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  1. Criticism as Conversation.Daniela Dover - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):26-61.
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  • I—Miranda Fricker: The Relativism of Blame and Williams's Relativism of Distance.Miranda Fricker - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):151-177.
    Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the ‘relativism of distance’. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical. I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our (...)
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  • Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map.Laura Valentini - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):654–664.
    This article provides a conceptual map of the debate on ideal and non‐ideal theory. It argues that this debate encompasses a number of different questions, which have not been kept sufficiently separate in the literature. In particular, the article distinguishes between the following three interpretations of the ‘ideal vs. non‐ideal theory’ contrast: (i) full compliance vs. partial compliance theory; (ii) utopian vs. realistic theory; (iii) end‐state vs. transitional theory. The article advances critical reflections on each of these sub‐debates, and highlights (...)
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  • Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Ethics 97 (4):821-833.
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  • Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    An argument against the bias towards the near; how a defence of temporal neutrality is not a defence of S; an appeal to inconsistency; why we should reject S and accept CP.
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  • Unprincipled virtue—synopsis.Nomy Arpaly - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):429-431.
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  • Rational Persuasion as Paternalism.George Tsai - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1):78-112.
    I argue that rationally persuading another to do something for their own good is sometimes (objectionably) paternalistic. Rational persuasion may express, and be guided by, the motive of distrust in the other’s capacity to gather or weigh evidence, and may intrude on the other’s deliberative activities in ways that conflict with respecting their agency and autonomy. I also examine factors that make a difference to whether (and when) the provision of reasons is respectful.
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  • Life and action: elementary structures of practice and practical thought.Michael Thompson - 2008 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Part I: The representation of life -- Can life be given a real definition? -- The representation of the living individual -- The representation of the life-form itself -- Part II: Naive action theory -- Types of practical explanation -- Naive explanation of action -- Action and time -- Part III: Practical generality -- Two tendencies in practical philosophy -- Practices and dispositions as sources of the goodness of individual actions -- Practice and disposition as sources of individual action.
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  • (1 other version)What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
    In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.
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  • Reasons for Action.Pamela Hieronymi - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):407-427.
    Donald Davidson opens ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’ by asking, ‘What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?’ His answer has generated some confusion about reasons for action and made for some difficulty in understanding the place for the agent's own reasons for acting, in the explanation of an action. I offer here a different account of the explanation of action, one that, though (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
    A good number of people currently thinking and writing about reasons identify a reason as a consideration that counts in favor of an action or attitude.1 I will argue that using this as our fundamental account of what a reason is generates a fairly deep and recalcitrant ambiguity; this account fails to distinguish between two quite different sets of considerations that count in favor of certain attitudes, only one of which are the “proper” or “appropriate” kind of reason for them. (...)
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  • Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity in Feminist Epistemology.Elizabeth Anderson - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (2):27-58.
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  • Reason, recognition, and internal critique.Antti Kauppinen - 2002 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):479 – 498.
    Normative political philosophy always refers to a standard against which a society's institutions are judged. In the first, analytical part of the article, the different possible forms of normative criticism are examined according to whether the standards it appeals to are external or internal to the society in question. In the tradition of Socrates and Hegel, it is argued that reconstructing the kind of norms that are implicit in practices enables a critique that does not force the critic's particular views (...)
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  • Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline.BernardHG Williams - 2009 - Princeton University Press.
    What can--and what can't--philosophy do? What are its ethical risks--and its possible rewards? How does it differ from science? In Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Bernard Williams addresses these questions and presents a striking vision of philosophy as fundamentally different from science in its aims and methods even though there is still in philosophy "something that counts as getting it right." Written with his distinctive combination of rigor, imagination, depth, and humanism, the book amply demonstrates why Williams was one of (...)
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  • Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline.Bernard Williams - 2006 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    What can--and what can't--philosophy do? What are its ethical risks--and its possible rewards? How does it differ from science? In Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Bernard Williams addresses these questions and presents a striking vision of philosophy as fundamentally different from science in its aims and methods even though there is still in philosophy "something that counts as getting it right." Written with his distinctive combination of rigor, imagination, depth, and humanism, the book amply demonstrates why Williams was one of (...)
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  • Internalism about reasons: sad but true?Kate Manne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):89-117.
    Internalists about reasons following Bernard Williams claim that an agent’s normative reasons for action are constrained in some interesting way by her desires or motivations. In this paper, I offer a new argument for such a position—although one that resonates, I believe, with certain key elements of Williams’ original view. I initially draw on P.F. Strawson’s famous distinction between the interpersonal and the objective stances that we can take to other people, from the second-person point of view. I suggest that (...)
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  • Habermas and the Project of Immanent Critique.Titus Stahl - 2013 - Constellations 20 (4):533-552.
    According to Jürgen Habermas, his Theory of Communicative Action offers a new account of the normative foundations of critical theory. Habermas’ motivating insight is that neither a transcendental nor a metaphysical solution to the problem of normativity, nor a merely hermeneutic reconstruction of historically given norms, is sufficient to clarify the normative foundations of critical theory. In response to this insight, Habermas develops a novel account of normativity, which locates the normative demands of critical theory within the socially instituted practice (...)
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  • The Idea of a Hegelian ‘Science’ of Society.Frederick Neuhouser - 2011 - In Stephen Houlgate & Michael Baur (eds.), A Companion to Hegel. Malden, MA: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 281–296.
    This chapter contains sections titled: The Aim of Hegel's Science of Society The Method of Hegel's Science of Society Comprehension versus Critique.
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  • Facing diversity: The case of epistemic abstinence.Joseph Raz - 1990 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1):3-46.
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  • Critique of Forms of Life.Rahel Jaeggi - 2018 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
    For many liberals, the question "Do others live rightly?" feels inappropriate. Liberalism seems to demand a follow-up question: "Who am I to judge?" Peaceful coexistence, in this view, is predicated on restraint from morally evaluating our peers. But Rahel Jaeggi sees the situation differently. Criticizing is not only valid but also useful, she argues. Moral judgment is no error; the error lies in how we go about judging. One way to judge is external, based on universal standards derived from ideas (...)
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  • Interpretation and Social Criticism.Michael Walzer - 1987 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (4):360-373.
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  • Is there an emancipatory interest? An attempt to answer critical theory's most fundamental question.Axel Honneth - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):908-920.
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