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  1. How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?Paul Boghossian - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (1-2):1-40.
    Epistemic relativism has the contemporary academy in its grip. Not merely in the United States, but seemingly everywhere, most scholars working in the humanities and the social sciences seem to subscribe to some form of it. Even where the label is repudiated, the view is embraced. Sometimes the relativism in question concerns truth, sometimes justification. The core impulse appears to be a relativism about knowledge. The suspicion is widespread that what counts as knowledge in one cultural, or broadly ideological, setting (...)
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  • Blind reasoning.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):225-248.
    The paper asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts of this phenomenon fail. The nature of this failure is taken to indicate the way forward: basic forms of deductive reasoning must justify by being instances of 'blind but blameless' reasoning. Finally, the paper explores the suggestion that an inferentialist account of the logical constants can help explain how such reasoning is possible.
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  • (1 other version)What The Tortoise Said To Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 104 (416):691-693.
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  • (1 other version)The Last Word.Simon Blackburn & Thomas Nagel - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):653.
    Like all of Nagel's work, this is a book with a message: an apparently clear, simple message, forcefully presented and repeated. The message is that there is a limit to the extent to which we can "get outside" fundamental forms of thought, including logical, mathematical, scientific, and ethical thought. "Getting outside" means taking up a biological or psychological or sociological or economic or political view of ourselves as thinkers. It also inclines many people to talk of the contingency or subjectivity (...)
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  • (1 other version)An outline of an argument for robust metanormative realism.David Enoch - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:21-50.
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  • (3 other versions)Natural Kinds.W. V. O. Quine - 1970 - In Carl G. Hempel, Donald Davidson & Nicholas Rescher (eds.), Essays in honor of Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht,: D. Reidel. pp. 5.
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  • Knowledge of Logic.Paul Boghossian - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Paul Boghossian defends a meaning‐based approach to the apriority of the propositions of logic. His model is based on the idea that the logical constants are implicitly defined by some of the axioms and inference rules in which they are involved, thereby offering an alternative to those theories that deny that grasp of meaning can contribute to the explanation of a thinker's entitlement to a particular type of transition or belief.
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  • The Last Word.Thomas Nagel - 1997 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In this important new book Nagel, one of the most distinguished philosophers writing in English today, presents a sustained defence of reason against the attacks of subjectivism. He offers systematic rebuttals of relativistic claims with respect to language, logic, science, and ethics.
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  • (1 other version)The realm of reason.Christopher Peacocke - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of content. To show how (...)
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  • The Indispensability of Mathematics.Mark Colyvan - 2001 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    This book not only outlines the indispensability argument in considerable detail but also defends it against various challenges.
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  • Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Against the traditional view, Alvin Goldman argues that logic, probability theory, and linguistic analysis cannot by themselves delineate principles of rationality or justified belief. The mind's operations must be taken into account.
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  • The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    1 Knowledge and Justification This book is an investigation of one central problem which arises in the attempt to give a philosophical account of empirical ...
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  • (2 other versions)Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (11):20-40.
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  • Hans Reichenbach's vindication of induction.Wesley C. Salmon - 1991 - Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):99 - 122.
    Reichenbach sought to resolve Hume's problem of the justification of induction by means of a pragmatic vindication that relies heavily on the convergence properties of his rule of induction. His attempt to rule out all other asymptotic methods by an appeal to descriptive simplicity was unavailing. We found that important progress in that direction could be made by invoking normalizing conditions (consistency) and methodological simplicity (as a basis for invariance), but that they did not do the whole job. I am (...)
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  • Highlights of recent epistemology.James Pryor - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):95--124.
    This article surveys work in epistemology since the mid-1980s. It focuses on contextualism about knowledge attributions, modest forms of foundationalism, and the internalism/externalism debate and its connections to the ethics of belief.
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  • Scientific method without metaphysical presuppositions.Herbert Feigl - 1954 - Philosophical Studies 5 (2):17 - 29.
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  • Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.
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  • Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
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  • (1 other version)Foundationalism, epistemic principles, and the cartesian circle.James Van Cleve - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):55-91.
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  • Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens.Joshua Schechter & David Enoch - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):687 - 715.
    In virtue of what are we justified in employing the rule of inference Modus Ponens? One tempting approach to answering this question is to claim that we are justified in employing Modus Ponens purely in virtue of facts concerning meaning or concept-possession. In this paper, we argue that such meaning-based accounts cannot be accepted as the fundamental account of our justification.
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  • Entitlement: Epistemic rights without epistemic duties?Fred Dretske - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.
    The debate between externalists and internalists in epistemology can be viewed as a disagreement about whether there are epistemic rights without corresponding duties or obligations. Taking an epistemic right to believe P as an authorization to not only accept P as true but to use P as a positive reason for accepting other propositions, the debate is about whether there are unjustified justifiers. It is about whether there are propositions that provide for others what nothing need provide for them—viz., reasons (...)
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  • Content preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
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  • Does belief have an aim?David John Owens - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.
    The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs.
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  • Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
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  • Objectivity refigured: Pragmatism without verificationism.Mark Johnston - 1993 - In John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 85--130.
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  • (3 other versions)Natural kinds.Willard V. Quine - 1969 - In Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 114-38.
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  • On Basic Logical Knowledge: Reflections on Paul Boghossian’s “How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?‘.Crispin Wright - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (1-2):41 - 85.
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  • (1 other version)What the tortoise said to Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 4 (14):278-280.
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  • Epistemic circularity.William P. Alston - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1):1-30.
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  • (1 other version)The Last Word.Thomas Nagel - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):529-536.
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  • (1 other version)The theory of probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley,: University of California Press.
    We must restrict to mere probability not only statements of comparatively great uncertainty, like predictions about the weather, where we would cautiously ...
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  • An argument for robust metanormative realism.David Enoch - 2003 - Dissertation, New York University
    In this essay, I defend a view I call “Robust Realism” about normativity. According to this view, there are irreducibly, perfectly objective, normative truths, that when successful in our normative inquiries we discover rather than create or construct. My argument in support of Robust Realism is modeled after arguments from explanatory indispensability common in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mathematics. I argue that irreducibly normative truths, though not explanatorily indispensable, are nevertheless deliberatively indispensable, and that this kind (...)
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  • Reid and epistemic naturalism.Patrick Rysiew - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):437–456.
    Central to the contemporary dispute over 'naturalizing epistemology' is the question of the continuity of epistemology with science, i.e., how far purely descriptive, psychological matters can or should inform the traditional evaluative epistemological enterprise. Thus all parties tend to agree that the distinction between psychology and epistemology corresponds to a firm fact/value distinction. This is something Reid denies with respect to the first principles of common sense: while insisting on the continuity of epistemology with the rest of science, he does (...)
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  • Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge. [REVIEW]E. N. & Hans Reichenbach - 1938 - Journal of Philosophy 35 (10):270.
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  • A priority as an evaluative notion.Hartry Field - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
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  • (1 other version)Goldman's psychologism: Review of Epistemology and Cognition[REVIEW]Paul Thagard - 1986 - Erkenntnis 34 (1):117-123.
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  • On the justification of induction.Hans Reichenbach - 1940 - Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):97-103.
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  • Experience and Prediction.William R. Dennes - 1939 - Philosophical Review 48 (5):536-538.
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  • Epistemic value.William G. Lycan - 1985 - Synthese 64 (2):137 - 164.
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  • (1 other version)The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Paul K. Moser - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4):670-673.
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  • (1 other version)Cognitive science and naturalized epistemology: A review of Alvin I. Goldman's Epistemology and Cognition[REVIEW]Gerald W. Glaser - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):161-164.
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  • (1 other version)Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition[REVIEW]Darryl Bruce - 1989 - Synthese 79 (1):165-169.
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