- Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
|
|
Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
|
|
Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.details
|
|
Tell me you love me: bootstrapping, externalism, and no-lose epistemology.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):119-134.details
|
|
Bridging Rationality and Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657.details
|
|
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
|
|
A Dilemma for Calibrationism.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):425-455.details
|
|
A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency.Eleonora Cresto - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):923-955.details
|
|
Accuracy, Deference, and Chance.Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):43-87.details
|
|
Mushy Akrasia: Why Mushy Credences Are Rationally Permissible.Rachel Fraser - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):79-106.details
|
|
Self-Intimation, Infallibility, and Higher-Order Evidence.Eyal Tal - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):665-672.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
|
|
Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs.Sherrilyn Roush - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):45-69.details
|
|
Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):767-794.details
|
|
A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
|
|
Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.details
|
|
(1 other version)Why epistemology cannot be operationalized.Timothy Williamson - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I. Normal Modal Propositional Calculi.Saul A. Kripke - 1966 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (1):120-122.details
|
|
Is Ignorance Bliss?Joseph B. Kadane, Mark Schervish & Teddy Seidenfeld - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (1):5-36.details
|
|
Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
|
|
Respecting all the evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.details
|
|
The epistemic role of consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):778-780.details
|
|
Normative Externalism.Brian Weatherson - 2019 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Inexact Knowledge without Improbable Knowing.Jeremy Goodman - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):30-53.details
|
|
(3 other versions)A New Introduction to Modal Logic.M. J. Cresswell & G. E. Hughes - 1996 - New York: Routledge. Edited by M. J. Cresswell.details
|
|
How to resolve doxastic disagreement.Peter Brössel & Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2014 - Synthese 191 (11):2359-2381.details
|
|
(1 other version)Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 161-186.details
|
|
The Fallacy of Calibrationism.Yoaav Isaacs - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):247-260.details
|
|
Externalism and exploitability.Nilanjan Das - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):101-128.details
|
|
(1 other version)Deference, respect and intensionality.Anna Mahtani - 2016 - Philosophical Studies:1-21.details
|
|
(1 other version)On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers.Roger White - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):233-250.details
|
|
(1 other version)Why epistemology cannot be operationalized.Timothy Williamson - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.details
|
|