- Buck-passing accounts of value.Jussi Suikkanen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):768-779.details
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Abandoning the buck passing analysis of final value.Andrew E. Reisner - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.details
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On the Rationalist Solution to Gregory Kavka's Toxin Puzzle.Ken Levy - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):267-289.details
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Is there reason to be theoretically rational?Andrew Reisner - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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What’s voluntary in stance voluntarism?Bruno Malavolta E. Silva - 2021 - Manuscrito 44 (2):52-88.details
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The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.details
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(1 other version)Value and the right kind of reason.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.details
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Reasons for Action.Pamela Hieronymi - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):407-427.details
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Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Practical reason.R. Jay Wallace & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2024 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Value theory.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The reasons of trust.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):213 – 236.details
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Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.details
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Interpersonal Reasoning: A Philosophical Psychology of Testimonial Trust.Berislav Marušić - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy:1-19.details
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Why Reasons Are Explanations.Stephen Finlay - 2024 - Philosophia 52 (4):1001-1014.details
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How Emotions Grasp Value.Antti Kauppinen - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):213-233.details
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Epistemic practices: A unified account of epistemic and zetetic normativity.Will Fleisher - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Judgment's Aimless Heart.Matthew Vermaire - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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(1 other version)Beautiful, Troubling Art: In Defense of Non-Summative Judgment.P. Quinn White - manuscriptdetails
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Aspects of Blame: In which the nature of blame, blameworthiness, standing to blame and proportional blame are discussed.Marta Johansson Werkmäster - 2023 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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Integrity as Incentive-Insensitivity: Moral Incapacity Means One can’t be Bought.Etye Steinberg - 2024 - Topoi 43 (2):503-513.details
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In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.details
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On the Practical Significance of Irrelevant Factors.Seyed Mohammad Yarandi - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):156-171.details
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Instrumentalism, Moral Encroachment, and Epistemic Injustice.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
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Deliberative Control and Eliminativism about Reasons for Emotions.Conner Schultz - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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The Right Kind of Reason for the Wrong Kind of Thing.Laura Tomlinson Makin - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (1-2):106-126.details
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What kind of reason does incoherence provide?Keshav Singh - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-9.details
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The subtleties of fit: reassessing the fit-value biconditionals.Rachel Achs & Oded Na’Aman - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2523-2546.details
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In defense of guilt‐tripping.Rachel Achs - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):792-810.details
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Reasons for Belief in Context.Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
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What is Structural Rationality?Wooram Lee - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):614-636.details
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The balance and weight of reasons.Nicholas Makins - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):592-606.details
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The very idea of rational irrationality.Spencer Paulson - 2024 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 23 (1):3-21.details
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Agent-centered epistemic rationality.James Gillespie - 2023 - Synthese 201 (3):1-22.details
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Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (3).details
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How Final and Non-Final Valuing Differ.Levi Tenen - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (4):683-704.details
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In Defense of Clutter.Brendan Balcerak Jackson, DiDomenico David & Kenji Lota - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
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(1 other version)Must Reasons Be Either Theoretical or Practical? Aesthetic Criticism and Appreciative Reasons.Keren Gorodeisky - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):313-329.details
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Contrastive Intentions.Andrew Peet - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (4):24.details
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Maladjustment.Michaela McSweeney - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (3):843-869.details
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Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment.James Fritz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):573-587.details
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In Defense of Constitutivism About Epistemic Normativity.David Horst - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):232-258.details
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Causal Blame.Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (4):347-58.details
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(1 other version)Constitutivism about Reasons: Autonomy and Understanding.Karl Schafer - 2018 - In Karen Jones & François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. New York: Oxford Univerisity Press.details
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Refitting the mirrors: on structural analogies in epistemology and action theory.Lisa Miracchi & J. Adam Carter - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-28.details
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Why immanent critique?Sanford Diehl - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):676-692.details
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Against normativism about mental attitudes.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):295-311.details
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Explaining Normative Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Noûs 57 (1):51-80.details
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Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
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