Happen. [REVIEW]Eric Hiddleston - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):545-547.details
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(3 other versions)Natural Kinds.W. V. O. Quine - 1991 - In Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science. MIT Press. pp. 159--170.details
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Systematicity, structured representations and cognitive architecture: A reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn.Andy Clark - 1991 - In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 198--218.details
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(1 other version)A property cluster theory of cognition.Cameron Buckner - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (3):1-30.details
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How scientific models can explain.Alisa Bokulich - 2011 - Synthese 180 (1):33 - 45.details
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(3 other versions)Natural Kinds.W. V. O. Quine - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 234-248.details
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The Nature of Psychological Explanation.Rom Harre - 1985 - Noûs 19 (3):473-474.details
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Constraints on Localization and Decomposition as Explanatory Strategies in the Biological Sciences.Michael Silberstein & Anthony Chemero - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):958-970.details
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Mechanism and Biological Explanation.William Bechtel - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (4):533-557.details
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Dynamical Models: An Alternative or Complement to Mechanistic Explanations?David M. Kaplan & William Bechtel - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):438-444.details
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Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science.Nigel Stepp, Anthony Chemero & Michael T. Turvey - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):425-437.details
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Microessentialism: What is the Argument?Paul Needham - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):1-21.details
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Dynamic mechanistic explanation: computational modeling of circadian rhythms as an exemplar for cognitive science.William Bechtel & Adele Abrahamsen - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):321-333.details
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