- Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.details
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Epistemic Trespassing.Nathan Ballantyne - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):367-395.details
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Radical Externalism.Amia Srinivasan - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):395-431.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.details
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Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.details
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Bridging Rationality and Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657.details
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Evidential Preemption.Endre Begby - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):515-530.details
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Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.details
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Should we be dogmatically conciliatory?Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1381-1398.details
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Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence.Miriam Schoenfield - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):690-715.details
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Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: from Accuracy to Akrasia.David Christensen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):397-422.details
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Akratic (epistemic) modesty.David Christensen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2191-2214.details
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(1 other version)Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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A Dilemma for Calibrationism.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):425-455.details
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Six Roles for Inclination.Zach Barnett - 2024 - Mind 133 (532):972-1000.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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Formulating Independence.David Christensen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 13-34.details
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Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Noûs 57 (1):238-260.details
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Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Logical Akrasia.Frederik J. Andersen - forthcoming - Episteme.details
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Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrewsdetails
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Dispossessing Defeat.Javier González de Prado - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):323-340.details
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Imprecise evidence without imprecise credences.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2735-2758.details
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Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler, John Hawthorne & Julianne Chung (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 278-305.details
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Elusive Externalism.Bernhard Salow - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):397-427.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic akrasia: No apology required.David Christensen - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):54-76.details
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Does rationality demand higher-order certainty?Mattias Skipper - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11561-11585.details
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How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.details
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Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
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Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):573-596.details
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Higher‐order evidence and losing one's conviction.Leah Henderson - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):513-529.details
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Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2043-2066.details
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(Almost) all evidence is higher-order evidence.Brian Hedden & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 82 (3):417-425.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required.David Christensen - 2022 - Noûs 1 (online first):1-22.details
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Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.details
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Epistemic Self-Doubt.Sherrilyn Roush - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Embracing Incoherence.Claire Field - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.details
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Embracing Epistemic Dilemmas.David Christensen - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.details
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Conciliationism and merely possible disagreement.Zach Barnett & Han Li - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):1-13.details
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The Weirdness of the World.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2024 - Princeton University Press.details
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Verbal Disagreements and Philosophical Scepticism.Nathan Ballantyne - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):752-765.details
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Misleading higher-order evidence, conflicting ideals, and defeasible logic.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:141--74.details
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(1 other version)1% Skepticism.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):271-290.details
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Self-Intimation, Infallibility, and Higher-Order Evidence.Eyal Tal - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):665-672.details
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The Fallacy of Calibrationism.Yoaav Isaacs - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):247-260.details
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Science as Public Reason and the Controversiality Objection.Klemens Kappel - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (4):619-639.details
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On Acting as Judge in One’s Own (Epistemic) Case.David Christensen - 2018 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 93 (1):207-235.details
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