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Belief Reports and the Property Theory of Content

In Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.), Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications. pp. 105-31 (2013)

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  1. Direct Reference: From Language to Thought.François Récanati - 1993 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
    This volume puts forward a distinct new theory of direct reference, blending insights from both the Fregean and the Russellian traditions, and fitting the general theory of language understanding used by those working on the pragmatics of natural language.
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  • Frege’s Puzzle (2nd edition).Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.
    This is the 1991 (2nd) edition of the 1986 book (MIT Press), considered to be the classic defense of Millianism. The nature of the information content of declarative sentences is a central topic in the philosophy of language. The natural view that a sentence like "John loves Mary" contains information in which two individuals occur as constituents is termed the naive theory, and is one that has been abandoned by most contemporary scholars. This theory was refuted originally by philosopher Gottlob (...)
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  • Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
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  • The semantics of singular terms.Brian Loar - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (6):353 - 377.
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  • Self-ascription and belief de re.Neil Feit - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (1):35-49.
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  • Belief ascription.Stephen Schiffer - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (10):499-521.
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  • Illogical Belief.Nathan Salmon - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:243-285.
    A sequel to the author’s book /Frege’s Puzzle/ (1986).
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  • Direct reference and ascriptions of belief.Mark Richard - 1983 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (4):425--52.
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  • Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
    I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat. If I heard such a patter in another house, I might expect a cat but no particular cat. What I expect then seems to be a Meinongian incomplete cat. I expect winter, expect stormy weather, expect to shovel snow, expect fatigue---a season, a phenomenon, an activity, a state. I expect that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. (...)
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  • Empty names.David Braun - 1993 - Noûs 27 (4):449-469.
    This paper presents a theory of empty names that is consistent with direct-reference theory and Millianism.
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  • (1 other version)A puzzle about belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.
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  • The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
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  • The doctrine of propositions, internalism, and global supervenience.Neil Feit - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):447-457.
    I present two short arguments concerning the views named in the title. First, I argue that the Doctrine of Propositions, according to which the contents of our psychological attitudes are always propositions, is incompatible with Internalism, understood as a doctrine endorsing the intrinsic character of mental content. Second, I try to show that the Doctrine of Propositions is also incompatible with the claim that psychological properties supervene globally on physical properties (i.e., that there can be no mental difference without some (...)
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  • Understanding belief reports.David Braun - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
    In this paper, I defend a well-known theory of belief reports from an important objection. The theory is Russellianism, sometimes also called `neo-Russellianism', `Millianism', `the direct reference theory', `the "Fido"-Fido theory', or `the naive theory'. The objection concernssubstitution of co-referring names in belief sentences. Russellianism implies that any two belief sentences, that differ only in containing distinct co-referring names, express the same proposition (in any given context). Since `Hesperus' and `Phosphorus' both refer to the planet Venus, this view implies that (...)
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  • Do belief reports report beliefs?Kent Bach - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.
    The traditional puzzles about belief reports puzzles rest on a certain seemingly innocuous assumption, that 'that'-clauses specify belief contents. The main theories of belief reports also rest on this "Specification Assumption", that for a belief report of the form 'A believes that p' to be true,' the proposition that p must be among the things A believes. I use Kripke's Paderewski case to call the Specification Assumption into question. Giving up that assumption offers prospects for an intuitively more plausible approach (...)
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  • (4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
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  • On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
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  • Frege's Puzzle. [REVIEW]Jan Wolenski - 1988 - Studia Logica 47 (4):439-440.
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  • The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs.Mark Crimmins & John Perry - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (12):685.
    Beliefs are concrete particulars containing ideas of properties and notions of things, which also are concrete. The claim made in a belief report is that the agent has a belief (i) whose content is a specific singular proposition, and (ii) which involves certain of the agent's notions and ideas in a certain way. No words in the report stand for the notions and ideas, so they are unarticulated constituents of the report's content (like the relevant place in "it's raining"). The (...)
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  • The adicity of 'believes' and the hidden indexical theory.P. Ludlow - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):97-101.
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  • Beyond Singular Propositions?Scott Soames - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):515 - 549.
    Propositional attitudes, like believing and asserting, are relations between agents and propositions. Agents are individuals who do the believing and asserting; propositions are things that are believed and asserted. Propositional attitude ascriptions are sentences that ascribe propositional attitudes to agents. For example, a propositional attitude ascription α believes, or asserts, that S is true iff the referent of a bears the relation of believing, or asserting, to the proposition expressed by s. The questions I will address have to do with (...)
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  • (1 other version)Naming and knowing.Stephen Schiffer - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):28-41.
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  • Talk about Beliefs.Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Studia Logica 54 (3):420-421.
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  • Naming and Nonexistence.Neil Feit - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):239-262.
    I defend a cluster of views about names from fiction and myth. The views are based on two claims: first, proper names refer directly totheir bearers; and second, names from fiction and myth are genuinely empty, they simply do not refer. I argue that when such names are used in direct discourse, utterances containing them have truth values but do not express propositions. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that if an utterance of, for example, “Vulcan (...)
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  • The pragmatics of substitutivity.Jonathan Berg - 1988 - Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (3):355 - 370.
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  • Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them.Mark Richard - 1990 - Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defence of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is 'psychologically real'. The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important issues (...)
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  • The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1981 - University of Minnesota Press.
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  • Direct Reference.Francois Recanati - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):953-956.
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  • Anaphora and attitudes de se.Gennaro Chierchia - 1989 - In Renate Bartsch, Johan van Benthem & P. van Emde Boas (eds.), Semantics and contextual expression. Providence RI, U.S.A.: Foris Publications. pp. 11--1.
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  • Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs.Neil Feit - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29-55.
    The author presents and defends a general view about belief, and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke's puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke's original (...)
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  • De re senses.John Mcdowell - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):283-294.
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  • Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap?Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):93-118.
    Attitude reports are reports about people’s states of mind. They are reports about what people think, believe, know, know a priori, imagine, hate, wish, fear, and the like. So, for example, I might report that s knows p, or that she imagines p, or that she hates p, where p specifies the content to which s is purportedly related. One lively current debate centers around the question of what sort of specification is involved when such attitude reports are successful. Some (...)
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  • Secondary Qualities and Self-Location.Andy Egan - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):97-119.
    There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer-independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less-than-fully-real, subjective, observer-dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically interesting because it is (a) often quite attractive to draw such a distinction, and (b) incredibly hard to spell it out in (...)
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  • Thought without Representation.John Perry & Simon Blackburn - 1986 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1):137-166.
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  • Selfless Desires and the Property Theory of Content.Neil Feit - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):489-503.
    The property theory of content takes the content of each cognitive attitude (each belief, desire, and so on) to be a property to which the subject of the attitude is related in the appropriate psychological way. This view is motivated by standard cases of de se belief and other attitudes. In this paper, I consider a couple of related objections to the property theory of content. Both objections have to do with the possible non-existence of the subject. More specifically, the (...)
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  • Referentialism and empty names.Anthony Everett - 2000 - In T. Hofweber & A. Everett (eds.), Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence. CSLI Publications. pp. 37--60.
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  • Demonstrative thought and psychological explanation.Christopher Peacocke - 1981 - Synthese 49 (2):187-217.
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  • (1 other version)Direct reference, propositional attitudes, and semantic content.Scott Soames - 2009 - In Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language. Princeton University Press. pp. 33-71.
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  • Discourse, beliefs, and intentions: semantic defaults and propositional attitude ascription.Katarzyna Jaszczolt - 1999 - New York: Elsevier.
    This book is about beliefs, language, communication and cognition. It deals with the fundamental issue of the interpretation of the speaker's utterance expressing a belief and reporting on beliefs of other people in the form of oratio obliqua. The main aim of the book is to present a new account of the problem of interpreting utterances expressing beliefs and belief reports in terms of an approach called Default Semantics.
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  • The default-based context-dependence of belief reports.Katarzyna M. Jaszczolt - 2000 - In Katarzyna Jaszczolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. Elsevier. pp. 169--185.
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  • On proper names in belief ascriptions.Thomas McKay - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 39 (3):287-303.
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  • Logical form and the hidden-indexical theory: A reply to Schiffer.Peter Ludlow - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):102-107.
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  • Indexicals and intensionality: A Fregean perspective.Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (1):3-31.
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  • (1 other version)Naming and knowing.Stephen Schiffer - 1979 - In A. French Peter, E. Uehling Theodore, Howard Jr & K. Wettstein (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 28-41.
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