- Explanation and description in computational neuroscience.David Michael Kaplan - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):339-373.details
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Minimal Models and the Generalized Ontic Conception of Scientific Explanation.Mark Povich - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):117-137.details
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Real patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.details
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When mechanistic models explain.Carl F. Craver - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):355-376.details
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Prosthetic Models.Carl F. Craver - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):840-851.details
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Physical law and mechanistic explanation in the Hodgkin and Huxley model of the action potential.Carl F. Craver - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):1022-1033.details
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Hempel’s Ambiguity.J. Alberto Coffa - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):141 - 163.details
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A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.Paul M. Churchland - 1989 - MIT Press.details
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Minimal models and canonical neural computations: the distinctness of computational explanation in neuroscience.M. Chirimuuta - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):127-153.details
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The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science.Storrs Mccall - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):99-106.details
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Systems biology and the integration of mechanistic explanation and mathematical explanation.Ingo Brigandt - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (4):477-492.details
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The cognitive neuroscience revolution.Worth Boone & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2016 - Synthese 193 (5):1509-1534.details
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Mechanistic Abstraction.Worth Boone & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):686-697.details
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The hodgkin‐huxley equations and the concrete model: Comments on Craver, Schaffner, and Weber.Jim Bogen - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):1034-1046.details
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Regularities and causality; generalizations and causal explanations.Jim Bogen - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):397-420.details
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Analysing causality: The opposite of counterfactual is factual.Jim Bogen - 2002 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):3 – 26.details
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Explanation: a mechanist alternative.William Bechtel & Adele Abrahamsen - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):421-441.details
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Minimal Model Explanations.Robert W. Batterman & Collin C. Rice - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (3):349-376.details
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Idealization and modeling.Robert W. Batterman - 2009 - Synthese 169 (3):427-446.details
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Asymptotics and the role of minimal models.Robert W. Batterman - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (1):21-38.details
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The Completeness of Mechanistic Explanations.Tudor M. Baetu - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (5):775-786.details
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The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science.Nancy Cartwright - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (3):411-415.details
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John Haugeland, having thought. Essays in the metaphysics of mind.Rüdiger Vaas - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (1):139-147.details
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Mental causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.details
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Review of Woodward, Making Things Happen. [REVIEW]Michael Strevens - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):233-249.details
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Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation.James F. Woodward - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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II—James Woodward: Mechanistic Explanation: Its Scope and Limits.James Woodward - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):39-65.details
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Explanatory generalizations, part I: A counterfactual account.James Woodward & Christopher Hitchcock - 2003 - Noûs 37 (1):1–24.details
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Explanatory autonomy: the role of proportionality, stability, and conditional irrelevance.James Woodward - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):1-29.details
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The Structure of Tradeoffs in Model Building.John Matthewson & Michael Weisberg - 2009 - Synthese 170 (1):169 - 190.details
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Philosophy of Experimental Biology. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology.Marcel Weber - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (1):139-141.details
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Marcel Weber: Philosophy of Experimental Biology: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, USD 75.00, ISBN 0521829453 (hbk), 374 pp. [REVIEW]Jacob Stegenga - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (3):431-436.details
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Causes without mechanisms: Experimental regularities, physical laws, and neuroscientific explanation.Marcel Weber - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):995-1007.details
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Converging Images: Techniques of Intervention and Forms of Representation of Sodium-Channel Proteins in Nerve Cell Membranes. [REVIEW]Maria Trumpler - 1997 - Journal of the History of Biology 30 (1):55 - 89.details
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Computational neuroscience.Terrence J. Sejnowski - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):104-105.details
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Theories, models, and equations in biology: The heuristic search for emergent simplifications in neurobiology.Kenneth F. Schaffner - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):1008-1021.details
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Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.Wesley C. Salmon - 1984 - Princeton University Press.details
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Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Wesley Salmon.James H. Fetzer - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (4):597-610.details
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Dynamical Models and Explanation in Neuroscience.Lauren N. Ross - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (1):32-54.details
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Moving Beyond Causes: Optimality Models and Scientific Explanation.Collin Rice - 2013 - Noûs 49 (3):589-615.details
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The causal situationist account of constitutive relevance.Emily Prychitko - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1829-1843.details
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Causal patterns and adequate explanations.Angela Potochnik - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1163-1182.details
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Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches.Gualtiero Piccinini & Carl Craver - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):283-311.details
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Explanatory completeness and idealization in large brain simulations: a mechanistic perspective.Marcin Miłkowski - 2016 - Synthese 193 (5):1457-1478.details
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Mental causation: Unnaturalized but not unnatural.Eric Marcus - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):57-83.details
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Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.details
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What was Hodgkin and Huxley’s Achievement?Arnon Levy - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):469-492.details
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Abstraction and the Organization of Mechanisms.Arnon Levy & William Bechtel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (2):241-261.details
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The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective.David Michael Kaplan & Carl F. Craver - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (4):601-627.details
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Moving parts: the natural alliance between dynamical and mechanistic modeling approaches.David Michael Kaplan - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (6):757-786.details
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