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The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):55.details
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Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge.Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):393-418.details
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Moral Cognitivism and Motivation.Sigrun Svavarsdóttir - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.details
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Moral cognitivism and motivation.Sigrún Svavarsdóttir - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.details
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Dogmatism, junk knowledge, and conditionals.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):433-454.details
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The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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In defense of "the moral problem": A reply to Brink, Copp, and Sayre-McCord.Michael Smith - 1997 - Ethics 108 (1):84-119.details
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Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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A Dilemma for De Dicto Halakhic Motivation: Why Mitzvot Don’t Require Intention.Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - 2022 - Journal of Analytic Theology 10:76-97.details
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Reinventing Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Michael Ridge - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (4).details
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Ethics.P. H. Nowell-Smith - 1955 - Philosophical Quarterly 5 (19):179-180.details
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Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.John Leslie Mackie - 1977 - New York: Penguin Books.details
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Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.details
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Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan.details
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There’s Nothing Quasi About Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.Matthew H. Kramer - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (2):185-212.details
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Praiseworthy Motivations.Zoë A. Johnson King - 2019 - Noûs 54 (2):408-430.details
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If Nothing Matters.Guy Kahane - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):327-353.details
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Immoral realism.Max Khan Hayward - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):897-914.details
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Representing ethical reality: a guide for worldly non-naturalists.William J. FitzPatrick - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):548-568.details
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A Moral Argument Against Moral Realism.Melis Erdur - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):591-602.details
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Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable.David Enoch - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1689-1699.details
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How Principles Ground.David Enoch - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:1-22.details
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XV—Normative Non-Naturalism and the Problem of Authority.Shamik Dasgupta - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):297-319.details
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Realism and the Absence of Value.Shamik Dasgupta - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (3):279-322.details
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Mind Independence versus Mind Nongroundedness: Two Kinds of Objectivism.Shlomit Wygoda Cohen - 2021 - Ethics 132 (1):180-203.details
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Why Care About Non-Natural Reasons?Richard Yetter Chappell - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):125-134.details
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Melis Erdur’s Moral Argument Against Moral Realism.Joshua Blanchard - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (2):371-377.details
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A dilemma for non-naturalists: irrationality or immorality?Matthew S. Bedke - 1027–1042 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1027-1042.details
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One Thought Too Few: Where De Dicto Moral Motivation is Necessary.Ron Aboodi - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):223-237.details
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Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Calling for Explanation.Dan Baras - 2022 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgments.Bart Streumer - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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On What Matters: Volume Three.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.details
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Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.Matthew H. Kramer - 2009 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Another World.James Dreier - 2015 - In Robert Johnson & Michael Smith (eds.), Passions and Projections Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn. Oxford University Press. pp. 155-171.details
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Can reasons fundamentalism answer the normative question?James Dreier - 2015 - In Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.), Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press.details
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A Menagerie of Duties? Normative Judgments Are Not Beliefs about Non-Natural Properties.Matthew Bedke - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):189-201.details
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Ethics.P. H. Nowell-Smith - 1955 - Ethics 65 (2):141-143.details
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