The book will be an indispensable resource for anyone interested in contemporary philosophy and the social sciences.

This article aims to present a new perspective on contemporary debates about the transformations of work and employment, and their impacts on individuals and communities, by focusing on the writings of Christophe Dejours. Basically, the article attempts to show that Dejours' writings make a significant contribution to contemporary social theory. This might seem like an odd claim to make, since Dejours' main training was in psychoanalysis and his main activity is the clinical, psychiatric study of pathologies linked to work. However, (...) in the course of his career, Dejours has greatly extended this initial clinical interest, and by integrating insights from philosophy and other social sciences, has developed a highly sophisticated and consistent theoretical model of work. Starting from a narrow psychopathological focus, Dejours has gradually developed a full-blown theoretical defence of the centrality of work. The article outlines the main features of Dejours' metapsychological model, and the structuring role played by work in his theory of subjective identity. This allows us to outline the originality of his approach by comparison with some of the most significant current accounts of the impact of transformations of work and employment conditions upon individuals and societies, notably Honneth, Castel and Sennett. (shrink)

This article briefly presents some of the main features of the notion of “centrality of work” within the framework of the “psychodynamic” approach to work developed by Christophe Dejours. The paper argues that we should distinguish between at least four separate but related ways in which work can be said to be central: psychologically, in terms of gender relations, social-politically and epistemically.

This article argues that Axel Honneth’s ethics of recognition offers a robust model for a renewed critical theory of society, provided that it does not shy away from its political dimensions. First, the ethics of recognition needs to clarify its political moment at the conceptual level to remain conceptually sustainable. This requires a clarification of the notion of identity in relation to the three spheres of recognition, and a clarification of its exact place in a politics of recognition. We suggest (...) that a return to Hegel’s mature theory of subjectivity helps specify the relationship between the normative demand for autonomous identity and its realization in and through politics. (shrink)

This article argues that Axel Honneth’s ethics of recognition offers a robust model for a renewed critical theory of society, provided that it does not shy away from its political dimensions. First, the ethics of recognition needs to clarify its political moment at the conceptual level to remain conceptually sustainable. This requires a clarification of the notion of identity in relation to the three spheres of recognition, and a clarification of its exact place in a politics of recognition. We suggest (...) that a return to Hegel’s mature theory of subjectivity helps specify the relationship between the normative demand for autonomous identity and its realization in and through politics. (shrink)

This article explores Marx’s contention that the achievement of full personhood and, not just consequently, but simultaneously, of genuine intersubjectivity depends upon the attainment of recognition for one’s place in the social division of labour, recognition which is systematically denied to some individuals and groups of individuals through the capitalist organization of production and exchange. This reading is then employed in a critique of Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition which, it is argued, cannot account for the systematic obstacles faced by (...) some struggles for recognition. (shrink)

This unique collection examines the connections between two complementary approaches to philosophical social theory: Hegel-inspired theories of recognition, and analytical social ontology.

Die Theorie der Gerechtigkeit gehört zu den am intensivsten bestellten Feldern der zeitgenössischen Philosophie. Allerdings haben die meisten Gerechtigkeitstheorien ihr hohes Begründungsniveau nur um den Preis eines schweren Defizits erreicht, denn mit ihrer Fixierung auf rein normative, abstrakte Prinzipien geraten sie in beträchtliche Distanz zu jener Sphäre, die ihr”Anwendungsbereich“ist: der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit. Zur Begründung dieses weitreichenden Unterfangens weist Honneth zunächst nach, daß alle wesentlichen Handlungssphären westlicher Gesellschaften ein Merkmal teilen: Sie haben den Anspruch, einen jeweils besonderen Aspekt von individueller Freiheit (...) zu verwirklichen. Im Geiste von Hegels Rechtsphilosophie und unter anerkennungstheoretischen Vorzeichen zeigt das zentrale Kapitel, wie in konkreten gesellschaftlichen Bereichen - in persönlichen Beziehungen, im marktvermittelten Wirtschaftshandeln und in der politischen Öffentlichkeit - die Prinzipien individueller Freiheit generiert werden, die die Richtschnur für Gerechtigkeit bilden. Das Ziel des Buches ist ein höchst anspruchsvolles: die Gerechtigkeitstheorie als Gesellschaftsanalyse neu zu begründen. (shrink)

The evidence today is practically uncontested: about thirty years ago we left Fordism behind and entered a new phase of capitalism. That the structures of the post-Fordist social order call for new modes of social critique is also a prevalent idea. The category of alienation continues, however, to be discredited. Nevertheless it is not clear that the categories of democracy (as apparatuses of non-domination), justice and the good life are capable of bringing about the political effects that may be expected (...) today from the concept of alienation. For these reasons, not only the historical diagnostic that appears to have authorized jettisoning the problematic of alienation but also the model of critique used to replace it demand critical scrutiny. (shrink)

How does Marx refer to Work and to Domination ? The interpretation of Marx’s references to work and to domination is a vexed question. Can we say that Marx criticises capitalism in terms of its effects on work ? Or does he criticise capitalism from the standpoint of those subject to domination, and with whom his position is one of solidarity ? Or does he elaborate a description of the unprecedented transformations brought about in the relations of power, which the (...) category of domination is unable to apprehend effectively ? The article argues that these differences in interpretation are actually based on a series of false oppositions. Marx’s aim is in effect to articulate the question of the domination of work and the question of domination at work, insofar as he accords a position of political centrality to the connection between domination and work. (shrink)

"We owe a large debt to Axel Honneth for uncovering some of the theoretical affinities between the work of the Frankfurt School and that of Foucault.

Despite the fact that the sociological notion ‘individualization’ contains the most heterogeneous phenomena, the article develops an interpretation of the fate of individualization in Western capitalism today. After having differentiated three different meanings of that notion with the help of Georg Simmel, the position is defended that the claims to individual self-realization, which have rapidly multiplied in the Western societies of thirty or forty years ago, have become so much a feature of the institutionalized expectations inherent in social reproduction that (...) the particular goals of such claims are lost and they are transmuted into a support of the system’s legitimacy. The result of this paradoxical reversal, where the processes which once promised an increase of qualitative freedom are henceforth altered into an ideology of de-institutionalization, is the emergence in individuals of a number of symptoms of inner emptiness, of feeling oneself to be superfluous, and of absence of purpose. (shrink)

The genesis of Axel Honneth's ethics of recognition shows that it represents the attempt to critically rejuvenate historical materialism through an emphasis on the normative dimensions and the anthropological preconditions of social interaction. By making explicit this project to redefine a theory of praxis, the exact theoretical stance and the full practical potential of Honneth's social theory can be stressed. However, by contrast to its initial formulation, the mature theory of recognition appears to have interpreted praxis in a narrow interpersonalist (...) sense. This is especially evident for the spheres of socialisation and labour. The last part of the article argues that the initial definition of the project could have been taken in a more materialist direction. This would define the second marxist horizon of the ethics of recognition, one of fruitful future developments. (shrink)

Comment transformer les définitions communes de la justice sociale afin qu'elles puissent rendre compte des formes aujourd'hui les plus caractéristiques de l'injustice sociale? Comment leur faire rendre compte des souffrances de " ceux qui ont trop à dire pour pouvoir le dire "? Telles sont les questions auxquelles ce livre se propose de répondre. Dans une démarche originale, Emmanuel Renault reprend et élargit la théorie de la reconnaissance élaborée par le philosophe allemand Axel Honneth, afin de proposer une grammaire des (...) luttes sociales mais aussi une grille d'analyse des injustices que ces luttes prennent rarement en charge. C'est par la reconnaissance que les autres et la société lui accordent que chacun peut bénéficier des conditions substantielles d'une vie digne d'être vécue. Inversement, les dénis de reconnaissance sont à l'origine de souffrances sociales et psychiques majeures. Dans cette perspective, l'auteur procède à un examen critique des théories contemporaines qui structurent notre pensée politique et sociale, proposées par J. Rawls, J. Habermas, M. Walzer et C. Taylor, P Bourdieu, T. Negri, etc. S'appuyant sur les travaux de la sociologie et la psychologie sociale qui analysent les mouvements sociaux, les restructurations du travail ou les souffrances engendrées par la précarisation ou par l'exclusion, il tente d'élaborer une théorie globale permettant d'éclairer la multiplicité des phénomènes étudiés. Ce livre soutient que la philosophie doit prendre l'injustice au sérieux, car c'est en elle que se déterminent les enjeux des discours sur la justice. Il propose ainsi une philosophie assumant sa dimension politique, reconnaissant qu'elle se meut à l'intérieur du monde réel et non simplement dans le ciel des idées. Il offre un argumentaire global au service de ceux qui font l'expérience quotidienne de l'injustice et sont en conséquence intéressés à la transformation de l'ordre social existant. (shrink)

Dans un contexte de crise du systeme capitaliste - une crise qui n'est sans doute qu'une etape de plus dans une fuite en avant qui dure depuis 30 ans, par laquelle ledit systeme tente desesperement de dissimuler la contradiction fondamentale qui l'habite (chercher a maintenir a tout prix la forme de la valeur alors meme que tout la denonce comme une forme fondamentalement depassee, perimee et anachronique de la richesse sociale) - ce livre part de notre impuissance pratique et de (...) l'impossibilite ou nous sommes actuellement de penser un autre monde. Et il rapporte cette impossibilite au fait de la privation de monde (et de la privatisation du monde) comme au fait majeur resultant du dispositif capitaliste. Ce dispositif a fait de nous ce que les philosophes modernes ont pense que nous etions: des sujets separes de l'objectivite, des sujets sans monde, retires du monde, spectateurs desinvoltes d'un monde qui n'est plus le leur. La perte du monde et la separation d'avec l'objectivite sont deux manieres d'exprimer un meme phenomene: celui de l'alienation. Ce dispositif a produit l'illusion du sujet souverain et la realite d'une masse d'individus depossedes de leur puissance. Au coeur de ce diagnostic, on trouvera une relecture de Marx, une tentative de mise en dialogue de Heidegger avec Marx et une confrontation critique avec des representants contemporains (Althusser, Deleuze, Foucault) ou actuels (J. Butler, S. Zizek, A. Honneth) de la critique sociale. La perspective est celle d'une objectivation des sujets qui en fasse des individus sociaux capables d'un usage commun de leur monde. (shrink)

In this pathbreaking study, Axel Honneth argues that "the struggle for recognition" is, and should be, at the center of social conflicts.

Writing for a wide audience, Harvey here tells the political-economic story of where neoliberalization came from and how it proliferated on the world stage. He constructs a framework, not only for analyzing the political and economic dangers that now surround us, but also for assessing the prospects for more socially just alternatives.

This collection brings together the latest work of some of the world’s leading Marxist philosophers and new young researchers. Based upon work presented at meetings of the Marx and Philosophy Society, it offers a unique snapshot of the best current scholarship on the philosophical aspects and implications of Marx's thought.

This volume stages a debate between two philosophers, one North American, the other German, who hold different views of the relation of redistribution to ...

The genesis of Axel Honneth's ethics of recognition shows that it represents the attempt to critically rejuvenate historical materialism through an emphasis on the normative dimensions and the anthropological preconditions of social interaction. By making explicit this project to redefine a theory of praxis, the exact theoretical stance and the full practical potential of Honneth's social theory can be stressed. However, by contrast to its initial formulation, the mature theory of recognition appears to have interpreted praxis in a narrow interpersonalist (...) sense. This is especially evident for the spheres of socialisation and labour. The last part of the article argues that the initial definition of the project could have been taken in a more materialist direction. This would define the second marxist horizon of the ethics of recognition, one of fruitful future developments. (shrink)

This paper compares Marx's first conception of capital, in 1844, to his conception of the modern political state in 1843. It argues that in 1843 Marx conceives the modern democratic state as realising human 'species-being', that is, the universality and freedom inherent in human nature, but only in the form of 'abstract' universality and freedom, and therefore inadequately. In 1844 he conceives capital in the same way, as an abstract and therefore inadequate realisation of human species-being. Accordingly the transition from (...) capital to communism consists essentially in transforming the abstract universality and freedom realised in capital into a 'concrete' universality and freedom. The paper concludes by commenting on the implications of this early philosophical conception of capital for Marx's later writings. (shrink)