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  1. Moral Uncertainty and Its Consequences.Brian Weatherson - 2000 - Mind 111 (443):693-696.
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  • The Moral Foundation of Rights.Rex Martin - 1990 - Ethics 100 (2):408-411.
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  • A Defense of the Rights of Artificial Intelligences.Eric Schwitzgebel & Mara Garza - 2015 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):98-119.
    There are possible artificially intelligent beings who do not differ in any morally relevant respect from human beings. Such possible beings would deserve moral consideration similar to that of human beings. Our duties to them would not be appreciably reduced by the fact that they are non-human, nor by the fact that they owe their existence to us. Indeed, if they owe their existence to us, we would likely have additional moral obligations to them that we don’t ordinarily owe to (...)
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  • Machines and the Moral Community.Erica L. Neely - 2013 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (1):97-111.
    A key distinction in ethics is between members and nonmembers of the moral community. Over time, our notion of this community has expanded as we have moved from a rationality criterion to a sentience criterion for membership. I argue that a sentience criterion is insufficient to accommodate all members of the moral community; the true underlying criterion can be understood in terms of whether a being has interests. This may be extended to conscious, self-aware machines, as well as to any (...)
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  • Running Risks Morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.
    I defend normative externalism from the objection that it cannot account for the wrongfulness of moral recklessness. The defence is fairly simple—there is no wrong of moral recklessness. There is an intuitive argument by analogy that there should be a wrong of moral recklessness, and the bulk of the paper consists of a response to this analogy. A central part of my response is that if people were motivated to avoid moral recklessness, they would have to have an unpleasant sort (...)
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  • Facing Animals: A Relational, Other-Oriented Approach to Moral Standing.Mark Coeckelbergh & David J. Gunkel - 2014 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 27 (5):715-733.
    In this essay we reflect critically on how animal ethics, and in particular thinking about moral standing, is currently configured. Starting from the work of two influential “analytic” thinkers in this field, Peter Singer and Tom Regan, we examine some basic assumptions shared by these positions and demonstrate their conceptual failings—ones that have, despite efforts to the contrary, the general effect of marginalizing and excluding others. Inspired by the so-called “continental” philosophical tradition , we then argue that what is needed (...)
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  • Patiency is Not a Virtue: The Design of Intelligent Systems and Systems of Ethics.Joanna J. Bryson - 2018 - Ethics and Information Technology 20 (1):15-26.
    The question of whether AI systems such as robots can or should be afforded moral agency or patiency is not one amenable either to discovery or simple reasoning, because we as societies constantly reconstruct our artefacts, including our ethical systems. Consequently, the place of AI systems in society is a matter of normative, not descriptive ethics. Here I start from a functionalist assumption, that ethics is the set of behaviour that maintains a society. This assumption allows me to exploit the (...)
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  • The Other Question: Can and Should Robots Have Rights?David J. Gunkel - 2018 - Ethics and Information Technology 20 (2):87-99.
    This essay addresses the other side of the robot ethics debate, taking up and investigating the question “Can and should robots have rights?” The examination of this subject proceeds by way of three steps or movements. We begin by looking at and analyzing the form of the question itself. There is an important philosophical difference between the two modal verbs that organize the inquiry—can and should. This difference has considerable history behind it that influences what is asked about and how. (...)
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  • Of, for, and by the People: The Legal Lacuna of Synthetic Persons.Joanna J. Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis & Thomas D. Grant - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3):273-291.
    Conferring legal personhood on purely synthetic entities is a very real legal possibility, one under consideration presently by the European Union. We show here that such legislative action would be morally unnecessary and legally troublesome. While AI legal personhood may have some emotional or economic appeal, so do many superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us. We review the utility and history of legal fictions of personhood, discussing salient precedents where such fictions resulted in abuse or incoherence. We (...)
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  • In Defense of Transracialism.Rebecca Tuvel - 2017 - Hypatia 32 (2):263-278.
    Former NAACP chapter head Rachel Dolezal's attempted transition from the white to the black race occasioned heated controversy. Her story gained notoriety at the same time that Caitlyn Jenner graced the cover of Vanity Fair, signaling a growing acceptance of transgender identity. Yet criticisms of Dolezal for misrepresenting her birth race indicate a widespread social perception that it is neither possible nor acceptable to change one's race in the way it might be to change one's sex. Considerations that support transgenderism (...)
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  • Don’T Know, Don’T Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution.Alexander A. Guerrero - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):59-97.
    This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the "Ignorance Thesis," which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that applies most directly to the part I call the "Moral Ignorance Thesis." Third, I argue for a (...)
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  • The Grounds of Moral Status.Julie Tannenbaum & Agnieszka Jaworska - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:0-0.
    This article discusses what is involved in having full moral status, as opposed to a lesser degree of moral status and surveys different views of the grounds of moral status as well as the arguments for attributing a particular degree of moral status on the basis of those grounds.
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  • The Moral Problem of Other Minds.Jeff Sebo - 2018 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 25:51-70.
    In this paper I ask how we should treat other beings in cases of uncertainty about sentience. I evaluate three options: an incautionary principle that permits us to treat other beings as non-sentient, a precautionary principle that requires us to treat other beings as sentient, and an expected value principle that requires us to multiply our subjective probability that other beings are sentient by the amount of moral value they would have if they were. I then draw three conclusions. First, (...)
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  • Can Machines Be People? Reflections on the Turing Triage Test.Robert Sparrow - 2012 - In Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & George Bekey (eds.), Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics. MIT Press. pp. 301-315.
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  • Computing Machinery and Intelligence.Alan M. Turing - 1950 - Mind 59 (October):433-60.
    I propose to consider the question, "Can machines think?" This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms "machine" and "think." The definitions might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude is dangerous, If the meaning of the words "machine" and "think" are to be found by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to (...)
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  • The Case for Animal Rights.Tom Regan & Mary Midgley - 1986 - The Personalist Forum 2 (1):67-71.
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  • Schopenhauer on the Rights of Animals.Stephen Puryear - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):250-269.
    I argue that Schopenhauer’s ascription of (moral) rights to animals flows naturally from his distinctive analysis of the concept of a right. In contrast to those who regard rights as fundamental and then cast wrongdoing as a matter of violating rights, he takes wrong (Unrecht) to be the more fundamental notion and defines the concept of a right (Recht) in its terms. He then offers an account of wrongdoing which makes it plausible to suppose that at least many animals can (...)
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  • Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience.Max R. Bennett & P. M. S. Hacker - 2006 - Behavior and Philosophy 34:71-87.
    The book "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" is an engaging criticism of cognitive neuroscience from the perspective of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of ordinary language. The authors' main claim is that assertions like "the brain sees" and "the left hemisphere thinks" are integral to cognitive neuroscience but that they are meaningless because they commit the mereological fallacy—ascribing to parts of humans, properties that make sense to predicate only of whole humans. The authors claim that this fallacy is at the heart of Cartesian (...)
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  • Why We Should Create Artificial Offspring: Meaning and the Collective Afterlife.John Danaher - 2018 - Science and Engineering Ethics 24 (4):1097-1118.
    This article argues that the creation of artificial offspring could make our lives more meaningful. By ‘artificial offspring’ I mean beings that we construct, with a mix of human and non-human-like qualities. Robotic artificial intelligences are paradigmatic examples of the form. There are two reasons for thinking that the creation of such beings could make our lives more meaningful and valuable. The first is that the existence of a collective afterlife—i.e. a set of human-like lives that continue after we die—is (...)
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  • Abortion and Moral Risk1: D. Moller.D. Moller - 2011 - Philosophy 86 (3):425-443.
    It is natural for those with permissive attitudes toward abortion to suppose that, if they have examined all of the arguments they know against abortion and have concluded that they fail, their moral deliberations are at an end. Surprisingly, this is not the case, as I argue. This is because the mere risk that one of those arguments succeeds can generate a moral reason that counts against the act. If this is so, then liberals may be mistaken about the morality (...)
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  • Is Having Your Computer Compromised a Personal Assault? The Ethics of Extended Cognition.J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (4):542-560.
    Philosophy of mind and cognitive science have recently become increasingly receptive to the hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which external artifacts such as our laptops and smartphones can—under appropriate circumstances—feature as material realizers of a person's cognitive processes. We argue that, to the extent that the hypothesis of extended cognition is correct, our legal and ethical theorizing and practice must be updated by broadening our conception of personal assault so as to include intentional harm toward gadgets that have been (...)
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  • Speciesism and Moral Status.Peter Singer - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (3-4):567-581.
    Many people believe that all human life is of equal value. Most of them also believe that all human beings have a moral status superior to that of nonhuman animals. But how are these beliefs to be defended? The mere difference of species cannot in itself determine moral status. The most obvious candidate for regarding human beings as having a higher moral status than animals is the superior cognitive capacity of humans. People with profound mental retardation pose a problem for (...)
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  • Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children.Julian Savulescu - 2001 - Bioethics 15 (5-6):413-426.
    We have a reason to use information which is available about such genes in our reproductive decision-making; (3) couples should selec.
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  • First, Do No Harm: Generalized Procreative Non‐Maleficence.Ben Saunders - 2017 - Bioethics 31 (7):552-558.
    New reproductive technologies allow parents some choice over their children. Various moral principles have been suggested to regulate such choices. This article starts from a discussion of Julian Savulescu's Principle of Procreative Beneficence, according to which parents ought to choose the child expected to have the best quality of life, before combining two previously separate lines of attack against this principle. First, it is suggested that the appropriate moral principles of guiding reproductive choices ought to focus on general wellbeing rather (...)
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  • Why Procreative Preferences May Be Moral – And Why It May Not Matter If They Aren't.Ben Saunders - 2015 - Bioethics 29 (7):499-506.
    There has been much argument over whether procreative selection is obligatory or wrong. Rebecca Bennett has recently challenged the assumption that procreative choices are properly moral choices, arguing that these views express mere preferences. This article challenges Bennett's view on two fronts. First, I argue that the Non-Identity Problem does not show that there cannot be harmless wrongs – though this would require us to abandon the intuitively attractive ‘person-affecting principle’, that may be a lesser cost than abandoning some more (...)
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  • Response to “The Problem of the Question About Animal Ethics” by Michal Piekarski.Mark Coeckelbergh & David J. Gunkel - 2016 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 29 (4):717-721.
    In this brief article we reply to Michal Piekarski’s response to our article ‘Facing Animals’ published previously in this journal. In our article we criticized the properties approach to defining the moral standing of animals, and in its place proposed a relational and other-oriented concept that is based on a transcendental and phenomenological perspective, mainly inspired by Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida. In this reply we question and problematize Piekarski’s interpretation of our essay and critically evaluate “the ethics of commitment” that (...)
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  • The Case Against the Case for Procreative Beneficence.Alan Holland - 2016 - Bioethics 30 (7):490-499.
    Julian Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence states that, other things being equal, and of the possible children they could have, a couple contemplating procreation are morally obliged to procreate the child with the best chance of the best life. The critique of PB is in three parts. The first part argues that PB rests on a particular conception of the good life, and that alternative conceptions of the good life afford no obvious way in which PB can be rendered operational. (...)
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  • Happiness, Cerebroscopes and Incorrigibility: Prospects for Neuroeudaimonia.Stephanie M. Hare & Nicole A. Vincent - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):69-84.
    Suppose you want to live a happy life. Who should you turn to for advice? We normally think that we know best about our own happiness. But recent work in psychology and neuroscience suggests that we are often mistaken about our own natures, and that sometimes scientists know us better than we know ourselves. Does this mean that to live a happy life we should ask scientists for advice rather than relying on our introspection? In what follows, we highlight ways (...)
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  • The Expanding Circle.Anthony Manser & Peter Singer - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (132):305.
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