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Belief and acceptance.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1989 - Mind 98 (391):367-389.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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Groups with minds of their own.Philip Pettit - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Groups as Agents.Deborah Tollefsen - 2015 - Malden, MA: Polity.details
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Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis.Philip J. Nickel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):312-334.details
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On Bullshit.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1986 - Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.details
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Who has scientific knowledge?K. Brad Wray - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):337 – 347.details
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Collective Belief And Acceptance.K. Brad Wray - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):319-333.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Group beliefs.Raimo Tuomela - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):285-318.details
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Group knowledge analyzed.Raimo Tuomela - 2004 - Episteme 1 (2):109-127.details
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Rejecting Rejectionism.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2003 - ProtoSociology 18:389-405.details
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Challenging Epistemic Individualism.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - ProtoSociology 16:86-117.details
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The law of group polarization.Cass R. Sunstein - 2002 - Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (2):175–195.details
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Belief control and intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.details
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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
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Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.details
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The Voluntariness of Belief.James Montmarquet - 1986 - Analysis 46 (1):49 - 53.details
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Collective Agents and Cognitive Attitudes.Anthonie Meijers - 2002 - ProtoSociology 16:70-85.details
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The epistemic features of group belief.Kay Mathiesen - 2006 - Episteme 2 (3):161-175.details
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Can Groups Be Epistemic Agents?Kay Mathiesen - 2011 - In Hans Bernhard Schmid, Daniel Sirtes & Marcel Weber (eds.), Collective Epistemology. Ontos. pp. 23-44.details
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Group Belief: Lessons from Lies and Bullshit.I.—Jennifer Lackey - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):185-208.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Routledge.details
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Modelling collective belief.Margaret Gilbert - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):185-204.details
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Collective epistemology.Margaret Gilbert - 2004 - Episteme 1 (2):95--107.details
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Reliable group belief.Jeffrey Dunn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (S23):5653-5677.details
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Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World.Margaret Gilbert - 2013 - New York, NY: Oup Usa.details
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A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society.Margaret Gilbert - 2006 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Group agency: the possibility, design, and status of corporate agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Philip Pettit.details
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On bullshit.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1986 - Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.details
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On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Ethics 102 (4):853-856.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.details
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Deciding to Believe.Carl Ginet - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth and Duty. Oxford University Press. pp. 63-76.details
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On the aim of belief.David Velleman - 2000 - In The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. pp. 244--81.details
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Belief, Acceptance, and What Happens in Groups: Some Methodological Considerations.Margaret Gilbert & Daniel Pilchman - 2014 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (3):551-551.details
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Voluntary belief and epistemic evaluation.Richard Feldman - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. Oxford University Press. pp. 77--92.details
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